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Abstract
The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) remains one of the most obscure and elusive government
agencies. Despite its rich and often tangled past, the SIS withstood various challenges in the twentieth
century to become a vital instrument in Britain’s foreign policy, offering both traditional intelligence
gathering, and a covert action capability. Despite recent revelations about its Cold War history,
knowledge about this organisation is uneven at best, and this is particularly so in Asia. Despite
Britain’s imperial history, which anchored informal intelligence gathering networks on a global scale,
SIS’s presence in Asia is largely undiscovered. This thesis asks why this lacuna exists in SIS’s
history; what was SIS activity in this region during the Cold War? Moreover, what was the value of
this activity?
Utilising a primarily archival methodology, this thesis sheds light on British intelligence activity in
Hong Kong, Beijing, and Hanoi in the late 1960s. The strategic aims are twofold. Firstly, it explores
the kinds of intelligence gathered, and the difficulties encountered from operating within the heart of a
secure communist state in order to gauge an ‘enemy society’. In doing so, it challenges conventional
definitions of intelligence, pointing to the notion of a dual identity diplomat-intelligence officer, that
provided alternative means of acquiring intelligence within denied areas. In this way, it opens a
window into a new dimension of SIS history, and, by extension, GCHQ, both of whom operated from
the grey space between diplomacy and intelligence. Secondly, it examines this intelligence through
the broader framework of the Anglo-American Special Relationship, given that these three case study
countries were areas where the SIS operated, but where the CIA encountered real hindrances due to a
lack of diplomatic premises. By tracing the path of British intelligence material, and analysing its
reception by its American audience, it ultimately assesses the value of such intelligence. It argues that
the granular detail afforded, and the insight on broader strategic relationships it provided, inverted the
Special Relationship, rendering Britain a valued partner when it came to intelligence collection in this
region and off-setting imbalances elsewhere.
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Introduction
BRITAIN’S Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) is one of the most elusive – yet complex – aspects of
British Cold War history. Regarded as one of the more controversial components of British reach
abroad, the SIS withstood numerous internal and external security challenges in the post-war period to
become a vital instrument in Britain’s foreign policy, offering a mixture of sensitive reporting and
covert action. For almost half a century the Cold War constituted ‘the organising factor’ shaping
Britain’s geo-political choices during a tumultuous period of decolonisation,2 in which, in addition to
economic decline, Britain lost important strategic territories, and waged violent counterinsurgency
campaigns against anti-colonial nationalist movements. Amidst the chaos of decolonisation,
intelligence remained central to Britain’s post-colonial statecraft as it sought to transform an empire
into a New Commonwealth, which might be defined as a new informal empire that sought to leverage
cultural and epistemological influence. The nexus of Cold War and the colonies war is therefore
where SIS intelligence gathering against adversaries often proved important. SIS was central to what
some have called the “fancy footwork” of imperial decline, extending the mirage of British power
beyond its material limits at a time of severe economic crisis. This centrality to the projection of
power, or perhaps the residue of power, is noteworthy, given the testing political and institutional
circumstances under which SIS had to operate, and merits greater scholarly attention.3
2 Matthew Grant, ‘Introduction’, in Matthew Grant (ed.), The British Way in Cold Warfare:
Intelligence, Diplomacy and the Bomb, 1945-1975, (London, 2009), p. 5.
3 B.R. Tomlinson, ‘The Contraction of England: National Decline and the Loss of Empire,’ The
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 11:1 (1982): pp. 58-72.
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Empire and intelligence connected in myriad ways. SIS’s capability during the Cold War –
always limited by constrained budgets – was, in large part, buttressed by the large network of bases
and outposts abroad it had cultivated over centuries of empire. This tradition stretched much further
back than the imperial era however, raising an important question – who were Britain’s spies in the
years preceding and during Empire? How did they operate, and what was the significance of these
sorts of arrangements? For the most part, Britain’s imperial mission determined the relatively informal
nature of its intelligence gathering network. Anchored by the necessity to gather knowledge upon
competitors and adversaries alike, as well as the need to penetrate the societies in which it built a
presence, the underlying assumption was that knowledge equated to power for the British. This was
embodied in the East India Company, which laid the foundations for Britain’s initial intelligence
network at the dawn of empire. Devoid of a thorough understanding of local customs, culture, and
beliefs, the British initially relied upon local informants to penetrate what was then largely oral
cultures of information-keeping.4 Reiterated in Richard Popplewell’s study of intelligence and
imperial defence of the Indian Empire, Britain was able to defeat violent nationalist movements ‘only
by developing a complex intelligence network on a global scale’ and pre-empting proto-rebellion
rather than fighting exhausting wars of counter-insurgency.5
Spanning multiple continents, the magnitude of Britain’s network was underpinned by the
wide spectrum of actors that together formed its nodes. Extensive studies on the various components
of British Empire reveal the bewildering mixture of officials, enterprising amateurs, informal agents,
archaeologists and delightfully more unconventional figures that were in effect, sources of
information, and in many cases, intelligence assets. Devoid of their own subject matter and cultural
experts, local informants often embedded themselves amongst British officials, creating a complex
information dependency on the part of the British.6 Whilst Indian Army officers were key in gathering
4 Christopher Allen Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social
Communication in Indian, 1780-1870, (Cambridge, 1996).
5 Richard Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the Defence of the
Indian Empire, 1904-1924, (London, 1995), pp. 5-6. See also Richard Popplewell, ‘’Lacking
Intelligence’: Some Reflections on Recent Approaches to British Counter‑Insurgency, 1900–1960,’
Intelligence and National Security, 10:2 (1995): pp. 336-352.
6 Bayly, Empire and Information.
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‘intelligence of every kind’, amateur agents – often ‘travellers of independent means – also took part
in what has been referred to as ‘this tournament of shadows’.7 The other part of the solution to the
British gap in knowledge was found in the deployment of Indian hillmen ‘of exception intelligence
and resource, specially trained in clandestine surveying techniques’. Disguised as Muslim holy men or
Buddhist pilgrims, they were able to explore and map ‘thousands of square miles of previously
unexplored terrain with remarkable accuracy’.8 Similarly, Edwardian agents formed the basis of
Britain’s informal network of spies in Arabia, imitating local nomads as a technique for illicit
intelligence gathering, before utilising this for conducting aerial surveillance and desert warfare over
Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.9 Lastly, in Chinese Turkestan, where the ‘collision’ of three
empires – Britain, the Soviet Union, and China – drew scientists and academics into the intelligence
collection network. Gathering information on the other’s influence and activities in Xinjiang, the line
between science and espionage ‘was thin and blurred’, demonstrating another element to Britain’s
informal intelligence tradition.10
Asia was also a fascinating sphere for historical intelligence efforts conducted by regional
actors with their own distinguished espionage traditions. This too points to the lack of formal
boundaries that characterise present-day professionalised intelligence services. In early twentieth
century China, for example, the substantial internal security apparatus established upon Dai Li and the
Kuomintang was in fact a ‘bewildering array’ of organisations including societies, unions, clubs, and
other civil bodies, leading to what Fred Wakeman has described as the presence of ‘tens of thousands
of spies’ in China by the end of the Second World War.11 Pointing to the important role of
globalisation in linking the movement of refugees across Europe and China to information collection
and espionage, Miller points to the processes of war and revolution in China, Spain, Italy, and
7 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: On Secret Service in High Asia, (New York, 1994), p. 5.
8 Ibid; Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence, p. 19.
9 Priya Satia, Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain’s Covert
Empire in the Middle East, (New York, 2008).
10 Michael B. Share, ‘The Great Game Revisited: Three Empires Collide in Chinese Turkestan
(Xinjiang), Europe-Asia Studies, 67:7 (2015), pp. 1116-1118.
11 Frederic Wakeman, Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service, (Berkeley, 2003).
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Bolshevik Russia as developing a spy presence during the interwar period.12 Such networks were not
territorially confined either; Elphick notes that a plethora of actors informed Japanese ‘ground’
intelligence, including disguised Japanese officers who exploited the naval option, exploiting fishing
fleets over the southern seas to spy upon naval and merchant ships belonging to other Pacific
powers.13
Grounded in multiple empires, informal intelligence gathering therefore had deep foundations
across the globe by 1900. However, Britain’s imperial network took on a particular significant in
Asia, where its attention gradually turned not only towards countering the threat posed by the Soviet
Union and Communist China, but also to managing their rivalry in an increasingly incendiary region.
Accordingly, intelligence requirements from Asia took on a greater sense of urgency, anchoring SIS’s
regional role there in intelligence collection. It is here that the notion of a ‘residual empire’14 – bases
and territories that once formally belonged to Britain – took on a greater importance into the Cold
War. The Cold War was hotter in Asia than anywhere else, with the use of nuclear weapons being
contemplated during the Korean War, the Taiwan Straits crisis and the Vietnam War. Britain also
fought its largest conflict of the Cold War period in that region, an undeclared war against Indonesia.
The SIS intelligence contribution was valued by London and also by their allies in Washington and
Canberra.15 Yet, remarkably, despite SIS’s extensive involvement in the Asian sphere, its absence
from the historical record is especially noteworthy, particularly given Britain’s tradition of
intelligence gathering in the region.
This is particularly noticeable if one considers the nature of intelligence gathering itself.
Amongst contemporary scholarship, intelligence is characterised across different categories;
conventional understandings of intelligence tend to treat secrecy, rather than knowledge as the
principal organising category for intelligence history. However, when conceptualised as a form of
12 Michael Miller, Shanghai on the Metro: Spies, Intrigue, and the French between the Wars,
(Stanford, 1994).
13 Peter Elphick, Far Eastern File: Intelligence War in the Far East, 1930-45, (London, 1997).
14 R.J. Aldrich, ‘”The Value of Residual Empire”: Anglo-American Intelligence Co-Operation in Asia
after 1945’, R.J. Aldrich |and M. Hopkins, Intelligence, Defence and Diplomacy: British Policy in the
Post-War World (London: 1994): 226-58.
15 Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, Oyster: the Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service
(Melbourne: Heinemann, 1989).
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knowledge that informs policy or operations, a broader perspective becomes clear: intelligence
activities can be conducted by organisations other than the secret intelligence services.16 The blurring
of boundaries between intelligence and diplomacy is one of the most transparent areas in which this
crossover becomes visible. This overlap is historically rooted too; in addition to the aforementioned
history of imperial Britain’s informal intelligence network, the use of secret services to conduct
diplomacy was ‘characteristic of pre-modern inter-state relations’ across the world.17
This blurring of boundaries is by no means confined to intelligence and diplomacy either; the
Cold War saw numerous convergences of diplomacy, intelligence, liaison, covert action, and
propaganda across various agencies. The role of the British SIS in the Northern Ireland peace process,
the role of the Israeli Mossad in Middle Eastern diplomacy efforts, and the CIA’s relationship with the
Palestine Liberation Organisations are all examples of secret intelligence services’ hands in peace
processes usually reserved for diplomatic personnel.18 Taking into account its imperial forebears,
SIS’s intelligence gathering abroad neatly captured the intersection of intelligence with many different
spheres of activity. A significant amount of this took place under the auspice of diplomatic and
consular outposts, in which SIS officers also took on the roles of diplomatic personnel or passport
control officers. This raises important questions as to the nature of intelligence gathering itself, above
all, in light of Britain’s remnants of empire. Moreover, it problematises the actors, process, and
substance of SIS’s gathering, and crucially, suggests further examination is needed at the nexus of
intelligence and diplomacy.
Furthermore, if SIS held an active role in underpinning Britain’s foreign policy during the
Cold War, then its significance was determined in part by the broader strategic partnerships that it
influenced. Whilst the Sino-Soviet spilt was a key rivalry that dominated regional geopolitics during
this period, so too was the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’. Britain’s global decline had
16 Len Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence, Covert Action, and Clandestine Diplomacy’, Intelligence and
National Security, 19:2 (2004), p. 162; Andrew Mumford, ‘Covert Peacemaking: Clandestine
Negotiations and Backchannels with the Provisional IRA during the Early ‘Troubles, 1972–76.’ The
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39:4 (2011): pp. 633-648.
17 Ibid, p. 169. See also Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge, 1996), p. 119.
18 Ibid, p.170.
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rendered it a ‘less valuable ally and intelligence partner’,19 and thus, an arguably exaggerated ‘special
relationship’ with the US lent a false credence to Britain’s continued role in the world, still aspiring to
a place on the UN Security Council and a capability for global military intervention. The inverse also
applied; Herman argues that the partnership with the US had ‘undoubtedly been conditioned by the
high priority given to maintain the secret intelligence link with Washington’.20 London therefore
sought to ‘give force to a new myth’ – it sought to construct a relationship with the US that preserved
the illusion of post-imperial power.21 This wider political context was ultimately what grounded the
SIS’s pursuit of both strategic and tactical intelligence from its constellation of diplomatic outposts
across Asia.
With this context in mind, this thesis’s central research questions are as follows:
• What kinds of intelligence were the British able to gather in Asia during the Cold War, and
how was this achieved?
• What was the significance of this intelligence?
• How did it relate to the ‘Special Relationship’ between the UK and the US?
• How does this change our understanding of what intelligence is?
The question remains, however: why is this period of SIS’s history in Asia, which after all concerned
at its core less than a hundred personnel, significant and worth studying?
As Moran observes, one of the key challenges intelligence historians face in today’s field is to resist
the urge to study the British intelligence community in geographic isolation.22 Without traction in a
broader, comparative framework, much of the literature becomes ‘parochial and Panglossian’; that is,
19 Jeffreys-Jones, In Spies We Trust: the story of western intelligence, (Oxford, 2013), p. 128.
20 Herman, Intelligence Power, p. 124.
21 Jeffreys-Jones, In Spies We Trust, p. 129.
22 Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity’, p. 50.
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accepting of the unique and incomparable make-up of British institutions, and reluctant to analyse
thematic issues in a broader transnational context’.23 Furthermore, the pursuit of intelligence history is
made increasingly difficult by the reliance upon ‘fragments, not files’ of historical material as sources.
As Herman notes – and particularly in the context of the Cold War – rumour and myth become ‘so
intertwined with fact’ in a sphere as enigmatic as intelligence, that to a certain extent, ‘just beyond the
reach of living memory, truth and fiction can no longer be separated’.24
Although intelligence history has gone from strength to strength since the publication of the
Mission Dimension manifesto by Andrew and Dilks in July 1984, much of it is overly descriptive and
often takes the form of ‘regimental history’. Precisely because intelligence services exist to provide a
service to military or diplomatic activities, they are hard to contextualise and the uses to which their
information was put is often not recorded in detail. Few prime ministers record in their diary that they
read a Joint Intelligence Committee paper at ten o’clock in the morning and an hour later took action
as a result. Intelligence rarely works like this and often contributes to a climate of opinion, or a
perspective. These incremental contributions to policy-making are especially hard to detect in the
written record or even through interview. As a result, so much intelligence history is focused on
individuals or institutions. This thesis seeks to escape that problem, insofar as the limited records
allow.25
The obstacles to writing an history of SIS in Asia in its major diplomatic outposts are
therefore substantial, and demand an effective approach that gives meaning to its past. However, as
Walsh notes, analysis Cold War intelligence ‘offers valuable methodological rewards’; unlocking one
chapter of intelligence history can also uncover pieces of institutional history, assessments behind
policymaking decisions, international relations, and assessments of internal security and political
situations in other Cold War countries.26 Relating SIS’s history in Asia to the Anglo-American Special
Relationship therefore offers a means of overcoming these challenges and providing a clear
23 Ibid.
24 Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, p. 22.
25 Nevertheless, organisational approaches have their place - for an excellent example deploying
sociological method see P. H. J. Davies, The MI6 and the Machinery of Spying, (London, 2004).
26 James Igoe Walsh, The international Politics of Intelligence Sharing, (New York, 2012), p. 30.
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operational and policy context. In this respect, this thesis’s contribution to knowledge can be regarded
on three levels; firstly, it interrogates the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy, questioning
the sharp distinction that has often been drawn by Cold War historians. Secondly, it analyses the
nature and texture of SIS in Asia, through and examination its intelligence activities in Hong Kong,
Beijing, and Hanoi. Thirdly, it offers to reconstruct an element of one of Britain’s key strategic
partnerships – the Special Relationship with the Americans – in which SIS held a degree of indirect
influence, as these three cities were locations in which the Americans experienced significant
intelligence shortcomings because of the absence of US representation in North Vietnam or China. In
all three locations, the Americans were dependant on their British allies. Accordingly, these cities, all
centres of Cold War espionage, provide fascinating case studies.
* * *
The following section outlines the structure of the thesis, in accordance with the central research
questions and methodology – outlined in the following chapter. Before delving into the content of the
three case studies, the thesis presents an historical chapter on the ‘residue of Empire’ in Asia. It offers
a regional overview of British engagement in Asia from both a foreign policy perspective, and an
intelligence standpoint, beginning from the Second World War, and stretching into the mid-Cold War
in the 1960s. Detailing the involvement of MI5, SIS, and GCHQ across the region (particularly the
latter two, in terms of human intelligence and signals intelligence against foreign targets), it recounts
British intelligence gathering activity, occasionally contrasting it against American activity where
possible. Whilst it admittedly cannot provide an overview of every country in Asia, it paints a picture
of complex Cold War tensions in China, Burma, India, Hong Kong, and Taiwan as they related to the
‘Special Relationship’ between Britain and the United States. Its purpose is to contextualise British
intelligence objectives and activity in the case study chapters; it grounds the argument that Britain’s
‘residual empire’ afforded it a gravitas in the region that the Americans were often unable to access. It
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also casts up the paradox of two countries that co-operated closely on intelligence in Cold War Asia
despite overarching strategies that were notably divergent.
Following the historical context chapter, the thesis presents a literature review of existing
scholarship on intelligence. It engages with several different areas of academic debate or scholarship
for two key purposes: firstly, these discussions will provide a broader framework in which to situate
the thesis’s main arguments and findings. Secondly, identifying problems and omissions in the
existing literature will allow the thesis to locate its main contribution to knowledge. The chapter
commences by outlining the definitional debate over what constitutes ‘intelligence’. It compares and
contrasts different perspectives on what intelligence is, by both scholars and practitioners, in order to
align itself with a particular definition of intelligence as something akin to a ‘spectrum’. It then
identifies the main schools of thought on the ‘Special Relationship’; it compares traditionalist and
revisionist interpretations in terms of how they differ on the power dynamics between Britain and the
United States, lending particularly attention to the notion of ‘diplomatic divergence’. Finally, the
chapter provides an overview of existing literature on the Special Intelligence Relationship in Asia.
Whilst it draws attention to the key pieces of work already existing on British and American
intelligence, it also highlights the gaps in our knowledge of the British Secret Intelligence Service in
Asia. The latter is of particular importance in locating the thesis’s contribution to knowledge on
British intelligence history.
The next three chapters constitute case studies of British intelligence gathering efforts in Asia.
As discussed above, these chapters explore intelligence gathering activities in Hong Kong, Beijing,
and Hanoi – three locations in which the Americans were notably dependent on British facilities or
territories. Importantly, they seek to weave together the various strands of argument presented in the
introduction. Most notably, they lend depth to the notion that British intelligence gathering in these
three locations was able to offset the asymmetry of Britain’s more junior position in ‘Special
Intelligence Relationship’ with the United States.
The first case study examines Britain’s ‘watchtower’ from Hong Kong, making a connection
between Britain’s Cold War intelligence gathering networks across Asia and its imperial legacy from
previous centuries, consisting as often as not of treaty ports, concessions and unequal trading
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relationships rather than formal colonies. The chapter pays special attention to the history of Anglo-
American tensions in Hong Kong during the Cold War, which were often economic, and utilises this
as the backdrop for broader intelligence gathering efforts, particularly the rift caused by CIA covert
action in the colony. Outlining the shortcomings of US intelligence there, it goes on to outline
Britain’s various intelligence functions, illustrating the ways in which British intelligence at times
held greater reliability, owing to its imperial past and historic connections with the mainland. It
discusses both signals intelligence and human intelligence, including the GCHQ station at Little Sai
Wan, as well both overt and covert intelligence that British intelligence personnel were able to collate
- though not without consideration of the constraints they experienced at the same time. Lastly,
examining the core thematic areas of intelligence focus - most notably Sino-Soviet tensions, above all
as they related to nuclear developments - it briefly delves into American use of this intelligence to
inform their own, high-level assessments. The chapter also provides background for the following two
case studies, in terms of the nature of the intelligence gathered, the laborious security conditions, and
the manner in which the resulting intelligence on the Chinese mainland was consumed by an eager
American audience.
The second case study moves on to explore the presence of SIS officers in a diplomatic post
under much more serious and hostile circumstances. It examines the British outpost in Beijing at the
height of the Cultural Revolution, centring itself around the tumultuous events of 1967, in which the
British Embassy there was ransacked, and its staff attacked. Outlining the repercussions of the violent,
rapid change that Beijing found itself subject to, it utilises this episode to reveal broader political and
intelligence tensions at play, between Britain, the United States, and China, offering a different
perspective on the Special Intelligence Relationship. Gripped by a ‘spy phobia’ that rendered the
capital outwardly hostile towards foreigners, Beijing was a peculiar environment in which the British
sought to gather intelligence, yet were hindered by strict information security. Matters were made
worse by the loss of core equipment during the embassy ransacking, and a paucity of contact with the
local population. Nonetheless, the chapter argues that despite the formidable security environment -
one in which the Americans lacked any presence due to non-recognition of the PRC - British
intelligence was able to satiate the American appetite for the most basic of details on life in Beijing, as
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well as higher level military intelligence - another dimension to the ‘residual empire’ argument in
Asia. With particular attention to Chinese internal security and US intelligence consumption, the
chapter’s ultimate suggestion is that what was considered ‘intelligence’ was determined by its
audience and consumer. In a strict security environment, even seemingly mundane reporting was
considered valuable, reinforcing the notion of intelligence as a ‘spectrum’ rather than a distinct and
separate category.
The final case study examines the British Consulate-General in Hanoi, analysing the presence
of six intelligence officers stationed there. Echoing the challenging security conditions – and
restrictions - that the British Embassy staff in Beijing was subject to, the chapter focuses itself upon
1967 – the year in which the Consulate-General in Hanoi significantly lost its capability to transmit
outbound messages using cyphers. Tying together the previous two case studies, it offers two
arguments that question the utility of narrower definitions of intelligence: firstly, it grapples with the
notion of the dual identity diplomat-intelligence officer, suggesting that this dual role was what
facilitated a broad span of intelligence collection from the very centre of such hostile territories.
Secondly, it suggests that as in Hong Kong and Beijing, intelligence is, to some extent, defined in the
eye of the beholder. It lends depth to the latter argument through its exploration of the ‘spy phobia’
phenomenon that pervaded Hanoi, just as it did Beijing and Hong Kong. Moreover, by using the
archives to trace the path of the British intelligence material that reached its counterparts across the
Atlantic, it suggests that the eager consumption of this material by the American defence and
intelligence community was what also rendered the less covert reporting by this rather beleaguered
station to be considered valuable ‘intelligence’. Situated at ‘ground zero’ for the American bombing
campaign against Hanoi, this reporting came from a vital ‘blind spot’ for the Americans as they waged
their campaign in Vietnam. There can be few better examples of intelligence offsetting the wider
asymmetry of the Special Relationship.
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2
Methodology
Reading the Archive
Intelligence history has long been regarded as one of the more obscure fields of modern historical
study. This is not least due to the many obstacles it poses for the contemporary researcher. Despite the
collection of information on an industrial scale during the Cold War, researching intelligence during
this period is somewhat ironically plagued by archival paucity, problems of information secrecy,
access to records, state control over access to interviewees, and of course, information reliability.
Indeed, such problems have beset the study of intelligence to such an extent that many historians have
often disregarded its value, and more often than not, its centrality, to the history of both modern state
and non-state actors. Some even feared that their own work would be ‘tainted’ by contact with the
dubious subject of intelligence.1
It is for this reason that historians such as Andrew and Walton have aptly referred to
intelligence history as the ‘missing dimension’ of the modern state. It is no accident that Andrew
began his career as a historian of empire, or that Walton has completed the standard account of
intelligence and post-war empire, and both conclude that the missing dimension is especially
remarkable for its absence in accounts of decolonisation - the key period which this thesis focuses
upon.2 Noting that British intelligence activities are ‘conspicuously missing’ from core colonial
histories of the post-Second World War period, without the avowal of the British intelligence
1 Donald C. Watt, ‘Intelligence and the Historian: A Comment on John Gaddis's “Intelligence,
Espionage, and Cold War Origins”’ Diplomatic History 14:2 (1990), pp. 197-9.
2 Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire,
(London, 2013), p. xxi; Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, The Missing Dimension: Governments
and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century, (Urbana, 1984).
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services’ existence - and by extension, their records - Walton argues that intelligence was ‘quietly and
subtly airbrushed out of the history books’.3 As other intelligence scholars have argued, empire was
very much about information, and so this has impoverished the historical record, inhibiting a fuller
understanding of the different dimensions of empire and decolonisation, as well as a better
understanding of the relationship between state, intelligence service, and subject population.
With the avowal of the existence of the British intelligence services (MI5 was given statutory
basis in 1989, and SIS in 1994), came the subsequent release of more records affording greater depth
to the study of intelligence history and, supposedly greater transparency (the latter according to the
government).4 In addition to the two aforementioned intelligence services, some records of other
intelligence-related departments such as the Ministry for Economic Warfare (MEW), the Naval
Intelligence Division (NID), the Political Warfare Executive (PWE), the Special Operations Executive
(SOE), the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC) have been released into the National Archives (TNA).5 It is also worth noting that
SIS and GCHQ have been the most hesitant with regard to releasing post-war records.
All these declassifications are limited in scale, but the advantages of such releases are
nevertheless clear; as Hughes has argued, access to previously hidden aspects of history do not merely
shed light upon intelligence as a practice, but also the broader dynamics of policy-making, and the
institutional context in which intelligence operated. Moran, for example, draws attention to the way in
which ‘attention to the form and function of espionage’ following archival releases has been able to
challenge existing orthodoxies concerning international relations and governance.6 In this sense,
Hughes labels the historical study of intelligence an ‘especially fertile area’ for understanding the
interplay between belief systems, cultural peculiarities, and the wider structural factors that affect
policy-making in international politics.7 It is for this reason that Walton has argued that without
3 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. xxi.
4 Ibid.
5 Nigel West, ‘A Skewed Survey of the UK’s Intelligence History’, International Journal for
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 22:4 (2009), p. 746.
6 Christopher Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity: The Pursuit of Intelligence History: Methods, Sources, and
Trajectories in the United Kingdom’, Studies in Intelligence, 55:2 (2011), p. 37.
7 R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, Len Scott, Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the
Secret State, eds. (Abingdon, 2008), p. 3.
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understanding the intelligence dimension of the British Empire, our scholastic understanding of it is
‘at best incomplete, and at worst fundamentally flawed’.8
However, with the release of such records has also come deeper enquiry and reflection on the
part of researchers as to the relationship between state and archive. As Hughes et al. have stated,
interpretation of the archival record ‘lies at the heart of historical enquiry’.9 This raises important
questions about the methodology of working with archival documents pertaining to intelligence. Not
only does the study of intelligence prompt us to reflect upon national differences in scholarly
approaches and cultural backgrounds,10 but the very nature of the archival releases themselves yield
clues as to the manner in which institutions, bureaucracies, and officialdom operated. This raises
difficulties, however; as Hammond notes, writing intelligence history also means dealing with
agencies that by their very nature, compartmentalise their knowledge, are shrouded in secrecy, and
often rely upon information sharing on a need-to-know basis (even internally).11 To some extent, this
touches upon another core element of intelligence and its relationship with the state; that of secrecy.
Drawing upon Moran’s extensive study of secrecy as it pertains to intelligence and the modern British
state, national archives could be considered a key component of information control.12 This has been
particularly true of previous decades; in the 1970s and 1980s, prior to the disclosure of the intelligence
services’ existence, the dearth of records on the intelligence services was a real inhibitor to effective
scholarship. He argues that, the ‘taboo of secrecy’ around the intelligence services was very much
supported by the ‘indefinite closure of service records’, thus denying the historian the most basic of
resources.13 Defined by Wilsnack as ‘the processes used to make sure that certain people will or will
not have access to certain information at certain times’, the release - and retention - of records is a
vital dimension of archival research, and one that uniquely constrains the intelligence historian.14
8 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. xxii.
9 Hughes, Jackson, and Scott, Exploring Intelligence Archives, p. 4.
10 Ibid.
11 Andrew Hammond, ’Through a Glass, Darkly: The CIA and Oral History’, The Journal of the
Historical Association, 100:340 (2015), p. 323.
12 Christopher Moran, Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain, (Cambridge, 2013), p. 3.
13 Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity’, p. 34.
14 R.W. Wilsnack, ‘Information Control: A Conceptual Framework for Sociological Analysis’,
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 8:1 (1980): 467-499,
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Gill has argued that a seeming greater openness and accountability masks and effort at greater
control. He suggests that, just as the reform and liberalisation of the Official Secrets Act in fact served
merely to remove any possibility of a public interest defence, so the liberalisation of the information
regime around intelligence in the 1990s was in fact designed to shape public perceptions of secret
service in a way that allowed government to re-assert control in an area where many unauthorised
releases had occurred.15 An example of this is the prioritisation of the release of intelligence records
relating to wartime rather than peacetime - on the basis that spying and covert action are more
justifiable at times of existential threat to the state and society.
Perhaps the greatest challenge is to be found in seeking the records of an agency whose
existence was not only disclosed until merely two decades ago, but also which is the only British
intelligence agency not to pass on its records to The National Archives. The refusal by the British
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) to disclose its records has led numerous scholars to question the
extent to which the story of this particular institution can ever be known. SIS has released the records
of the wartime SOE organisation that were in its care, and some SIS records are intermingled with the
records of MI5. Furthermore, some SIS records are contained in the files of the Foreign Office
Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department, a section of the Foreign Office designed to co-ordinate
intelligence, covert action, and foreign policy. But, even these limited records now in the TNA do not
extend beyond the 1950s. Meanwhile, the records that SIS retains in its own archives are much less
complete than those of either MI5 or GCHQ.16
West, for example, one of the first researchers to write at length about MI6, muses as to
whether the study of an institution without its own original records leads to ‘mixed results’, as
scholars have to rely upon other sources.17 Probing the delicate issue of ‘misstating SIS’s history’,
West asks that, with a somewhat precarious foundation for such research, how do scholars form
judgements as to what was, or was not accomplished by the SIS? Moreover, without SIS’s original
15 Peter Gill, Reasserting control: Recent changes in the oversight of the UK: Intelligence, Threat,
Risk and the Challenge of Oversight, Intelligence and National Security, 11:2 (1996) 313-331
16 SOE records are in the HS series and MI5 records are in the KV series. The files of PUSD have
been released into FO 1093. Information from Keith Jeffery, MI6 official historian.
17 Nigel West, The Friends: Britain's Post-war Secret Intelligence Operations (London, 1988).
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files, ‘how are the authors able to assess the true extent of the damage inflicted by each man?’18
Intelligence has gradually moved from the periphery of government to the centre over the last century,
and so our knowledge of the British policy machine is incomplete without considering the role of SIS.
But, how does the scholar achieve as full an understanding as possible of the Service without recourse
to estimation, rumour, or inadvertent error?
This raises important questions about the intelligence historian as a ‘prisoner of the archive’.
Researchers are constrained not only by the availability of documents within the archive, but also by
the very policies that determine document retention, classification, and in the case of British Empire,
document destruction. This creates, in effect, an enslavement to the archival record. As Hammond
observes, intelligence historians are often ‘just far enough away from the inner working of the
institution, yet just close enough in terms of release dependency’ from the archive.19 This problem is
by no means confined to Britain’s SIS either. Reflecting upon his extensive research into GCHQ,
Easter laments the lack of signals intelligence featuring in studies of British foreign policy or military
strategy after 1945 owing to the key problem of ‘official secrecy’.20 Placing emphasis upon the British
governments efforts to ‘prevent the disclosure of information on GCHQ’ (including details such as the
organisation’s budget), he observes that just as with SIS, GCHQ’s archives are exempt from the
normal thirty year declassification rule, whilst ‘virtually no documents’ have been released to the
National Archives for the period after 1945. All the three intelligence security agencies are exempt for
the Freedom of Information Act. Furthermore, indirect references to signals intelligence in Foreign
Office, Prime Minister’s Office, and Ministry of Defence documents are ‘routinely redacted’,
illustrating the extent of efforts to which the government has sought to stem the release of
information.21
From a methodological perspective, Walton notes that, unlike other historians, intelligence
historians encounter the unique problem of having to rely upon the actual subjects under examination
18 Nigel West, ‘A Skewed Survey of the UK’s Intelligence History’, International Journal for
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 22:4 (2009), pp. 749-752.
19 Hammond, ‘Through a Glass, Darkly, the CIA and Oral History’, p. 321.
20 David Easter, ‘GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s’, Intelligence and National Security,
23:5 (2008), p. 681.
21 Ibid
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(the intelligence services) themselves to reveal their own history.22 Alarmingly, this is rather like the
lab rat being in charge of the experiment. In reflecting upon the challenges of researching state
history, Aldrich similarly observes the uniqueness of intelligence history in that ‘nowhere else is the
researcher confronted with evidence precisely managed by their subject’. In this respect, he argues
that intelligence historians essentially ‘are what they eat’, their diet is effectively managed by the
archives they access and the departmental record officers that determine what is released. In the last
decade, the opening of particular batches of records, especially from MI5 relating to the period 1930-
1960, or wartime SOE records, has led to a growing culture of archival dependency in which doctoral
students only attack subjects that the government has released records on. This is reinforced by the
emphasis in universities on the timely completion of theses and anxiety about resistant subjects and
elusive data.23
In a similar vein to the issues raised by West, Walton observes that this inevitably raises the
question of to what extent the state is able to dictate its own history by shaping the past - to what
extent can the intelligence historian trust the documents they receive exposure to in the archive, or are
they ‘presented merely with a version of the past as the intelligence services want us to see it’?24
Historians of intelligence have reached a broad consensus about the nature of the problem but are
divided about what to do about it, or how optimistic to be in the face of a laconic secret state.
A Lesson in Empire
The question of access and archives is perhaps most poignant when it comes to the history of empire.
As we have seen, there is an emerging consensus amongst scholars suggesting that the relationship
between the public archive and secret state is deep-rooted, which bears significant implications upon
researchers’ access to documents. Nowhere is this issue better demonstrated than through the
22 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. 353.
23 Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London,
2001), p. 6.
24 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. 353.
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extensive destruction of records that took place during British decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s.
No discussion of research methodology in the realm would be complete without attention to the case
of the ‘Hanslope Disclosure’ – the discovery of around 8,800 previously ‘lost’ files from British
colonies at the British government’s Hanslope Park facilities by Professor David Anderson in April
2012. Its significance is twofold; firstly, the case generated significant debate amongst scholars as to
the archival process itself, in terms of selecting, retaining, and destroying official records. Secondly,
the disclosure had reverberations in a real world context, raising significant legal repercussions for the
British government. Thirdly, in 2015, David Anderson uncovered the existence of further legacy
archives in seven departments of state, including Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of
Defence, and Treasury amounting to millions of files that have been excluded arbitrarily from the
provision of the Public Record Office Act. Pertaining to intelligence records in particular, this case
brings to the fore the unique methodological difficulties faced by intelligence historians of the British
Empire.25
Detailed in the Cary Report, the documents were discovered as part of a legal case brought
forward by former Mau Mau rebels against the Foreign Office in the early 2000s. The rebels sought
compensation for alleged torture that took place at the hands of British government officials during its
counterinsurgency campaign in Kenya in the 1950s – one that has widely been acknowledged by
scholars as notoriously violent on the part of the British government security forces. Despite several
legal requests by the representative of the rebels, Leigh Day – who were advised by several prominent
historians aware of a trail of missing documents – the Foreign Office denied their possession, until
they were discovered by chance, a few days preceding the trial.26 The sudden revelation of the
existence of the documents – in contravention of the normal procedures for withholding state papers -
was crucial in provoking scholars to critically rethink the relationship between the state and the
archive.
25 Ian Cobain and Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Files that may shed light on colonial crimes still kept secret
by UK', The Guardian, 26th April 2013. Information from David Anderson, September 2015.
26 For more information, see Anthony Cary, ‘The Migrated Archives’, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 24th February 2011. See also David Anderson, ‘Guilty Secrets: Deceit, Denial, and the
Discovery of Kenya’s ‘Migrated Archive’’, History Workshop Journal, 80 (2015), p. 142-160.
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Tracing the path of the ‘migrated archive’ at Hanslope has given rise to some startling
observations that raise questions about the state’s ability to manipulate historical narratives on a large
scale. In the case of Kenya, which was one of the more refined approaches to document retention, all
files relating to intelligence, or that were graded ‘Top Secret’ were to either be incinerated, or
‘packed in weighted crates and dumped in very deep and current free water at maximum practicable
distance from the coast’.27 These would generate the issue of a ‘destruction certificate’ documenting
the files’ eradication, copies of which were sent to London,28 creating a trail for contemporary
historians to pursue. The surviving documents were ‘migrated’ to London, on the grounds of having
the potential to embarrass the British government or associated persons, containing sources of
intelligence information, or risking being ‘used unethically’ by ministers is a successive government.29
Yet, even this process was replete with omissions. In addition to the Kenya files, records from
thirty-six other colonies were discovered at Hanslope Park. However, amongst these, substantial gaps
remained that earned the British government a bitter reception from historians; the bulk of Aden files
were incincerated by the India Office Library Records Department in 1966 to 1967, whilst thirteen top
secret files that were not part of the migrated archive but part of the legal case have still not been
found. In the words of Tony Badger, a top Cambridge historian who conducted an independent
inquiry into the matter, the loss was ‘much greater’ than these thirteen files, pointing to a listing of
170 boxes of British Colonial and Overseas Territories files marked Top Secret, that have gone
missing since their removal to Hanslope Park in the 1990s.30
All this points to the most vital question to arise from the documents’ disclosure – which files
still remain missing, hidden from public knowledge, or destroyed without a documented trail? What is
the scale of deception perpetrated on Britain’s historians of overseas policy? Whilst some scholars
such as Badger attributed this to mundane problems of record management,31 the majority of scholars
27 Ibid, p. 147.
28 Caroline Elkins, ‘Archives, Intelligence and Secrecy: The Cold War and the End of the British
Empire’, in Leake and Adams, Decolonisation and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence,
(London, 2015), pp. 256-258.
29 Anderson, ‘Guilty Secrets: Deceit, Denial, and Discovery of Kenya’s ‘Migrated Archive’’, p. 147.
30 Anthony Badger, ‘Historians, A Legacy of Suspicion and the ‘Migrated Archives’’, Small Wars and
Insurgencies, 23:4-5 (2012), pp. 804-806.
31 Ibid, pp. 799-806.
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were much more critical, considering the retention of the files as a deliberate plot, and a ‘cover up of
massive proportions’.3233 As scholars such as Walton have argued, the removal of certain files (on the
official pretext that they might ‘embarrass’ Her Majesty’s Government) was able to ‘inculcate a
fictional history of its colonial benevolence’, distorting historians’ understandings of empire.34 Even
the more conservative could not help but notice the discrepancies in the process; Badger himself
acknowledged the power of destruction, in noting ‘the absence of material that historians feel should
be in the migrated archive’.35 Historians should be congratulated for their forensic discovery of files
that were not there, but little can be done to recover the information that has been destroyed; the
elephant in the room is therefore – what, exactly, has been destroyed? And how much?
The implications of the various omissions and discoveries were profound. The Mau Mau case
resulted in a landmark decision against the British government, in which the Foreign Office set an
historical precedent by conceding its affiliation with practices of torture and abuse during the conflict,
underlined in its agreement to pay compensation to over five thousand victims.36 As Anderson argues,
this confirmed the practice of torture as ‘widespread, amounting a systematic pattern of state policy’.37
Moreover, more crucial from a methodological point of view, the files’ disclosure gave rise to a new
set of voices, re-writing a key aspect of Britain’s decolonisation history. Given the manner in which
the colonial archives had previously been treated as ‘liminal’ in character,38 their revelation allowed a
new historical narrative to be written into history that defied the state’s previous attempts to
manipulate its own past.
32 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. xxii.
33 For more information, see Badger, ‘Historians, A Legacy of Suspicion and the ‘Migrated
Archives’’, pp. 799-807; Gregory Rawlings, ‘Lost Files, Forgotten Papers and Colonial Disclosures:
The ‘Migrated Archives’ and the Pacific, 1963-2013’, The Journal of Pacific History, 50:2 (2015), pp.
189-212; Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, ‘Further Thoughts on the Imperial Endgame and Britain’s Dirty
Wars’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 40:3 (2012), pp. 503-514; Caroline
Elkins, ‘Alchemy of Evidence: Mau Mau, the British Empire, and the High Court of Justice’, The
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39:5 (2011), pp. 731-748.
34 Ibid.
35 Badger, ‘Historians, A Legacy of Suspicion, and the ‘Migrated Archives’’, p. 804.
36 Anderson, ‘Guilty Secrets: Deceit, Denial, and Discovery of Kenya’s ‘Migrated Archive’’, p. 157.
37 David M. Anderson, ‘British Abuse and Torture in Kenya’s Counterinsurgency, 1952-1960’, Smalls
Wars and Insurgencies, 23:4-5 (2012), p. 700.
38 Anderson, ‘Guilty Secrets: Deceit, Denial, and Discovery of Kenya’s ‘Migrated Archive’’, p. 145.
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Accordingly, the Hanslope Disclosure raises important questions as to the veracity of the
archive and its review process. Despite the several different layers of review the migrated files were
subject to – which Anderson has documented in considerable detail – none of these yielded assurances
as to the reliability of the selection process in determining which documents survived.39 The broader
importance of the case therefore lies in its implications for understanding the ontology of knowledge
drawn from the archive. As Elkins argues, there is an intimate connection between the ‘deeply
political nature of archives and the production of historical knowledge’,40 which, in this case,
demonstrated the ability of the state to obscure its role in systematised violence during Empire. As
Anderson underlines, destruction is itself a component of this this process; asserting that archives have
historically been the product of negotiation, selectivity, and censorship, ‘destruction is thus
necessarily constitutive to the archival process’, in ordering knowledge according to its most powerful
actors.41
This carries significant implications for the process of ‘writing history’. Drayton argues the
manner in which ‘contemporary’ history is written is conditional upon the ‘constant’ pressure of ideas
about earlier historical pasts. History is thus continually reconstituted – and the discovery of such files
plays a vital role in moving away from the ‘modes of subjectivity’ that historians are usually subject
to.42 However, this comes with a note of caution. Singling out intelligence historians and the peculiar
kinds of privileged and highly-classified material they eventually have access to, Drayton points out
that this can also render the historian hostage to the sources’ perspective – ‘a kind of intellectual
Stockholm Syndrome’.43 Like government ministers who were once the customers of the intelligence
agencies, historians can also come to believe that the ‘Top Secret’ classification equates to ‘true facts’.
Therefore, whilst on the one hand, the discovery of new files from formerly top secret sources allows
us to bring new historical voices to the fore, on the other hand, such cases underline the dual role of
39 Ibid, pp. 148-150. This included the Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Foreign Office, the
Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Council on National Records and Archives, and the National Archives.
40 Elkins, ‘Archives, Intelligence, and Secrecy’, p. 265.
41 Anderson, ‘Guilty Secrets: Deceit, Denial, and Discovery of Kenya’s ‘Migrated Archive’’, p. 144.
42 Richard Drayton, ‘Where Does the World Historian Write From? Objectivity, Moral Conscience,
and the Past and Present of Imperialism’, Journal of Contemporary History, 46:3 (2011), pp. 672.
43 Ibid, p. 273.
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the archive in ‘providing the means for certain forms of obfuscation’ when it comes to information
control.44 The result is ultimately ‘wilful and conscious exclusions of other forms of knowing’ that
defined the end of empire for decades.45
This form of information control is well-rooted elsewhere in the British government’s history.
As Aldrich has demonstrated, Whitehall resorted to a variety of methods in order to protect its ‘empire
of secrecy’. He points to the concealment of the Ultra code-breaking success during the Second World
War as evidence of the British government’s carefully orchestrated management of its own history. As
he notes, ‘large areas of the past would have to be controlled if important secret methods were to be
protected, and embarrassments avoided’. This was by no means confined to the earlier half of the
twentieth century either; despite the so-called ‘Glasnost’ era in the 1990s, in which London relaxed its
grip over archival records, releasing a considerable quantity of intelligence archives into the public
domain, this too was also a ‘more sophisticated programme of information management’. Thus,
through carefully managing the declassification process, the British government was ‘able to influence
the agenda for archive-based researchers of secret service’.46
In this regard, Aldrich also argues that the problem of scale is one that affects the
contemporary intelligence historian. Whilst Whitehall is known to select around two per cent of its
records for permanent preservation – a large proportion by most standards – Aldrich argues that a
degree of disregard, or even un-inquisitiveness, has beset the majority of historians, in that the large
proportion of documents released distracts from wider problems of record selection and destruction.
In this way, most records ‘head towards the incinerators unseen and largely uncontested’. The result is
what he labels the ultimate influence of the ‘hidden hand’ – the ‘prevailing distortion is the result of
omission’ of archival records.47
The issue of scale is thrown into relief by a comparison with the US national archives. Here,
between five and ten per cent of material is retained. In 2005, the FBI released 270 million pages of
44 Elkins, ‘Archives, Intelligence, and Secrecy’, p. 265.
45 Ibid, p. 273.
46 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 6; see also Richard J. Aldrich, 'Policing the Past: Official History,
Secrecy and British Intelligence since 1945', English Historical Review, 119:483 (September 2004): pp.
922-53.
47 Ibid, p. 8.
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records without review in an attempt to clear its backlog. But the volume is so great that there are
significant delays to declassification - fifty million pages of FBI material remained unprocessed
because they required inspection by ‘weeders’. Other materials lie in a strange historical no-mans-land
between openness and secrecy, waiting to be accessioned into the archives. Moreover, once they are
released, they are hard to use because they are poorly catalogued. The uncomfortable fact is that
preserving more records sometimes make them less accessible.48
From a methodological perspective, this therefore brings to light major issues that relate to
reliance upon archival material. Just as in the case of the ‘lost’ Foreign Office records rediscovered at
Hanslope Park, the incomplete nature of other records relating to the intelligence services raises
questions as to the efficacy of such research. In his comprehensive history of the SOE, Murphy, for
example, draws attention to the extensive loss of SOE records. Owing to a combination of record
destruction, (including a fire at the Baker Street office in 1946) and questionable weeding processes
that resulted in ‘wholesale and indiscriminate’ file destruction (once SOE files were inherited by the
SIS), Murphy notes that at least eighty-seven per cent of SOE’s papers had been destroyed.49 Most of
the files that survived are London files - few papers reflect the fact that SOE was a global organisation
with many regional archives and headquarters. Moreover, 137 files on SOE remain to be opened in
the National Archives as they are closed under Section 3.4 of the Public Records Act, which
essentially gives power to departments to retain documents on the grounds of sensitive information
contained therein. Therefore, as Murphy notes, the key question for researchers is ‘just how useful any
work that relies on what remains can be’.50
48 Scott Shane, ‘U.S. to Declassify Secrets at Age 25’, New York Times, 21st December 2006.
Available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/21/washington/21declassify.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0.
49 Christopher J. Murphy, Security and Special Operations: SOE and MI5 during the Second World
War, (Basingstoke, 2006), p. 214.
50 Ibid. Murphy notes that this was not confined to SOE either. MI5 experienced a similar process;
former Director-General Stephen Lander noted that in MI5 archival records, ‘there is rather less
material than might have been expected’, pointing to wartime bomb damage from the German
Luftwaffe in 1940 in the Wormwood Scrubs facilities, and an ‘inconsistent approach to file
destruction’. Subsequently, after consultations with historians, MI5 then destroyed some 90% of its
archive in the 1990s, accepting that the TNA could not store its vast volume of Cold War files.
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In addition to access to records, the content of the documents themselves poses a core
problem for researchers. Not only are intelligence documents subject to content redaction, such as
names, personal information, or information pertaining to national security, but the very nature of
intelligence adds additional complications to ascertaining content. Asserting that ‘deception, deceit,
and manipulation’ are central elements of intelligence practice, Hughes, Jackson, and Scott ask the
implications that this has for the historical record.51 Pointing out that such difficulties have weighed
into the decision of many historians to ‘ignore intelligence’ as a factor in international politics, they
argue that not only do intelligence documents ‘not speak for themselves, some may also dissemble,
and some may even lie’.52
Overcoming Archival Obstacles
Nevertheless, archival releases can yield significant information. Despite the numerous obstacles to
archival research discussed, if subjected to focused academic analysis, intelligence records are still
‘able to turn up secrets’, or at least traces of them.53 As Walton argues, the discovery of intelligence
failures is a case in point; the disclosure of failures suggests that selectivity of the archive by
government is not always possible without officials revealing their hand, and this prevents a one-
sided, optimistic picture of intelligence history from emerging.54 Moreover, as this section explains,
the fragmentary nature of intelligence records are such that to some extent, they concede certain
loopholes to the archival researcher, enabling the construction of the historical record through less
conventional means. In other words, the archival detritus left by government is simply too complex
for the history police to contain all its secrets and prevent some of them from spilling into the public
domain.
This latter conception dominates the approach to archival research taken in this thesis.
Moreover, this thesis goes further and asserts that we do not need to know everything in order to know
51 Hughes, Jackson, Scott, Exploring Intelligence Archives, p. 3.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid, p. 8.
54 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. 353.
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enough. Metaphorically, if our question is about the skin of a crocodile we do not need to see or touch
the whole beast to know that it is covered in scales – a brief contact with the tip of its tail may be
enough. After all, historians of earlier periods have had to content themselves with limited evidence.
In short, this thesis takes a position of both ontological and epistemological optimism. The history of
secret service is a measurable entity - there is enough data to make some confident assertions about it,
despite the efforts of the counterintelligence state to deny historians and political scientists
knowledge.55
This conception characterises the thesis’s approach to archival research. It contends that
intelligence and security agencies are now so large, and their records so voluminous, that they are
impossible to hide or keep entirely secure. James Bamford deployed this approach when researching
his famous book on the US National Security Agency, The Puzzle Palace.56 Duncan Campbell and
Peter Laurie adopted this approach in the UK when researching the security state. As Aldrich has
argued, this methodology begins with the idea there are ‘no secrets, only lazy researchers’.57 Whilst
this is an overstatement, this does point to significant areas in which historians need a greater degree
of introspection. As discussed in the introduction, this thesis will examine the activities of the British
SIS in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Hanoi. Not only do these three cases remain unexplored in SIS’s
history, but they are also cases in which, through a combination of archival records and oral history, it
is possible to piece together a different dimension of British intelligence history because of the
intermingling of diplomatic and intelligence records and functions at these particular posts. These
cases allow attention to both the granular details of everyday intelligence activity, as well as the
higher-level institutional context that gave meaning to such intelligence.
This thesis will draw upon a key method of archival research which numerous other
intelligence historians have deployed – that of ‘archival intelligence hacking’.58 This approach was
55 By contrast Peter Jackson, longstanding editor of Intelligence and National Security describes
himself as an ontological optimist and an epistemological pessimist. Remarks at Gregynog CISS
conference, May 2013.
56 Paul Constance, ‘How Jim Bamford Probed the NSA’, Cryptologia, 21:1 (1997), pp. 71-74.
57 Aldrich, GCHQ, pp. 361-2.
58 R.J. Aldrich, “The Secret State,” in Paul Addison and Harriet Jones, (eds.), A Companion to
Contemporary Britain, (Oxford, 2005), p. 336.
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pioneered by the three ‘lone gunmen’ of the UK National Archives: Bradley Smith, David Stafford
and Julian Lewis.59 In the late 1970s, these three researchers set out to work on topics such as SOE or
the Joint Intelligence Committee, at a time when their core records were still classified. They realised
that both organisations cooperated widely with other government bodies; the ubiquitous use of carbon
paper therefore meant that many copies of ‘closed’ documents were available in the mundane files of
other departments - or even those of allied countries - to which they had been circulated. Typically,
Lewis discovered highly classified material from cabinet committees on intelligence and chemical
weapons in the files of Combined Operations Headquarters, which dealt mostly with landing craft and
beach gradients.60 David Stafford and Bradley Smith both uncovered vast quantities of SOE material
in the late 1970s, some twenty years before the SOE archive was finally realised into the archives by
SIS.61
The most remarkable body of overlooked material was the archive of the India Office, the
London department responsible for liaising with the Viceroy and the Government of India in Delhi.
During the 1947 negotiations for the transfer of power, Nehru insisted that the newly independent
state inherit not only the files generated in Delhi but also those in the archive of the India Office in
London. This issue became a sticking point in the negotiations and the compromise was that the
papers remained in London, but were never to be integrated into the main UK National Archives.
Instead, they were housed at their own building in Blackfriars, and not subjected to the sorts of
weeding and selective retention on security grounds that were applied to other files. Thousands of
files had slipped through the net. 62
This method that relies upon exploiting the records of other governmental departments has
been gaining ground since the 1980s. A central tenet of this thesis is that intelligence collection is not
59 R. Shearman, Wanting to Believe: A Critical Guide to The X-Files, Millennium and The Lone
Gunmen, (New York, 2009).
60 Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942-
47, (London, 2004).
61 David Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, 1940-1945: a Survey of the Special Operations
Executive, With Documents, (London, 1980); Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the
Origins of the CIA, (New York, 1983).
62 See for example A. Farrington, Guide to the records of the India Office Military Department, 10R
L/MIL & L/WS. (London, 1982).
39
solely the remit of the intelligence services - in accordance with Michael Herman’s conception of
intelligence as a ‘layer cake’, intelligence was also gathered under the auspices of the Foreign
Office.63 This method is especially suitable to the subject investigated here, since one of the central
arguments in the thesis turns on the role of the dual intelligence officer-diplomat. In practical terms,
this means that the records of other departments are of greater methodological importance because
they provide not only important data, but better context.
This highlights the utility of bureaucratic overlap and liaison to the historian; despite SIS’s
lack of official records, intelligence officers posted to consular outposts emerge clearly in Foreign
Office files. As Walton points out, given that the purpose of the intelligence agencies is to service
other departments, it is ‘only natural’ that their records should be found amongst those of other
departments. In his study of British intelligence and decolonisation, Walton therefore sought to
combine intelligence records with those of other departments.64 This ‘outside-looking-in’ approach is
a longstanding - and fruitful - technique for intelligence historians; Murphy, for example, drew upon
records belonging to the War Office, Air Ministry, and Prime Minister’s Office for his history of the
SOE, noting that the records of certain departments (such as the Cabinet Office) tended to have a
‘higher survival rate’ than others.65 As Andrew and Dilks have emphasised, this method enables the
intelligence historian to fill in ‘both the general outline of the missing intelligence dimension and
much of its operational detail’.66
Accordingly, this thesis has sought to circumvent such restrictions imposed by the archival
record. Involving both British and foreign archives, document duplication has been most useful in
revealing information otherwise meant to be kept classified. As Murphy has highlighted, similar files,
despite containing the same material, can be vetted differently, since each department controls its own
records and implements general guidelines differently. In his case, whilst the name of a particular
SOE officer was ‘diligently redacted’ from SOE’s Western Europe files, unedited versions of the
63 Michael Herman, ‘Intelligence and Policy: A Comment’, Intelligence and National Security, 6:1
(1991), p. 233.
64 Ibid, p. 354.
65 Murphy, SOE and MI5 during the Second World War, pp. 216-217.
66 Andrew and Dilks in Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity’, p. 50.
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same papers in MI5 files revealed the officer’s identity.67 Bureaucratic rivalry also has its advantages
for the archival researcher. As Hughes, Jackson, and Scott have discussed, ‘the interlocking nature of
modern government’ is a useful tool for the intelligence historian. They assert that ‘internecine
quarrels’ are of particular use for the historian, as they give incentive to officials to record things in
written form, whether to protect themselves, their department, or with eye to the future historical
record.68 As such, where possible, this thesis will draw upon Foreign and Colonial Office files,
records from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Cabinet Office, the latter
which holds correspondence and reports by the Joint Intelligence Committee.
This thesis has sought to enhance this methodical approach. A key problem of the ‘archival
intelligence hacking’ approach developed by Smith, Stafford and Lewis is the sheer time taken to
survey the files. The more mundane or obscure the file, the more likely it is to be overlooked by the
weeder; this, combined with the potential relevant of all the file content, leads to the logical outcome
that all the files need to be surveyed – a recipe for overload. It is worth noting that technology has
begun to offer a solution; private companies have begun to scan large batches of UK government files,
making them commercially available to universities, in the form of data bases that can be searched
with optical character readers. Suddenly, it is possible to search all the Foreign Office files for China
over several decades for the word ‘sigint’. Bizarrely, however, this has meant travelling to the Library
of Congress to access an expensive database of files that are available in hard copy in London. Thus,
the initial groundwork for archival research can be condensed into a matter of hours. and material
overlooked by government weeders quickly uncovered.69
The cases of Hong Kong, Beijing, and Hanoi are especially of methodological interest,
because they open up the possibility of augmenting the written record with oral history. Importantly,
the archival files have enable the tracing of SIS officers posted to these respective outposts. Despite
the fact that few of the intelligence officers mentioned in this study are alive in the present day, where
possible, this thesis has sought to combine archival research with unstructured interviews with
67 Ibid, p. 217.
68 Hughes, Jackson, Scott, Exploring Intelligence Archives, p. 8.
69 The Adam Matthew Digital electronic database of Foreign Office Files for China, 1919‑1980, has
been notably valuable.
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surviving intelligence officers, although this has confined the amount of interviews conducted to a
small number. By contrast with American records, which are often subject to a shorter classification
review period, the longer release period for MI5 or SIS-related records permits less time for
researchers to contact retired officers, leaving the laundered archival record to stand alone,
unchallenged by oral testimony. Given the more technical nature of certain intelligence activities, it is
possible that the full meaning of some of these documents will not necessarily be self-evident to
future historians.
However, interviews too pose their own set of challenges for the intelligence historian and for
the social scientists.70 When utilised as a supplement to the archival record, as Davies notes,
interviews can ‘enrich and interpret the arcane and often vaguely worded’ document,71 and when
employed effectively, can enable the interview to go beyond usual boundaries, in encouraging the
interviewee to reflect upon their own actions. In this way, memory is treated as more than simply a
‘passive repository of facts’, but rather an active process that continues to evolve.72 Nonetheless, oral
history remains beset by numerous issues relating to information reliability, acknowledged by
numerous intelligence historians. Firstly, memory is subject to its own distortions, carrying with it the
risk of being ‘faulty and unreliable, prone to the crustaceans of time’.73 Furthermore, in terms of
interpretation by the researcher, this translates into the issue that the historian is effectively assessing
the respondents’ own perceptions and sensibilities, rather than the factual accuracy of those
perceptions. In this regard, Davies observes that their epistemological status is more akin to a
memoir.74 Secondly, oral history is affected by the very nature of intelligence itself. The element of
secrecy and subversion associated with intelligence exacerbates the existing challenges the memory
poses. Moran asserts that pertaining to a ‘subject worked in secrecy’, such testimony is often ‘polluted
by what has been absorbed from subsequent experience and discourse’. Moreover, this is particularly
70 Hilaiy Arksey and Peter Knight, Interviewing for Social Scientists: An Introductory Resource with
Examples, (London, 1999), p.1; Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing,
(Evanston, IL, 1970), p.5.
71 Philip H.J. Davies, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview
Data in the Study of Intelligence and Security Services’, Politics, 21:1 (2001), p. 74.
72 Hammond, ‘Through a Glass, Darkly: The CIA and Oral History’, p. 325.
73 Ibid, p. 322.
74 Davies, ‘Spies as Informants’, p. 77.
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so for those considered ‘once powerful, corrupted by a self-conscious desire to entomb a good
reputation’.75 This takes on a somewhat darker tone when taking into account that former intelligence
officers were once trained to mislead, deceive, and hide – as Hammond observes, such interviewees
are ‘just as likely to subvert the historical record as anything else’.76
As such, this thesis has also seized upon existing oral history transcripts, the memoirs of
former officers, or reflections published privately. This has been most valuable in yielding
information that would most certainly not have been revealed through official records and which was
not available to the researcher due to the death of key subjects. Moreover, memoirs in particular tend
to have greater evidential stability than say, oral history methods. Davies, for example, recognises
memoirs as a ‘published artefact’, and therefore less volatile over time.77 Memoirs are nevertheless
subject to a strong degree of subjectivity, and even if not especially partisan, tend to capture what the
actor thought interesting or important about their past in retrospect. This is conceded by Percy
Cradock, one of the officials stationed at the British outpost in Beijing, and a key figure in one of the
case study chapters. Reflecting upon his own memoirs on China, he notes that, ‘we each construct our
vision of China from the limited materials available to us, from our experience and reading, our
memories of certain conversations and scenes, and we cling tenaciously to it’.78 Indeed, he goes on to
characterise the genre as ‘an elitist history…of puzzled or frustrated Western emissaries under close
surveillance’, conditioned by their circumstances.79 Diaries, in some ways, are more useful than
memoirs, since they capture thoughts at the time, but few intelligence officers kept them for security
reasons. Lastly, in some instances, email correspondence with former intelligence officers who have
served in later time periods, but in similar stations, have provided valuable insight that the archival
record was unable to produce.
All the above sources have, however, been treated with caution; in a few instances,
information derived from interviews has clashed with memoir material, requiring a thorough approach
75 Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity’, p. 44.
76 Hammond, ‘Through a Glass, Darkly: The CIA and Oral History’, p. 323.
77 Davies, ‘Spies as Informants’, p. 77.
78 Percy Cradock, Experiences of China, (London, 1994), p. 2.
79 Ibid, p. 3.
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to establishing the consistency and reliability of the information at hand. This is in part where the
written record has proved its primacy; Walton concurs, arguing that it is ‘better to attach weight to
written records’, not only when their authors never thought they would be declassified, but also
because of the malleability of memory, noting that it is ‘easily capable of playing tricks’.80 Crucially,
it is also where the triangulation of data has proved the best solution, in terms of cross-referencing
both between and within data collected, as advocated by Davies.81 To a certain degree, this actually
took place during the process of data collection; in two instances, the author was able to present to an
interviewee – one of the former SIS officers stationed in Asia, and a key figure across all three case
studies – documents they had written whilst in post. This was a vital tool not only in establishing a
more intimate relationship with the interviewee, but in stimulating their own reflections and in some
ways, their own assessments of their intelligence duties whilst in post – a truly unique experience.
Furthermore, with regard to the transatlantic dimension of the ‘Special Intelligence
Relationship’ between the UK and US, this thesis has also striven to make use of foreign archival
records. In order to achieve a fuller, more complete picture of intelligence exchange and liaison
between the two countries in the aforementioned stations, this thesis has drawn upon records from the
US National Archives, the CREST database containing CIA records, and the Johnson Presidential
Library in Austin, Texas. Hughes, Jackson, and Scott endorse this ‘multi-national approach’ to
studying the intelligence-related aspects of state behaviour, noting that whilst governments can exert
some means of control over their own historical records, ‘they have little or no control over
declassification and destruction procedures in other countries’.82 Historians often underline the
‘profusion’ of British intelligence materials available in American archives, supposedly since the
1970s at least, one particular instance of captured CIA records being those of the Shanghai Municipal
Police, for example - which was in fact an extensive British-run security agency.83
The American and British authorities have held ‘history police’ conferences to achieve joint
lists of records that should remain closed, seeking to protect each other’s secrets. Moran points to files
80 Walton, Empire of Secrets, p. 354.
81 Davies, ‘Spies as Informants’, p. 78.
82 Hughes, Jackson, Scott, Exploring Intelligence Archives, p. 8.
83 F. Wakeman, ‘Policing Modern Shanghai’, The China Quarterly, 115:1 (1988), pp.408-440.
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where British attachments are missing from US archival records, and thus more sensitive of British
considerations.84 Nevertheless, the sheer scale of American archives often defeats these efforts at
hiding documents. In the American instance, document duplication has been most revealing.
Comparing British and American archival holdings of the same file has allowed the thesis to
practically reconstruct whole documents in rare instances, or to locate documents missing from the
UK National Archives in American archives, owing to differences in national policies concerning
document redaction. Moreover, in the case of the Hanoi chapter in particular, using such
complementary archival records has allowed the thesis to trace the journey of British intelligence
documents across the Atlantic, to its specific recipients in the US. This affirms the utility of a
comparative approach; as Hughes, Jackson, and Scott argue, comparing and contrasting intelligence
records of different states can ‘therefore provide new perspectives on both intelligence practices’.85
It is also worth noting that several records relating to each of the three case studies still remain
classified at the UK National Archives, whilst others were destroyed upon review in the early 2000s.
Although the grounds for such policies may never be anything more than a reduction in the volume of
records, it adds the caveat that certain questions will not be able to be fully answered by this thesis.
This raises the inevitable question - and what Aldrich labels an ‘elementary rule’ of historians’ work –
constantly asking what is not present in the archive. The destruction of documents is not confined to
the managers of archives either; as will be shown in the Beijing chapter in particular, the hostile
security environment in which SIS officers operated had consequences for the records each diplomatic
outpost was able to retain, leading to some forms of panicked document destruction. In numerous
instances, upon hearing of an impending attack or threat, or even extreme ‘spy phobia’ in some cases,
the officers undertook extensive file destruction on the spot, burning documents in makeshift
incinerators make from oil barrels or bins. However, in a few cases, index sheets of the documents
destroyed have detailed what exactly was destroyed, which in itself yields some insight to the
84 Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity’.
85 Hughes, Jackson, Scott, Exploring Intelligence Archives, p. 8.
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researcher. As Murphy states, though ‘undeniably frustrating’, these are still an indication of previous
content, and better than nothing at all.86
In conclusion, although the archival process remains a flawed tool for the intelligence
historian, it can nonetheless lead to valuable discoveries. Its caveats are clear: relying upon the archive
for primary material raises issues of subjectivity, reliability, and most palpably, issues of access for
the researcher. In addition, there are the challenges of using intelligence material itself, known to be
plagued by secrecy, omission, and even deception, given the tradecraft of its authors. These aspects
are not insurmountable, however. Adopting a more wholesome approach to archival research, by
combining it with interviews, transcripts, memoirs, secondary literature, and even the material of
foreign archives, allows for avoiding obvious pitfalls when working with material that is in many
ways, hostage to its own secret nature.
Epistemological optimism then, reinforced with the exciting new tools of electronic research,
must nevertheless be tempered by due caution. In 1987, Christopher Andrew, the doyen of
intelligence historians, offered a stern methodological warning. He explained that, in studying the
sources for British foreign policy, there must be constant caution in dealing with what is, in essence, a
‘laundered archive’, despite the intentions of ‘honourable men’ acting in what ‘they believed is the
national interest’. What follows is an attempt to defeat the diligent cleansing operatives and scrubbers
of the government archive – worthy opponents - in order to uncover a story that many in government
wished might not ever be told.87
86 Murphy, SOE and MI5 during the Second World War, p. 217.
87 C.M. Andrew, ‘Secret Intelligence and Foreign Policy 1900-1939’, in C.M. Andrew and J. Noakes
(eds.) Intelligence and International Relations 1900-1945, (Exeter, 1987), p.9.
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3
Literature Review
Introduction
Intelligence is by nature an obscure, yet dynamic concept. As the introductory chapter has explained,
the epistemological roots of the study of this subject in governmental records and archival research
renders it somewhat of a polemic for scholars. In the methodological section, it will be suggested that
the multifarious relationship between government, archive, and researcher has generated an array of
scholarly debates, illustrating the complexity of intelligence history as a field some three decades after
its foundation in the early 1980s.1 Moreover, owing to its intersection with other substantial subject
areas such as foreign policy, diplomacy, and certain types of warfare, intelligence has drawn
interjections not only from intelligence historians, but also from international historians, and
practitioners, eager to apply their career experiences and to extract lessons learned, together with
political scientists and even investigative journalists. The field of intelligence studies is now
substantial in size; with its own journals, specialist conferences and university degrees, the attendant
volume of publication is considerable.2 This chapter will draw upon three distinct areas of intelligence
history literature in order to contextualise the broader arguments raised across the thesis, as well as to
provide a framework for its contribution to knowledge.
Firstly, it will examine a most basic – yet vital – debate that engages any scholar seeking to
study intelligence. It will examine what intelligence is as a concept, exploring its multifaceted nature,
1 The publication of a ‘manifesto’ about the missing dimension by Andrew and Dilks in July 1984 is
often taking as the starting point.
2 The busy intersection of disciplines and trades is most visible at the Intelligence Studies Section of
the International Studies Association which now fields some eighty panels a year.
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the different ways in which scholars categorise or organise intelligence, and the implications of the
definitional ambiguity of intelligence. Doing so will enable this thesis to define intelligence as it
pertains to the three case study chapters, ultimately positioning itself alongside scholars who regard
intelligence as a spectrum, in which ‘information’, though not gathered using clandestine methods,
nonetheless contributes to intelligence assessment. It will also contextualise one of the arguments
common to all the case studies, which is the notion that intelligence officers stationed in consular
posts were able to use their dual role to collect both secret and non-secret intelligence.
Secondly, in order to lend context to the broader international relations framework used by
this thesis, this chapter will explore scholarly debate concerning the ‘Special Relationship’ between
Britain and the United States during the Cold War. Drawing upon various schools of thought
provoked through one of the most vigorous and prolific research areas of the last few years (including
in the fields of diplomatic history and intelligence history), this section will explore the degree of
proximity between the two allies. It will traverse across different ‘waves’ of argument, ranging from
more orthodox understandings of the special relationship, to revisionist notions of ‘transatlantic
antagonism’, and even rivalry between the two allies. It will also explore realist, idealist and liberal
institutionalist interpretations of possible alliance drives. Doing so will ultimately serve to frame this
thesis’s broader argument that British intelligence allowed Britain to punch above its weight as the
weaker, junior power in an asymmetric relationship.
Lastly, this chapter will sketch out the existing literature on British intelligence in Asia. As
will be shown, although several key intelligence historians have produced seminal pieces on British
intelligence, including excellent research on the Special Operations Executive (SOE), military
intelligence, and signals intelligence, research focusing specifically on the Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS) in Asia remains limited. This is particularly true for the Cold War period, which in comparison
with the two world wars, and the interwar period, remains an impoverished area of study. Examining
this literature will therefore allow the thesis to identify important gaps in the existing literature, and to
position itself in relation to these gaps. In doing so, it will make its contribution to knowledge, though
its application of British intelligence history to the special relationship.
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Definitional debate – what is intelligence?
The inherent degree of secrecy that characterises intelligence raises a fundamental problem for the
scholar – that of defining ‘intelligence’ as a concept. The secret nature of intelligence activities,
whether with regard to source, methods, purpose, or institutions, has given rise to a panoply of
definitions, ranging from more simplistic notions of ‘information’, to covert activity, secrecy, and
even national strategic culture. It is made more difficult by the preponderance of fictional references
to intelligence and the extent to which even practitioners reference this material in the course of their
policy work.3
Definitions in this area are therefore highly problematic. Captured in Gill and Phythian’s
description of intelligence as an ‘elusive’ concept,4 it raises the issue of whether intelligence as a term
has become too diluted. The implications of this are substantial for writing intelligence history;
various scholars have argued that its incoherence as a term remains a key obstacle to developing a
theory of intelligence.5 Intelligence was once considered under-theorised, but that has changed in
recent years with much effort being devoted to issues of perception and ethics. Nevertheless, the
subject remains rather hazy, and certainly the wider connection to international relations theory
remains underdeveloped.6
Herman, in stating that intelligence ‘by definition resists scholarship’, argues that
intelligence’s incoherence in definitional terms splits its researchers in two fields: those in the
minority, who are able to conduct intelligence studies ‘on the inside’, and those ‘on the outside’,
3 S. Keslowitz, ‘Simpsons, 24, and the Law: How Homer Simpson and Jack Bauer Influence
Congressional Lawmaking and Judicial Reasoning’, Cardozo Law Review, 29:2878, (2007); Keren
Tenenboim-Weinblatt, ‘Where is Jack Bauer When You Need Him?: The Uses of Television Drama
in Mediated Political Discourse’, Political Communication 26:4 (2009), pp. 367-387; A. Zegart,
‘’Spytainment: the Real Influence of Fake Spies’, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence, 23:4 (2010), pp. 599-622.
4 Peter Gill and Mark Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, (Cambridge, 2006), p. 1.
5 E.g. Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of 'Intelligence’,” Studies in Intelligence 46:3 (2002):
15–22; Walter Laqueur, World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, (New Brunswick,
1993).
6 Christopher M. Andrew, 'Intelligence, International Relations and ‘Under-Theorisation’',
Intelligence and National Security, 19:2 (2004), pp.170–184; Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, Mark,
Phythian, (eds.) Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates (New York, 2008).
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without official access to original records.7 His point about official records resonates with this thesis
and so this section will examine three related aspects of the ‘what is intelligence?’ debate, including
how intelligence is organised by scholars, secrecy, and the notion of intelligence as information.
Before delving into specific definitions, it is worth briefly examining the way in which
intelligence has been organised definitionally by scholars. In a key article critically examining
definitions of intelligence, Warner examines Cold War definitions, relating particularly to an
American context, in which he considers military, practitioner, and academic assertions of what
intelligence is, or should be. In attempting to make sense of the wide range of definitions collected, he
divides these down along the lines of source, and clarity of the definition: he suggests that intelligence
is an agency, a process, and end-product, ‘both an activity and a product of that activity’.8 Similarly,
Johnson identifies four categories through which intelligence can be understood: as a product, process,
mission, or organisation, pointing to strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence, geographical threats,
intelligence in a mission sense, as an institution, and to the intelligence cycle, to name but a few
manifestations.9
By contrast, and representative of the more recent literature to emerge in the past ten years,
Gill and Phythian define intelligence according to its purpose, in terms of covert action,
investigations, advice to policymakers, and countering threats. They conclude that intelligence is
ultimately an umbrella term that encompasses all of the above (secrecy, information, the intelligence
cycle, counterintelligence, strategic threats, and covert action).10 However, it is important to note that
these understandings are very much representative of the Anglosphere; although scholars have
devoted attention to differentiating between British and American conceptions of intelligence,11 their
7 Michael Herman, ‘Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence’, in Loch K. Johnson (eds.),
Handbook of Intelligence Studies, (Abingdon, 2007), pp. 17-28.
8 Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence’, pp. 15-22. In this he follows the arguments made by
Mark Lowenthal that intelligence can be an organisation, an activity or an informational product.
9 Loch K. Johnson, ‘Introduction’, in Loch K. Johnson (eds.), Handbook of Intelligence Studies,
(Abingdon, 2007), p. 1.
10 Gill and Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World, pp. 2-17. Roy Godson’s early work also took
a functional approach, which he called ‘elements’ of intelligence, see R. Godson, Intelligence
requirements for the 1980's (Washington, 1979).
11 For an excellent discussion of the contrast between British and American intelligence cultures, see
Philip Davies, ‘Divergent National Concepts’, ‘Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts
and Institutions’, Harvard International Review, 24:3 (2002), pp. 62-66.
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understandings remain notably narrow compared to other geographical areas, such as the European
Union, or the global South. In the latter regard, the most recent literature delineates the manner in
which intelligence in non-democratic states is often associated with internal security and regime
protection, usually serving as an enforcing tool for the leadership.12
A common strand to the above approaches to intelligence, and with intelligence definitions in
general, is the notion of secrecy. Often referred to as the ‘missing dimension’ of history,13 numerous
scholars converge on secrecy as a defining characteristic of intelligence. Referring to it as the missing
ingredient in intelligence definitions, Warner, for example, defines intelligence as ‘secret, state
activity to understand or influence foreign entities’.14 Both he and Johnson draw upon the work of
Shulsky, who places heavy emphasis upon secrecy in asserting that what distinguishes intelligence
from other intellectual activities is ‘the connection between intelligence and secrecy’. Shulsky also
applies this to a counterintelligence context, pointing to the need for secrecy within intelligence
activity and intelligence organisations, stating that intelligence often entails access to ‘information
some other party is trying to deny’.15 Ken Robertson captures this succinctly, suggesting that
intelligence is about other people’s secrets stolen secretly; he emphasises that the value of the theft is
increased if the victim does not realise that their information is compromised.16 This is echoed in
Johnson’s understanding of intelligence, who, in his discussion of intelligence, underlines the role of
12 P. Davies and K.C. Gustafson (eds.), Intelligence Elsewhere Spies and Espionage Outside the
Anglosphere (Washington DC, 2013); Richard Aldrich and John Kasuku, ‘Escaping from American
Intelligence: Culture, Ethnocentrism, and the Anglosphere’, International Affairs, 88:5 (2012), pp.
1009-1028. They also lend discussion to intelligence cultures in China, and South Africa. For other
examples of intelligence outside of the Anglosphere, see: Zakia Shiraz, ‘Drugs and Dirty Wars:
Intelligence Cooperation in the Global South’, Third World Quarterly, 34:10 (2013), pp. 1749-1766;
John M. Nomikos, ‘A European Union Intelligence Service for Confronting Terrorism’, International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 18:2 (2005), pp. 191-203; James I. Walsh,
‘Intelligence Sharing in the European Union: Institutions are Not Enough’, Journal of Common
Market Studies, 44:3 (2006), pp. 625-643.
13 Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence
Communities in the Twentieth Century, (Urbana, 1984).
14 Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence’, p. 21.
15 Ibid, p. 19; Johnson, ‘Introduction’, pp. 3-4.
16 Ken G. Robertson, ‘Intelligence, Terrorism and Civil Liberties’, Conflict Quarterly 7:2 (1987) p.
46.
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access to information that other nations try to keep hidden. In this sense, intelligence has a secret
component, which thus renders it ‘intelligence’, rather than simply information.17
However, it is important to observe that Andrew’s reference to the ‘missing dimension’ of
history was over thirty years ago. With this in mind, can intelligence still be considered in this way?
Perhaps the answer is to be found in the element of surprise the archive is still able to unearth for
contemporary historians. Anderson’s discovery of the ‘migrated archive’ is perhaps the most
prominent, recent example of the complex interaction between intelligence, official history and the
archive. As part of a landmark legal case involving victims of the British campaign against the Mau
Mau insurgency, Anderson and his team stumbled upon 8,800 legacy files relating to abuses carried
out by British officials during their counterinsurgency campaign.18 Given that these files were
previously believed to have been removed or destroyed at Kenyan independence, their discovery
revitalised debate amongst scholars as to the process involved in keeping these files withdrawn (or
hidden) from the clutches of the archive – essentially pointing to the role of secrecy in writing official
historical narratives.19 With this in mind, using secrecy as a lens through which to examine
intelligence is useful for three key reasons: firstly, it provides for a much narrower definition of
intelligence, and secondly, it converges with numerous areas of intelligence history, allowing for an
excellent overview of the literature. Lastly, focusing on the split between the overt and covert aspects
of intelligence is a crucial debate that will help to frame the definition adopted in line with the case
studies of this thesis.
17 Johnson, ‘Introduction’, pp. 3-4.
18 David M. Anderson, ‘Mau Mau in the High Court and the ‘Lost’ British Empire Archives: Colonial
Conspiracy or Bureaucratic Bungle’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 39:5
(2011), pp. 699-716.
19 For example, see Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the
Twilight of Empire, (London, 2013); Anthony Badger, ‘Historians, A Legacy of Suspicion and the
‘Migrated Archives’’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 23:4-5 (2012), pp. 799-807; Gregory Rawlings,
‘Lost Files, Forgotten Papers and Colonial Disclosures: The ‘Migrated Archives’ and the Pacific,
1963-2013’, The Journal of Pacific History, 50:2 (2015), pp. 189-212; Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon,
‘Further Thoughts on the Imperial Endgame and Britain’s Dirty Wars’, The Journal of Imperial and
Commonwealth History, 40:3 (2012), pp. 503-514; Caroline Elkins, ‘Alchemy of Evidence: Mau Mau,
the British Empire, and the High Court of Justice’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth
History, 39:5 (2011), pp. 731-748.
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The absence of intelligence history from the official record is another key dimension of the
debate surrounding secrecy and intelligence. Discussing the relationship between government secrecy,
archival policy, and the political nature of writing intelligence, Moran underlines the centrality of
secrecy to intelligence, particularly in a definitional sense.20 Crucially, he moves beyond the
definitional debate, noting that ‘how we define intelligence has significant implications for
practitioners and scholars alike’. With particular regard to secrecy, he argues that definitions can have
ramifications on a practical level; definitions can shape the work and remit of oversight committees on
intelligence agencies, and influence declassification policies through elucidating which activities
governments are obliged to keep secret.21
Secret services not only report on the world, but also seek to change it by means of the
‘hidden hand’. Accordingly, several scholars have defined intelligence through its cross-over with
covert action. This has often been through discussion in a national context. Stempel, for example,
discusses the nexus between intelligence and covert action in the US foreign policy establishment,
arguing that this forced a differentiation between intelligence and diplomacy in terms of ‘norms,
objectives, and means and methods’.22 By contrast, the British aspect of the discussion centres itself
around the normative dimension of the ‘secret state’. For example, in a significant and lengthy study
of the British SIS, Dorril discusses the darker side of intelligence and its engagement in covert action,
pointing to the wide reach of the British government through surveillance, infiltration missions,
propaganda, and subversive activity, including assassination plots. Although cognisant of the fact that
secrecy in its present form has very much eroded, inherent in Dorril’s piece is the secrecy surrounding
SIS covert activities, especially during the Cold War, given the service’s determination to thwart
Britain’s post-imperial decline after the end of the Second World War.23 While diplomatic reportage
20 Christopher Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity: The Pursuit of Intelligence History: Methods, Sources, and
Trajectories in the United Kingdom’, Studies in Intelligence, 55:2 (2011), pp. 33-55.
21 Ibid, p 45.
22 John D. Stempel, ‘Covert Action and Diplomacy’, International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, 20 (2007), pp. 122-135.
23 Stephen Dorril, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, (London, 2000).
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and intelligence collection often overlap, covert action and diplomacy are often considered to be
awkward bedfellows.24
Although a similar assumption is to be made in Hennessy’s study, whose focus upon the
institutions behind intelligence policy – namely, Whitehall and the British secret intelligence agencies
– has determined his approach to intelligence as inevitably led by its secret nature, his portrayal of the
secret state is much smaller, and less nefarious in its scope. Certainly, as scholars such as Aldrich
have observed, this institutional approach to studying government policy and covert action often
results in understandings of intelligence intertwined with secrecy. In comparison to other states, he
notes that secrecy is often considered central to the British state, because the secret services are
intimately ‘woven into its fabric.25 As such, prolific usage of the term ‘secret state’ tends to be
‘synonymous with shadowy intelligence and security agencies’.26
However, examining intelligence through the lens of secrecy offers a rather limited and
constrained consideration of what might be considered ‘intelligence’. By contrast, examining the
debate around intelligence as information offers a broader way in which to understand intelligence,
particularly in terms of sources and raw gathered intelligence. An alternative set of definitions within
the existing literature define intelligence as simply information; Kahn, for example, defines
intelligence as something more akin to ‘news’, that a host of actors are able to collect, thus unconfined
to intelligence officers.27 Similarly, in his consideration of the different components of intelligence,
Johnson highlights an understanding of intelligence as simply information, that is to say a product that
is collected and analysed, ‘in hopes of achieving a deeper comprehension of subversive activities at
home, or political, economic, social, and military situations around the world’.28 Such an
understanding also pervades various institutions within the US national security establishment,
underlined by the eminent CIA officer Sherman Kent, known within his field as the father of
24 Stempel, ‘Covert Action and Diplomacy’, pp.122-124.
25 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘The Secret State’, in Paul Addison and Harriet Jones, A Companion to
Contemporary Britain, 1939-2000, (Blackwell, 2005), p. 339.
26 Ibid, p. 333.
27 David Kahn, ‘An Historical Theory of Intelligence’, in Peter Gill, Stephen Marrin, and Mark
Phythian (eds.), Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Debates, (London, 2009), p. 4.
28 Johnson, ‘Introduction’, pp. 3-4.
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intelligence analysis within the CIA, who defines intelligence as ‘knowledge’ to safeguard the
national interest.29 In other words, intelligence can be thought of as a particular kind of information
gathered or processed to make policy or operations more effective.
Many of the scholars who conceive of intelligence in a similar way have traced the origins of
intelligence to the battlefield. Kahn articulates intelligence’s core purpose as being a component of
historical warfare in addition to force and will – essentially, as a force multiplier in war.30 Moreover,
Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark note the manner in which historically, ‘definitions of intelligence have
been shaped by patterns of state development’, placing particular emphasis upon the advent of
military-technical challenges to the state, which they argue prompted the emergency of sophisticated
intelligence systems accompanying military advances. This is underlined in their statement that the
decades after Clausewitz witnessed a ‘revolution in methods of war and diplomacy, during which
intelligence would be produced on an industrial scale’.31 Intelligence in the Cold War was therefore
primarily about warnings for ‘hot’ war, diplomatic negotiations, to verify arms control, and support
local wars (such as the British government’s intelligence support to the Americans in Vietnam). Much
of the information gathered during the Cold War that found itself included in intelligence reports did
not come from secret sources such as human agents.
However, such definitions have come under criticism from proponents of secrecy, who
emphasise secrecy as intelligence’s defining property. In discussing the manner in which different
elements of the US national security establishment, such as the Brown-Aspin Commission, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, and even the 1947 National Security Act ‘all stress the informational aspects
of intelligence more than its organisational facets’.32 Warner is highly critical of this approach, which
he deems to be lacking in rigour, and ‘too vague to provide real guidance’ to practitioners, thus
weakening the definition to the point of being ‘incomplete’.33 Indicative of other scholars belonging to
the ‘secrecy’ school, Warner maintains that informational definitions of intelligence run the risk of
29 Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence’, p. 16.
30 Johnson, ‘Introduction’, pp. 4-9.
31 Christopher M. Andrew, Richard J. Aldrich, Wesley K. Wark, Secret Intelligence: A Reader,
(London, 2009), p. 1.
32 Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of Intelligence’, pp. 15-16.
33 Ibid, p. 17.
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over-broadening intelligence as a term; questioning whether every piece of information can be called
intelligence, he concludes that the answer is ‘obviously not, because that would mean that newspapers
and radio broadcast and atlases are intelligence documents, and that journalists and geographers are
intelligence officers’.34
Other scholars have responded to this debate by refining their definitions of intelligence
according to the purpose, or audience that intelligence serves. Although Lowenthal immediately
points to secrecy as a defining characteristic of intelligence, he distinguishes ‘information’ from
intelligence by defining the latter according to the intelligence cycle. By centring his definition around
its intended purpose for policymakers and decision-making, he arrives at the understanding that
‘intelligence is a subset of the broader category of information…all intelligence is information; not all
information is intelligence’.35 Laqueur adopts a similar approach to distinguishing intelligence from
information, by anchoring his definition within its audience. Writing about intelligence from the point
of view of its customers, i.e. policymakers, he asserts that intelligence is ‘by no means the only
collector and producer of intelligence’. Instead, intelligence reaches the policymaker ‘from a great
many other sources, and intelligence agencies draw their information largely form open sources’, thus,
he states, they have no monopoly over ‘intelligence’ itself.36
More recent attempts to add clarity to this definitional debate over ‘information’ have rooted
themselves in the concept of national strategic cultures. Davies, for example, details what he regards
as differences in the British and American approaches to defining intelligence. Noting that the
tendency of countries to employ different definitions of intelligence has both conceptual and
substantive implications – all of which contribute to the national strategic culture of each country – he
points to cultural differences over the role of information. He contends that the US approaches
information as a specific component of intelligence, whilst Britain approaches intelligence as a
specific type of information.37 In the latter case, he argues that the British definition is narrower,
referring only to a ‘particular kind of information gathered from indirect or clandestine sources, in
34 Ibid.
35 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington: CQ Press, 2002), p. 8.
36 Laqueur, World of Secrets, pp. 11-12.
37 Davies, ‘Divergent National Concepts’, pp. 14-16.
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which ‘intelligence’ usually denotes the raw material gathered. By contrast, in the US, he states that
intelligence is a broader category, subsuming both the collection and analysis of information, and
considered closer to a product, than raw intelligence. This is certainly reflected in the enormous effort
that the United States put into training analysts and their proliferating numbers.38
A helpful repost has emerged within the literature on intelligence that moves away from the
secrecy versus information dichotomy. Achieved through its inclusion of a broader range of sources –
both overt and covert – this school of thought conceives of intelligence as more akin to a spectrum, in
which secret intelligence is confined to a small fraction of what informs intelligence analysis. It is
here that the thesis locates itself definitionally, in order to frame one of the core strands of argument
running through the case study chapters, which argues that intelligence collected by SIS in Asia was a
mix of both secret and non-secret information.
This definition of intelligence has commanded increasing acceptance in more recent literature,
owing to broader political and societal changes that have impacted the manner in which information
flows. In the contemporary context, both Rovner and Moran, draw attention to the increased numbers
of non-state actors that have evolved the manner in which intelligence is both gathered and produced.
Pointing to both the increased production and consumption of information acquired by private groups
(including the likes of water supplies, electricity companies, and even airline companies),39 he
observes that their inadvertent involvement in gathering intelligence has made intelligence
‘increasingly difficult to define in the twenty-first century … challenging the assertion that
intelligence is organised by the state for the state’.40 A consensus is to be found amongst Andrew,
Aldrich, and Wark, who note that the rise of non-state actors since the 1970s has had an impact on
defining intelligence through the emergency of the market state. Whilst they also mention the growth
of national infrastructure and telecommunications companies in gathering and consuming intelligence,
they also point to the growth of open source intelligence (OSINT), which they argue has ‘blurred
38 Philip J. Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States’,
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17:3 (2004), p. 500.
39 See Joshua Rovner, ‘Intelligence in the Twitter Age’, International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, 26:2 (2013), pp. 260-271.
40 Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity’, p. 45.
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traditional distinctions between intelligence and information, and the barrier between secret and non-
secret’. Describing intelligence collection as somewhat closer to an ‘interactive network’, this
conception of intelligence is thus based around the actors involved, rather than information or secrecy
per se.41
Perhaps the most useful idea of intelligence to emerge from this school of thought resides in
Hibbert’s conception of intelligence as a ‘layer cake’. Hibbert is notably authoritative voice, having
served initially in wartime SOE and then having risen to be Deputy Under-Secretary in the Foreign
Office.42 In his discussion of intelligence and how it filters into foreign policy, he argues that for
intelligence to be considered useful as a term, it must be used in a broader sense, beyond simply
‘secrecy’, given its proximity and use in foreign policy.43 In this regard, he argues that ‘every
diplomatic service, every embassy or diplomatic becomes, in one of its aspects, and intelligence-
collection agency’, in which their main function is to collection the widest possible information about
the nature and functioning of a foreign state and its government, and to relate this back to the needs of
its own government. The objective is thus to provide ‘as comprehensive and accurate a picture as
possible of the attitudes, polities, political and economic imperatives, and likely course of action’ of
the foreign state in question.44
Returning to his idea of a ‘layer cake’, he therefore disentangles intelligence, fragmenting it
into fifty per cent open source material (including in the ‘most security-minded totalitarian states’),
ten to twenty per cent privileged material (usually obtained by diplomats through their privileged
status), twenty to twenty-five per cent classified material (he denotes that its essential quality is that it
is ‘not bought or sold’, but a product of normal diplomatic activity imparted in contravention of
security criteria), and lastly, less than ten per cent secret intelligence. This is of great importance with
situating the case study chapters, given that, as will be shown, the majority of what the British SIS
41 Andrew, Aldrich, and Wark, Secret Intelligence, pp. 1-2.
42 James Pettifer, ‘Obituary: Sir Reginald Hibbert, Albanologist and Former Ambassador in Paris’,
Gazette, November 2002. He was also the first ever British diplomat posted in Mongolia, as Charge
d'Affaires in Ulan Bator from 1964 to 1966. As we shall see, John Colvin and Daphne Park followed
in his footsteps to that remote listening post.
43 Reginald Hibbert, ‘Intelligence and Policy’, Intelligence and National Security, 5:1 (1990), pp. 10-
11.
44 Ibid, pp. 11-12.
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officers collected in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Hanoi, was largely privileged or classified material,
with the occasional piece of secret intelligence acquired as well. Furthermore, as Hibbert points out,
the British Foreign Office itself was a ‘huge assessment machine’ that constituted a ‘capacious and
versatile digestive system’ fed by the aforementioned material.45 Given that one of its merits was a
lesser degree of classification, it is partly for this reason that Foreign Office documents make up the
crux of this thesis’s archival sources.
Other scholars arrive at similar conceptions of intelligence, albeit it with different structures.
Johnson, for example, draws upon the notion of intelligence as a jigsaw puzzle, asserting that many
different types of information together form the whole picture, most of which will originate from
publicly available documents. In the American context, he argues that whilst the ‘overwhelming
percentage – sometimes upwards of ninety-five per cent’ of intelligence reports to US policymakers is
based on open sources, the small portion of clandestine material can be vital, providing the secret
‘nugget’ to understand foreign adversaries’ plans.46 By contrast, Hibbert adopts a slightly different
stance, arguing that ‘modern governments have three foreign intelligence systems: diplomacy, the
intelligence community, and the overseas links of other governmental departments’ (including
treasuries, health, transport, etc.).47 Although he diverges from Herman in his assessment of covert
intelligence, arguing that this is insufficiently reflected in the ‘layer cake’ concept, as in his view, ‘it
probably rivals all the layers of the diplomatic system put together’,48 he nonetheless conceives of the
actors that gather intelligence as ‘sitting at various points on a continuum’ between overt and covert
sources of collection.49 As this section has sought to show, defining intelligence carries with it
significant issues for the scholar, particularly when faced with the ‘secrecy versus information’ binary
that so commonly divides the literature. However, more sophisticated understandings of intelligence
that avoid this dichotomy – represented by the likes of Herman, Johnson, and Hibbert – serve to
45 Ibid, p. 111.
46 Johnson, ‘Introduction’, pp. 3-4.
47 Michael Herman, ‘Intelligence and Policy: A Comment’, Intelligence and National Security, 6:1
(1991), p. 239.
48 Ibid, p. 233.
49 Ibid, p. 231.
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provide a useful, more encompassing definition of intelligence that underpins the content of the case
studies in this thesis.
The Special Relationship
The following section will turn its attention to the illustrious ‘Special Relationship’ between Britain
and the United States, focusing particularly upon intelligence. The dynamics of alliance generally
have constituted a sizeable area of activity for scholars of both international history and international
relations. The motivations of long-term alliance beyond immediate security emergencies are broadly
considered to be either power maximisation, ideological affinity or liberal-institutional partnerships.
Official explanations have tended to emphasise common ideals, but in recent years, scholars have
tended to emphasise realist explanations.50
Since Richelson and Ball’s landmark piece on post-war intelligence cooperation between
Western countries in the 1980s, the dynamics of the Special Relationship during the Cold War have
been subject to much consideration and debate amongst scholars. Labelled as a ‘significant feature of
twentieth-century history’ by Jeffreys-Jones, he argues that intelligence became a ‘vital ingredient’ in
the national security arrangements of democratic countries in alliance such as the UK, the US,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Moreover, given its academic value as the ‘world’s most
dominant example of liaison’ from an intelligence perspective, the relationship’s dynamics merit
further exploration.51
Boasting close political, military, and economic ties, conventional literature on the Special
Relationship has portrayed intimate cooperation, exchange, and most importantly, an even footing,
50 The classic literature includes: T.J. Christensen and Jack L. Snyder, ‘Chain Gangs and Passed
Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarityns in Multipolarity,’ International Organisation,
44:2 (1990); Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in
International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York, 1973); Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of
Alliances (Ithaca, 1987).
51 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, ‘The End of an Exclusive Special Intelligence Relationship: British-
American Intelligence Cooperation Before, During, and After the 1960s’, Intelligence and National
Security, 27:5 (2012), p. 707.
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between the two main transatlantic allies. Key thinkers belonging to this school of thought, such as
Dumbrell, argue that in addition to close cultural ties, including historical and linguistic connections,
the longevity Special Relationship has its roots in the ‘intimate combination of defence and
intelligence linkages’, going as far back as Roosevelt and Churchill’s relationship in the early 1940s.52
Such approaches are often related to institutional understandings of the Special Relationship;
Dumbrell, for example, highlights the ‘institutions, habits, and strategic choices’ of both allies that
have proven their ability to ‘reshape and survive’ other crises into the twenty-first century.53
Moreover, he argues that the proximity of the two allies was the product of a response from a
perceived mutual threat, stemming from the conditions of the end of the Second World War, and
advent of the Cold War.54 In this way, it is not surprising that military intelligence, especially around
nuclear weapons, their targeting and their control, could be seen to dominate the Anglo-American
Cold War intelligence relationship.
Significantly, a strong consensus exists as to the centrality of nuclear-related matters in setting
the relationship’s foundations. Aldrich has observed how it is ‘often remarked’ that the twin pillars of
US-UK security cooperation in the Cold War were nuclear weapons and intelligence exchange, the
former the ‘subject of a number of impressive studies’, including by Clark, Melissen, and Baylis.55
This is underpinned by other important works laying out the dynamics of the Special Relationship,
such as Goodman, who argues that in the immediate post-war period, intelligence on the Soviet
nuclear weapons programme was ‘vital’ to Anglo-American intelligence and military planning after
the detonation of the first Soviet nuclear bomb.56 Demonstrated through mutual primary intelligence
targets on Soviet technological advances, cooperation over the Soviet long-range detection
52 John Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK Special Relationship’ in a World Twice Transformed’, Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, 17:3 (2004), p. 437.
53 Ibid, p. 439.
54 Ibid, p. 438.
55 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ during the
Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 24:3 (1998), p. 331. For more information, see the
following: Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain's Deterrent and
America, 1957-62 (Oxford, 1994); Jan Melissen, The Struggle for Nuclear Partnership: Britain, the
United States and the Making of an Ambiguous Alliance, 1952-9, (Groningen, 1993); J. Baylis,
Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy, 1945-64 (Oxford, 1995).
56 Michael Goodman, Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb,
(Stanford, 2007), p. 2.
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programme, and the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile, he goes as far as to the label Anglo-American
atomic intelligence ‘in effect a ‘special relationship’ within the broader, more commonly referred to
special relationship’.57 Lastly, underlining the importance of information-sharing over nuclear-related
matters, Dumbrell argues that the UK-USA Mutual Defence Agreement of 1958 ‘set the stage for an
extended era of mutual intermeshing of defence technologies and policies’, as well as a ‘unique
sharing of intelligence’ unseen between other Western partners.58
However, the significance of the Special Relationship lay not so much in the intimacy of
intelligence and nuclear ties, but in just how much weight it carried in comparison to other areas of
cooperation. Dumbrell underscores the resilience of the Special Relationship when it came to military
and intelligence cooperation; despite major diplomatic fallouts over foreign policy clashes such as
Suez, Vietnam, and Grenada in 1983, he states that ‘close military and intelligence linkages persisted’,
which were what elevated the Special Relationship to a status of ‘an existence above and beyond the
strategic choices of transnational political elites’.59 A similar concurrence can be found in Aldrich,
who discusses cooperation over strategic intelligence assessments between the two powers. Arguing
that that the compartmentalisation of the respective British and American intelligence agencies during
the 1950s and 1960s was what ‘rendered many aspects of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation
particularly resilient’, this allowed the relationship to be unshaken by foreign policy failures
elsewhere.60
Despite the perceived resilience of the Special Relationship, more recent scholarship on the
subject has captured a different set of dynamics between Britain and the US, characterised by tension
and what David Reynolds has called competitive co-operation.61 Emphasising a strong sense of
divergence between the two allies, this revisionist school of thought argues that competition – and
even animosity – was what characterised relations between the two partners, what Dumbrell and Ellis
57 Ibid, pp. 2-3; 166.
58 Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK Special Relationship’, pp. 437-438.
59 Ibid.
60 Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American Special Relationship’, pp. 336-7.
61 David Reynolds, ‘Rethinking Anglo-American Relations’, International Affairs, 65:1 (1988), pp.
89-111.
62
have labelled ‘the intensity of transatlantic antagonism’.62 Exemplary of scholarship dissecting the
relationship’s decline over the course of the Cold War, Jeffreys-Jones argues that although Anglo-
American relations reached a ‘Churchillian apogee’ in the 1940s and 1950s, domestic changes in the
US, British decline, and differing approaches to foreign policy eroded at the exclusivity of the Special
Relationship into the 1960s.63 Noting the ‘migration of power to the other side of the Atlantic’, he
firmly states that the mutual bond described by orthodox scholars ‘had no guarantee of permanence’.64
Furthermore, although associated with more traditionalist accounts of the Special Relationship,
Dumbrell notes that the phrase ‘special relationship’ has become ‘as much associated with British
weakness and dependency’ as it has with transatlantic mutuality.65 British decline has been singled out
as a particularly significant factor in this breakdown. Often equated with imperial overstretch from the
decline of the British Empire following the Second World War, numerous scholars have pointed to
Britain’s flagging economic power as damaging the gravitas it previously held in the Special
Relationship.66
Yet, these changes owed much to broader diplomatic tension over foreign policy issues,
linked in part to Britain’s decline. Drawing upon Reynold’s broader diplomatic framework of
‘competitive cooperation’, applied to the earlier Special Relationship in the late 1930s, Jeffreys-Jones
points to tensions over the Fuchs affair, a shift in social attitudes, and accelerating decolonisation of
the British empire as bringing about ‘shifts in power and political utility’ for Britain.67 Furthermore,
intelligence as it related to foreign policy did little more than inflame existing tensions. As Aldrich
notes, CIA covert operations – some of which were ‘designed, in part, to modify some aspects of
British foreign policy which were distasteful to Washington’, (including opposition to Euro
62 John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives, 1966-67:
Marigold, Sunflowers and ‘Kosygin Week’, Diplomatic History, 27:1 (2003), p. 145.
63 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, ‘The End of an Exclusive Special Intelligence Relationship: British-
American Intelligence Cooperation Before, During, and After the 1960s’, Intelligence and National
Security, 27:5 (2012), p. 707.
64 Ibid, pp. 711-18.
65 Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK Special Relationship’, p. 437.
66 See for example: David Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since
1945, (Basingstoke, 1990); John Dumbrell, ‘The Johnson Administration and the British Labour
Government: Vietnam, the Pound, and East of Suez’, Journal of American Studies, 30:2 (1996), pp.
211-231; Dumbrell and Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives’, p. 149.
67 Jeffreys-Jones, ‘The End of an Exclusive Special Intelligence Relationship, pp. 714-715.
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federalism, and OEEC activities) contributed to an ‘unavoidable’ – if somewhat hostile – interplay
between intelligence estimates and covert action.68 This is further evidenced in a mid-1960s enquiry
President Johnson commissions into the British MI5 and other agencies. In the wake of the Ramparts
affair, the US sought to establish if there were lessons that could be adopted from the British model,
only to reject the British intelligence model (in particular, the Foreign Office’s Information Research
Department).69 However, for Aldrich, this mirrored broader Anglo-American disagreements over
détente in the late 1950s, as well as divergence between the CIA and SIS in areas like the Middle East.
As such, intelligence was more a component of the realist ‘bargain’ between the two powers, rather
than an unconditional alliance.70
The acute and growing asymmetry within the Special Relationship during this period has
drawn strong attention from revisionist scholars. Claiming that the Special Relationship was an
‘Anglo-American myth’, Beloff argues that such were divergences in foreign policy, that by the
1960s, the notion of the ‘special relationship’ was ‘something of an irritant’ to American officials.71
Vietnam was a particular bone of contention between the two powers. In their excellent discussion of
the Kosygin-Wilson peace talks in 1967 over Vietnam, Dumbrell and Ellis assert that the late 1960s
were characterised as a period of an ‘extremely high level of mutual distrust, impatience, and even
personal dislike’ pervading Anglo-American relations.72 Underlining Wilson’s desire for a close
relationship with US President Johnson, they note the manner in which foreign policy divergences –
most notably, Britain’s refusal to engage military in Vietnam – called into question Wilson’s faith in
diplomacy. The ramifications were clear – surrounding diplomatic ties were ‘problems of mutual
incomprehension, resentment, and mistrust’.73 A similar sentiment is echoed in Ruane’s work, who,
tracing divergence in British and US foreign policy back to the Geneva Conference of 1954, describes
the ‘smouldering resentment’ felt in Washington at London’s refusal to support action in Vietnam. In
68 Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American Special Relationship’, p. 338.
69 Jeffreys-Jones, ‘The End of an Exclusive Special Intelligence Relationship, p. 720.
70 Ibid, pp. 338-339.
71 Ibid, p. 718.
72 Dumbrell and Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives’, p. 145.
73 Ibid, pp. 145-148.
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his view, this aggravated Anglo-American tensions ‘to the gravest strain’.74 It is for this reason that, as
Jeffreys-Jones has stated, by the late 1960s, the term ‘Special Relationship’ was only really invoked
by the UK, by then the clear junior partner.75
One particular strand of thought within the revisionist school argues that such was Britain’s
fragility in the 1960s, that it had little to offer the US other than intelligence and a shrinking array of
global military bases. In these terms, Britain stood to gain considerably more from the alliance than its
counterpart. Baylis argues that Britain’s proximity with the US allowed it to increase its own security
by cutting the costs of its own strategic deterrent. This was particularly true when it came to US troop
commitment in Europe, as the US was able to take over some of Britain’s defence commitments.76
Moreover, Smith adds that the US had considerably less to gain from this partnership, owing to the
fact that it had several special relationships, such as with West Germany, Japan, Israel, and Canada
during the Cold War. Resultantly, he maintains that because of these disparities in global power, the
Special Relationship ‘as viewed from Washington, often looked less important than it appeared in
London’.77
Crucially, a sub-school within the revisionist literature has argued that in light of its own
decline, Britain sought to utilise the Special Relationship as a diplomatic tool. Where Britain’s
economic and political prowess might once have carried weight, into the 1960s, Britain had to rely
upon two key weapons left in its arsenal in order to influence the US: what Aldrich has referred to as
its ‘residual empire’, and intelligence. Dumbrell, for example, argues that this reification of the
Special Relationship was, to some degree, purposefully fostered by political elites in the UK, who
regarded a strong partnership with the US as ‘the best way to manage and finesse British international
decline’.78 These dynamics played themselves out over Vietnam and China in particular as matters of
notable divergence between the two partners.
74 Kevin Ruane, ‘Containing America? Aspects of British Foreign Policy and the Cold War in
Southeast Asia, 1951-54’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 7:1 (1996), pp. 141-143.
75 Jeffreys-Jones, ‘The End of an Exclusive Special Intelligence Relationship, p. 711.
76 Baylis, Ambiguity and Deterrence, p. 213.
77 Steve Smith, ‘The Special Relationship’, Political Studies, 38:1 (2006), p. 133.
78 Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK Special Relationship’, p. 438.
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Given the recognised inferiority of the British as the junior partner in the Special
Relationship, Britain sought to exert its influence upon the Americans in order to effectively contain
the latter’s foreign policy. Although somewhat an anomaly in this strand of thought, given that they
reject the notion of Britain’s imperial decline, Marsh and Baylis nonetheless argue that Britain sought
to ‘guide the naïve American giant’ on the international stage by making the Special Relationship
forward-looking, and still relevant to the US.79 Asserting that the relationship was merely ‘informally
special’ at best, they maintain that Britain’s use of its colonies and informal empire for defence
cooperation was able to placate US anti-colonial sentiment.80 In a similar vein, both Ruane and
Dockrill contend that Britain’s economic difficulties meant it could no longer maintain its overseas
commitments as it had done in its imperial heyday. Fearing damage to its prestige and international
standing, the solution manifested itself in ‘burdensharing’, principally with the US.81 Furthermore,
Ruane points to Vietnam as a key area of contention. Fearing that US military intervention might have
provoked a Chinese response, precipitating an ‘Asian or even a global conflagration’, this prompted
Britain’s strategy to essentially contain the Americans in Asia.82
Lastly, intelligence was a key tool by which Britain was able to harness to offset the
asymmetry of the Special Relationship. Upholding intelligence as Britain’s ‘most important’
contribution to the Special Relationship, Aldrich asserts that although the UK’s intelligence-gathering
capabilities declined relative to the US after 1945, the rate of their decline was still slower than that of
British military capabilities.83 Significantly, he argues that Britain’s value in the Special Relationship
derived from its ‘residual empire’; in both nuclear and intelligence exchange, Britain’s overseas
territories provided ‘invaluable political contacts, but also a vast panoply of key airbases, naval
installations, and suitable sites for technical collection’. Although he notes the caveat that precise
nature of Britain’s contribution remains ‘something of an imponderable’, he nevertheless points to an
79 Steve Marsh and John Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American Special Relationship: The Lazarus of
International Relations’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 17:1 (2006), pp. 173-174.
80 Ibid, pp. 182-195.
81 81 Ruane, ‘Containing America?, pp. 145-148; M. L. Dockrill, ‘The Foreign Office, Anglo-
American Relations, and the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951’, International Affairs, 62:3 (1986),
pp. 459-476.
82 Ruane, ‘Containing America?’, pp. 141-143.
83 Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American Special Relationship’, p. 348.
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‘unrivalled network’ that served US foreign policy interests, and in some cases provided
‘indispensable’ contributions to US security arrangements.84 Noting that British technical intelligence
collection systems were more ‘immune to imperial retreat’ that other defence capabilities, Britain was
able to maintain (sometimes undeclared) collection systems in former colonial territories, and was
particularly strong in the area of non-Soviet targets, including China, Vietnam, and later, Africa.85
The Special Intelligence Relationship in Asia
Having examined the broader literature on the dynamics of the Special Relationship, the following
section surveys existing literature on the Special Intelligence Relationship in Asia. Aldrich observes
that, although various scholars have written about Anglo-American exchange over nuclear and
defence intelligence, intelligence on its own is ‘rarely subjected to sustained analysis or integrated into
the context of the discussion’.86 For example, although Richelson and Ball wrote a seminal piece in
the mid-1980s on post-war intelligence cooperation between Western countries, he argues that this
focused too heavily upon organisational and structural features, rather than considering the impact of
intelligence estimates upon national security or alliance systems as a whole.87 Furthermore, Aldrich
adds that, despite the substantial archival releases of new documentation since the end of the Cold
War (by London, Washington, and Moscow), ‘constraints still continue to operate’, the biggest
consequence of which seems to have been the ‘relative dearth of other serious studies in the field’,
when contrasted with the deluge of memoirs and personal accounts from the past two decades.88 With
84 Ibid, pp. 349-350.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid, p 335. He points to C. J. Bartlett, 'The Special Relationship': A Political History of Anglo-
American Relations since 1945 (London, 1992); Robert M. Hathaway, Great Britain and the United
States: Special Relations Since World War Two, (Boston, 1990). For two exceptions see the useful
discussions in Christopher Hitchen, Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies (London,
1990); David Reynolds, ‘A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order since
the Second World War', International Affairs, 62:1 (1985), pp. 1-20. On liaison generally, see H.
Bradford Westerfield, America and the World of Liaison', Intelligence and National Security, 11:3
(1996), pp. 523-60.
87 Ibid, p. 334.
88 Ibid, p. 335.
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this in mind, this section attempts to map out existing literature on the Special Intelligence
Relationship in Asia, whilst also observing the notable gaps in knowledge that exist on this subject,
across a range of disciplines.
Diplomatic historians have covered in considerable depth the history of the Special
Relationship in Asia across the breadth of the Cold War. Given the degree of diplomatic divergence
over the region, this has given rise to numerous detailed studies of diplomatic negotiations, political
crises, and wilting alliances, particularly during the 1960s. For example, John Young, Sylvia Ellis,
Peter Busch, Gerald Hughes, and Greg Kennedy have devoted substantial pieces to researching the
dynamics of ‘transatlantic antagonism’ between the two allies, between them covering the
ramifications of Britain’s decolonisation, failed peace talks with the US, and the more personal
relationships that characterised the Special Relationship.89
However, it is worth noting that whilst these works together provide an excellent overview of
the Special Relationship in Asia, intelligence palpably remains as the ‘missing dimension’ of
diplomatic history. This is despite its proximity and indeed, its direct involvement in foreign policy-
making, particularly through national strategic assessments. To give but one example, Kear’s account
of the British Consulate-General in Hanoi in the 1960s fails to take account of the fact that six
consecutive Consul-Generals stationed in Hanoi were SIS officers.90 Similarly, Young, Ellis, et al. fail
to account for the intelligence dimension of diplomatic negotiations between the UK and US over
delicate matters such as Vietnam. This is particularly discerning as both British and American
archives are replete with documents and cables from intelligence officers and agencies seeking to
establish the political climate surrounding negotiations between the Western and Asian powers
(especially China and North Vietnam).91
89 John Young, Wilson Government and the Davies Mission’; Ellis, Britain, America and the Vietnam
War; Pedaliu, ‘Transatlantic Relations at a Time When ‘More Flags’ Meant ‘No European Flags’;
Busch, Busch, All the Way with JFK?: Britain, the US, and the Vietnam War, (New York, 2003),
Hughes, Wilson’s Cold War; Vaughan, Anglo-American Relations in the Vietnam War; Thorne, Allies
of a Kind; Greg Kennedy, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933-1939,
(London, 2002).
90 See Simon Kear, ‘The British Consulate-General in Hanoi, 1954-1973’, Diplomacy and Statecraft,
10:1 (1999), pp. 215-39.
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An overview of the intelligence history of Asia also presents us with a stark contrast.
Intelligence collection and cooperation before and during the Second World War is rich in depth of
discussion. Ranging from British intelligence and codebreaking, to Allied intelligence cooperation, an
overabundance of works exists in this respect.92 However, literature on British intelligence in Asia is
more limited in scope, with much research focusing upon Japan and the Pacific theatre of war, 93 an
exception perhaps being Aldrich’s research into ‘imperial rivalry’ in Asia prior to 1946, going against
the grain of the overall pattern of the wartime Special Intelligence Relationship.94 However, the same
cannot be said for the British SIS in Asia, in which existing literature is considerably more scattered
and fragmentary. Whilst it must be noted that seminal monographs exist on a more general history of
SIS, by scholars such as Dorril, Jeffrey, West, Davies, and Bower, constant to all their work are the
holes that appear on SIS in Asia. Other than the mention of a handful of SIS officers that they
acknowledge were posted to stations in Asia, little, if any, real coverage is given to British intelligence
collection in any of these pieces.95 In contrast to the Special Operations Executive (SOE), for which
there is substantially more work, few standalone pieces exist on SIS, other than Aldrich’s piece on
Britain’s SIS in Asia during the Second World War, and Davies’ structural piece on SIS in Singapore
and the Far Eastern Controller.96 Whilst this is undoubtedly due in part to archival record retention.
92 For example, on British intelligence during the Second World War, see: R. V. Jones, The Wizard
War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945 (New York, 1978); Francis H. Hinsley and Michael
Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, (New York, 1979—1990); David Alvarez,
(ed.), Allied and Axis Signals Intelligence in World War II (London, 1999), 146-167. See also John
Ferris, The British Army and Signals Intelligence during the First World War, (Stroud, 1992).
93 For example, see: Antony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-
1941, (Basingstoke, 2002); Douglas Ford, Britain’s Secret War Against Japan, 1937-45, (London,
2006); Alan Stripp, Codebreaker in the Far East, (Oxford, 1989).
94 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Imperial Rivalry: British and American Intelligence in Asia, 1942-1946’,
Intelligence and National Security, 3:1 (1988), pp. 5-55.
95 See the following: Stephen Dorril, Inside the World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service,
(New York, 2000); Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service, 1909-1949,
(London, 2010); Nigel West, MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations, 1905-1945, (New
York, 1983); Philip H. J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying: Structure and Process in
Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service, (Abingdon, 2004); Gordon Corera, The Art of Betrayal: The
Secret History of MI6, (New York, 2012); Tom Bower, Red Web: MI6 and the KGB Master Coup,
(London, 1989).
96 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service during the Second World War’, Modern
Asian Studies, 32:1 (1998), pp. 179-217; Philip H. J. Davies, ‘The SIS Singapore Station and the Role
of the Far East Controller: Secret Intelligence Structure and Process in Postwar Colonial
Administration, Intelligence and National Security, 14:4 (1999), 105-129. For Britain’s SOE, see
Charles Greg Cruickshank, ‘SOE in the Far East, (Oxford, 1983); Richard Gough, SOE Singapore,
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The still classified MI6 records are especially weak on both the Middle East and Asia, compared to
Europe.97 Moreover, from the early 1970s onwards, significant amounts of Foreign Office and other
records on Asia are still withheld in the National Archive at Kew, as well as the unfortunate lack of
surviving intelligence officers from this period, it still begs the question as to why such little has been
written on SIS in Asia, compared to Russia, Europe, and the Middle East.
Beyond 1945, however, and into the Cold War, the landscape on British intelligence in Asia
becomes much sparser, particularly with regard to the Special Relationship. A small cluster of
research exists around British signals intelligence in Asia. Thomas details British signals intelligence
in the immediate post-war period, lending some attention to Hong Kong, whilst Ball devotes a piece
to British signals intelligence operating out of the Little Sai Wan station in Hong Kong, lending some
attention to American signals intelligence from there too.98 Without doubt, the most comprehensive
piece to be found not simply on British intelligence, but also intelligence exchange, is Aldrich’s study
of Anglo-American competitive co-operation over intelligence during the early Cold War, including
Asia, although this study does not extend much beyond the 1950s.99 Most of these limitations on
British intelligence history in Asia exist, in no small part, because of documentation availability in the
archives. As discussed in the methodology, this is without doubt a key factor in the ability of the
intelligence historian to access later chapter of SIS and GCHQ’s history in Asia in the late 1960s and
beyond.
Action leaves a more visible trail than espionage. Accordingly, a substantial body of work
exists on the nexus between British intelligence, special operations, subversion, and propaganda in the
post-war period in Asia. In 2000, the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies convened a conference on the
Clandestine Cold War in Asia, in co-operation with SOAS. Attended by a number of retired
1941-42, (London, 1985); Christopher J. Murphy, Security and Special Operations: SOE and MI5
during the Second World War, (Basingstoke, 2006); Alan Ogden, Tigers Burning Bright: SOE Heroes
in the Far East, (New York, 2013).
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98 See Andy Thomas, ‘British Signals Intelligence after the Second World War’, Intelligence and
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practitioners, including John Colvin, the papers dealt with subjects such as British covert support in
Malaya, American espionage and psychological operations in Hong Kong, as well as work on
Singapore, Korea, and Burma.100 Furthermore, Baxter details the operations of British Intelligence in
Asia during the immediate post-war period in a carefully researched article on MI6, McKnight
discusses SEATO’s interaction with Asian security organisations during the earlier Cold War, and
Easter discusses the British propaganda campaign against Indonesia during the Confrontation, fed by
British human and signals intelligence.101 It is worth noting that this coverage is largely reflective
upon the archival records behind them – and as such, revealing of the difference in accessibility
between intelligence records, as opposed to covert action or propaganda records. Having previously
mentioned the newest releases pertaining to the Mau Mau insurgency in 2011, a large body of work
exists on the Foreign Office’s Information Research Department in Asia.102
Nonetheless, despite the shortcomings of both intelligence and diplomatic history in this area,
a handful of important pieces exist on the Special Intelligence Relationship in Asia. Between them,
they span the sub-disciplines of intelligence, international relations, and diplomacy. Intersecting with
all of these disciplines, it becomes clear that intelligence exchange between Western allies is perhaps
the area afforded the greatest level of depth by scholars. For example, in what is considered one of the
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Liaison’: British Anti-Communist Propaganda and Cooperation with the United States, 1950-51’,
Intelligence and National Security, 17:4 (2002), pp. 100-130; Tony Shaw, ‘The Information Research
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key contributions to intelligence exchange as a topic of research, Walsh comparatively discusses
intelligence sharing between the US and Britain, France, and Germany – the latter all of which are
considered junior partners to the US during the Cold War. Adopting an approach that examines the
Special Intelligence Relationship through ‘relational contracting’ – a process based on trust and
neoliberal institutionalism – he discusses the utility of Britain’s contribution to the Special
Relationship, arguing that there was ‘little need for a hierarchical relationship’ when it came to
intelligence exchange between the allies.103
Yet, Walsh’s emphasis rests very much upon the Soviet Union as Britain’s main focus for
intelligence gathering. Although he discusses, to a limited extent, British facilities in Asia which were
able to grant the US better access to ‘listening posts’ on the USSR (such as Hong Kong and
Singapore), his research on British intelligence collection in Asia is minimal. As such, it offers little
on the impact of British intelligence upon broader Anglo-American relations.104 Similar issues arise in
other important pieces that address British intelligence and the Special Relationship. Located in the
school upholding the notion that the Special Intelligence Relationship was able to rise above foreign
policy divergences, Aldrich contextualises the nature of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation
over the Soviet Bloc and China. Arguing that such intelligence activities retained a resilience because
they were ‘specialised, compartmentalised, or technical’ in face of foreign policy disagreements,105 he
observes that part of this link’s strength also lay in on-the-ground difficulties of collecting intelligence
in such hostile territories, pointing to the perilous nature of human operations, and secure enemy
communications systems. Under such conditions of informational ‘famine’, he states that the British
and Commonwealth contributions were ‘indispensable’.106 However, emphasis in this piece rests more
so upon the changing dynamics of the Special Intelligence Relationship, than the nature and value of
the British contribution in Asia.
A few other pieces make a more concerted link between British intelligence in Asia and the
Special Relationship. Devoting one chapter to the decline of the Special Relationship in Vietnam
103 James Igoe Walsh, The International Politics of Intelligence Sharing, (New York, 2010), p. 29.
104 Ibid, pp. 33-34.
105 Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American Special Relationship’, pp. 341-342.
106 Ibid, pp. 341-344.
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during the Cold War, Jeffreys-Jones discusses the notion of Anglo-American rivalry, described as
being ‘as evident in the world of spies as in that of diplomats’.107 Noting British economic decline, the
piece positions itself within the school of thought that Britain sought to construct a relationship with
the US that would preserve Britain’s illusion of imperial power amidst its decline. Yet, other than a
brief allude to ‘notable contributions’ to both joint successes and failures with American intelligence
partners, little detail emerges on their substance; instead, attention is focused upon the Thompson
Advisory Mission to South Vietnam, entering counterinsurgency territory.108 Thus, other than
Vietnam’s status as a ‘source of awkwardness’ between the allies, Britain’s intelligence value remains
hidden within this territory.
Perhaps the best work on British intelligence in Asia as it relates to the Special Relationship is
to be found in Aldrich’s Hidden Hand. Writing within the ‘deep strand of ambiguity’ injected into the
Special Relationship as both allies sought to manage their presence on the global stage, he observes
that a tension arose alongside the realisation that a ‘global intelligence system was synonymous with
successful management of empire’.109 Although this ‘lent a new utility to the remnants’ of Britain’s
former empire, this what somewhat tempered in Asia, which he labels an area of ‘unspecial’ relations
between the UK an US, owing to deep economic and foreign policy divergences.110 However, Aldrich
provides the most comprehensive account of British intelligence collection in China and Hong Kong
within this framework, arguing that ‘China, not the Soviet Union, was the ‘driver’ in American
policy’ during the later twentieth century, which ‘electrified Anglo-American differences’.111
Crucially, his work on this study was carried out in the 1990s, in a period of documentary scarcity,
and at a time when electronic databases were in their infancy, limiting its scope. Nevertheless, his
argument that British and American disagreements over a wider regional war lent further purpose to
107 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western Intelligence, (Oxford, 2013), p.
128.
108 Ibid, pp. 131-140.
109 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 9.
110 Ibid, p. 293.
111 Ibid, p. 313.
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British agents and signals intelligence from Asia is of real value in framing this thesis’s evidential
base and argument.112
Conclusion
The review of literature undertaken above is of utility in framing this thesis’s arguments, and in
locating its contribution to knowledge. Having examined the ‘what is intelligence?’ debate so prolific
amongst intelligence historians and practitioners, this chapter has focused on a dichotomy that runs
through much of the literature, between defining ‘intelligence’ according to secrecy, or information.
However, it has also presented an alternative school of thought which regards ‘intelligence’ as
something more akin to a spectrum, in which both overt and covert material are situated, the latter
being but a smaller proportion of what intelligence services gather abroad. This is particularly true in
the British context, and serves us well by setting up the range of material British SIS officers gathered
in Asia, as the case study chapters will demonstrate.
This chapter has also presented an overview of the ‘Special Relationship’ between Britain and
the United States, in both diplomatic, and intelligence terms. It has contrasted two key schools of
thought that differ in their regard to the dynamics of the Special Relationship, outlining orthodox
thinking on a more balanced, mutual relationship between the two allies, against revisionist thinking
on ‘transatlantic antagonism’. This debate is important for situating the broader argument offered by
the thesis; namely that British intelligence gathering in Asia took place against the dynamics of an
inverse relationship, in which Britain was very much the junior partner, able to punch above its weight
through its intelligence contribution.
Lastly, this chapter has demonstrated the limited scale of literature on British intelligence in
Asia, particularly as it relates to the Special Relationship. Although intelligence history is a diverse
and vibrant field, there remain many shortcomings to research on the British SIS, hindered in no small
part by the limited access scholars have to declassified documents, particularly in the later stages of
112 Ibid, pp. 305-313.
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the Cold War. However, there are a few vital pieces that make the connection between British
intelligence collection in Asia with the broader Special Intelligence Relationship. These are key to
framing the broader argument offered by the thesis. Nonetheless, this overview also points to real gaps
in knowledge on the specificities of SIS intelligence collection in Asia. This is vital for this thesis’s
contribution to knowledge, as the activities of SIS officers in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Hanoi have
gone largely unnoticed. With this in mind, and the snippets of information offered in existing
literature about these stations, this thesis aims to make a contribution to the field through a fuller
account of SIS intelligence collection in these three locations through a careful review of the extant
archival materials.
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The Special Intelligence Relationship in Asia
Britain and the United States emerged from the Second World War in the pursuit of two contrasting
approaches to foreign policy.1 Although both were driven by an ideological commitment to contain
the spread of Communism – albeit it to varying degrees – differing political and economic stances
determined their policies. Most notably, Britain was undergoing a protracted ‘crisis of empire’, its
engagement in the Cold War plagued by an almost continual state of imperial retreat and defence
over-stretch. While Britain was determined to escape from empire, Whitehall and Washington were
anxious that this should not leave a vacuum that might be filled by communism.2
Epitomised by the politics of ‘diplomatic divergence’, as discussed in the literature review
chapter, the contrasting approaches of Britain and America to these complex problems manifested
themselves most obviously in Asia, rendering it a particularly significant theatre of operations for the
Special Intelligence Relationship. Its strategic importance to both powers meant that their various
interventions in the region created both opportunities and sources of friction when it came to
intelligence gathering. As Jones argues, London and Washington were unable to overcome the
frequent differences of views and policies in their responses to the Communist threat, the most
obvious sign being their divergence over the recognition of the People’s Republic of China.3 Britain
1 D. Reynolds, ‘Rethinking Anglo-American Relations’, International Affairs, 65:1 (1988), pp. 89-
111.
2 S. Dockrill, Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?
(London, 2002); A.I. Singh, The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American
Relationship, 1947-56 (London, 1993); R.J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United
States, India, and Pakistan, (New York, 1994).
3 Matthew Jones, ‘‘Maximum Disavowable Aid’: Britain, the United States, and the Indonesian
Rebellion, 1957-58’, The English Historical Review, 114:459 (1999), p. 1216.
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recognised Communist China in 1949, while the United States held out until Nixon’s famous
rapprochement with Beijing in the 1970s.4
As this chapter will explain, on a broader level, diplomatic divergence extended across Asia.
Britain and the United States clashed over policy in countries including China, Korea, Vietnam, and
Indonesia. Critically, this also manifested itself in intelligence policy at both a strategic and tactical
level; the American CIA and British SIS were often at odds over approaches to countering
Communism, particularly as Britain struggled with limited resources and political tensions stemming
from its dwindling empire. London was especially sceptical about the CIA’s enthusiasm for
propaganda and covert action, often conducted in collaboration with Taiwan or Chinese exiles and
dissidents.5
However, this also meant that intelligence collection lent a new utility to the remnants of
Britain’s empire in Asia, particularly in areas in which the US found itself lacking ‘eyes and ears’.
Through a brief historical overview of the Special Intelligence Relationship in Asia, this chapter aims
to provide context to the later dynamics of Cold War intelligence gathering in the region in the mid to
late-1960s. In doing so, it also seeks to demonstrate the strategic importance of Asia – not only in
terms of the wealth of intelligence sources it provided Britain with – but also with regard to the
broader value it lent to Britain’s ‘residual empire’. It is important not to underestimate this last point –
as the case studies seek to evidence, the intelligence ‘take’ that these territories facilitated was
significant in offsetting British decline elsewhere in its foreign policy. It ultimately elevated Britain’s
worth in a relationship in which it was widely acknowledged to be the junior partner.
The Remnants of Empire
Intelligence collection lent a new utility to the remnants of Britain’s empire located in Asia. Britain’s
imperial prestige had suffered a rapid decline with the onset of the Cold War, as it sought to re-
4 J.H. Tang, ‘From empire defence to imperial retreat: Britain's postwar China policy and the
decolonization of Hong Kong,’ Modern Asian Studies, 28:02 (1994), pp. 317-337.
5 W.S. Lucas and Alistair Morey, ‘The hidden ‘alliance’: The CIA and MI6 before and after Suez’,
Intelligence and National Security, 15:2 (2000), pp.95-120.
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negotiate the status of its colonial territories into a Commonwealth of independent states. Outwardly
seeking to present this as a series of smooth constitutional transitions commanding consensus on all
sides, in reality there was much fighting. Tangled in a complex web of small wars and insurgencies
throughout the post-war period, Britain lost significant territories that were either sympathetic to the
USSR or stridently non-aligned and neutralist. Even those that remained closer to Britain were often
fraught with their own, complex internal divisions. In the 1960s alone, Britain lost Cyprus, Singapore,
Malta, Kenya, Aden, Uganda and Mauritius to independence.6 Nonetheless, it retained an extensive
network of defence and intelligence bases across the majority of these territories, particularly in Asia.
As Jones argues, Britain’s ‘residual imperial footholds’ were what gave Britain access to resources
and bases across Southeast Asia, ultimately allowing it to continue playing a strategic role in the
containment of Communism well into the 1960s.7
Crucially, these footholds were nodal points for British intelligence collection as it struggled
with the end of empire. This occurred in two main ways: firstly, the countries of the New
Commonwealth were designated Crown territory and ‘friendly countries’, and resultantly received
MI5 liaison officers to be stationed in them, working closely alongside internal security services and
police forces.8 Whilst GCHQ and its sister agency, LCSA, provided cypher machines and technical
support through diplomatic facilities there, turf wars between MI5 and SIS meant that the latter tended
not to secure its own stations in these territories.9 However, as the case study chapters demonstrate,
SIS was adept at placing its officers within diplomatic posts in order to discreetly gather intelligence
from their confines. In fact, Easter also asserts that just as the CIA and KGB were doing, Britain also
engaged in ‘practical cryptanalysis’ from its embassies, utilising human intelligence officers to
supplement the secrets of cryptographic systems, by subverting cypher clerks, stealing cryptographic
material, tapping communications, and even bugging embassies in order to gain more information on
6 David Easter, ‘GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s’, Intelligence and National Security,
23:5 (2008), pp. 683-5.
7 Jones, ‘Maximum Disavowable Aid’, p. 1216.
8 TNA, CAB 21/6006, Ministry of Defence Memo., 'The Counter-Subversion Committee', Annex to
COS.1593/10/3/63, 10th March 1964.
9 Ibid.
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codes.10 Some small consular posts, such as Ulan Bator, existed largely as a cover for electronic
listening stations.11
Secondly, other intelligence collection assets retained a lower profile in Britain’s territories,
which meant that they were able to survive imperial decline. Owing to Commonwealth connections,
discreet leasing arrangements, and ‘communications facilities’ on remote islands, GCHQ in particular
was able to preserve a far-reaching network that made British intelligence collection during this
period still so effective. Not only did Britain run intercept posts in the Middle East and Africa,
including from Aden, Bahrain, and Kenya, but it also provided space for American signals
intelligence bases at the same time, including in Mauritius, and Cyprus.12 This was even more
noteworthy, given the manner in which GCHQ was affected by the decolonisation process; Easter
asserts that ‘as the empire melted away, GCHQ’s own empire of overseas signals intelligence stations
also faced dissolution’. Owing to a combination of broader British budgetary problems, cuts in
defence spending and the closure of bases east of Suez, this jeopardised GCHQ’s intelligence
collection, by impacting upon the agency’s technical capability, thus removing a layer of security for
the posts.13 Bases rights granted to Britain in the first flush of independence in countries such as
Ceylon or Iraq, later became easy targets for nationalist politicians, and some were closed
retrospectively.
Yet, more stable locations such Cyprus and Hong Kong, together with remote islands such as
Diego Garcia and Ascension Island, allowed intelligence to outlast the transition to Commonwealth.14
A notable consensus exists amongst several intelligence historians as to the power of Britain’s
‘residual imperial footholds’; Aldrich argues that such territories were what enabled British
intelligence power to outlast the ‘End of Empire’, whilst for Easter, GCHQ’s ‘greatest asset’ were the
listening posts ‘beyond Europe which exploited the global reach of the British Empire’.15 The
10 Easter, ‘GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s’, p. 692.
11 Private information.
12 Easter, ‘GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s’, p. 686.
13 Ibid, pp. 686-688.
14 P.R. Keefe, Chatter: Uncovering the ECHLEON Surveillance Network and the Secret World of
Global Eavesdropping, (London 2006).
15 Easter, ‘GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s’, p. 683.
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following section sketches out the scope of Britain’s intelligence collection across Asia in the mid-
1950s to early 1960s, in order to demonstrate the resilience of Britain’s intelligence connections.
Furthermore, it places emphasis upon the Anglo-American dimension of intelligence activity in Asia
during this period, in order to demonstrate the manner in which, in light of the broader foreign policy
divergences outlined above, intelligence was both source and solution to tensions in the Special
Intelligence Relationship.
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan
As discussed in the literature review, China, just as much as the Soviet Union, was a key ‘driver’ in
US foreign policy during the second half of the twentieth century. China palpably lay at the heart of
broader disagreements between Britain and the US as to the management of adversaries and the risks
of real military involvement in Asia. Rooted in the strategic thought of British Prime Ministers from
Attlee to Wilson, Britain continually concerned itself with the possibility of US entanglement in the
wrong kind of war in Asia – one that could lead to conventional warfare, and eventually, the use of
atomic weapons. Furthermore, the British and Americans were unable to overcome fundamental
differences in the way that they perceived of Chinese Communism; whilst Washington held a strong
tendency to regard Communism as a monolithic movement, reducing China to an appendage of the
Soviet Union’s ambitions, Britain held onto a much more pragmatic view of Beijing, paying greater
attention to the power dynamics and actors at play, ultimately believing that the Communists would
retain control over the Chinese mainland in the long-term. This resulted in the sharpest policy
difference, in which political, financial, and broader strategic interests in Asia pushed Whitehall to
adopt a more conciliatory approach to the Chinese regime, including official recognition.16
16 P. Lowe, Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British Policies towards Japan, China and Korea,
1948-53, (Manchester, 1997); Xia Yafeng, Negotiating with the Enemy: US-China Talks during the
Cold War, 1949-1972, (Indiana, 2006).
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In intelligence terms, this undoubtedly translated into tensions between SIS and its American
counterpart, the CIA. In line with America’s more interventionist stance towards Asian affairs, this
manifested itself especially over the CIA’s prioritisation of covert action over traditional intelligence
gathering - a legacy of its wartime OSS heritage - particularly as this tended towards pseudo-military
engagement and sabotage in British territories. Frank Wisner, the first head of American covert action
had brought in many military officials seconded from Army units, thus contributing towards
somewhat of a ‘commando culture’.17 This clashed with the British SIS approach, which subordinated
action to intelligence gathering in a re-organisation in 1945. Moreover, SIS had enjoyed close
relations with the Chinese Communists throughout the Second World War. Nonetheless, all this did
not inhibit intelligence sharing with the Americans. Between 1943 and 1947, GCHQ intercept high-
grade traffic passing between Moscow and the Russian Mission in Yunnan, passing this onto its
American counterparts as early as 1946.18
Britain and American’s policy differences were even more pronounced in Hong Kong and
Taiwan. Hong Kong became a key battleground not only for the CIA and SIS, but a host of other
Chinese and foreign intelligence agencies, all of which grappled for the Chinese mainland in some
way. The Anglo-American Special Intelligence Relationship grew particularly terse owing to the
America’s covert activities in Hong Kong, including sponsorship of anti-Communist groups in the
colony, as well as considerable propaganda efforts through the United States Information Agency. As
shall be seen in the case study chapter on Hong Kong, both agencies operated out of the American
Consulate-General in Hong Kong, committed to countering Beijing’s influence in internal
developments there. Resulting in claims that the British were not doing enough to clamp down on
Beijing, this proved to be a key source of friction with the British, who sought not to provoke Beijing
or to inflame already tense political relations with the colony. As early as 1951, the British
psychological operations liaison officer with Washington was asked to look into the US Information
17 Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence,
(London, 2002), pp. 294-5.
18 Aid, ‘The Russian Target: The U.K.-U.S. Cryptologic Effort Against the Soviet Union, 1945-1960',
paper presented to the Annual Conference e of the Society of Historians of American Foreign
Relations, Washington DC, 6-8 June 2003, pp. 22-9.
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Service’s links ‘with covert activities’ in Hong Kong, forcing the Americans to attempt to ‘smooth
over British suspicions’ through some rather fraudulent claims.19
The dynamics from Hong Kong rippled into Taiwan, exacerbating tensions. Convinced that
Beijing had developed an extensive reach into Hong Kong through infiltrating businesses, trade
unions, schools, and even the media, America used the CIA to actively finance Taiwan’s anti-
Communist groups in Hong Kong. This created a substantial rift with the British; Hong Kong
Governor Alexander Graham was intolerant of Taiwan (and other) clandestine groups utilising Hong
Kong to stage subversive activities, to the point that the British went about dismantling these actors,
and arresting their leaders – by August 1951, eight undercover operatives from Taiwan were in
custody.20 However, as the Nationalist-Communist conflict escalated, so too did subversive activity in
Hong Kong. Both sides exchanged fire over the then Nationalist-held islands of Kinmen and Mazu,
drawing America further into supporting the Nationalists.21
Remarkably, in April 1955, the Taiwanese secret service arranged for the bombing of an Air
India airliner, ‘The Kashmir Princess’, which was carrying Chinese Communist journalists to the
Bandung Conference in Indonesia. The bomb was planted as the plane refuelled in Hong Kong, and
later went off, killing all on board, though not its presumed target – Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou
Enlai, who was meant to be on board, but changed his mind at the last minute. Consequently, tensions
flared between the British and Communist Chinese security organisations, in which the Indians had to
serve as a buffer.22 Taiwan continued to be a source of friction well into the 1960s, acknowledged by
the then CIA Head of Station in Hong Kong, Peer de Silva, who stated that Special Branch in Hong
Kong were aware of the CIA’s connection to the Taiwanese service, acknowledged in the fact that
19 US National Archives, RG 59, Box 38 Martin, 'Use of Hong Kong USIS as Cover for Covert
Operations', 17th December 1952, Office of Chinese Affairs, P Files, 1953-5; Box 17 (draft) National
Security Council 48/2, 9th February 1950, Office of Chinese Affairs.
20 Johannes R. Lombardo, 'A Mission of Espionage, Intelligence, and Psychological Operations: The
American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64', p. 70.
21 G.H. Chang and He Di, ‘The Absence of War in the US-China Confrontation over Quemoy and
Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence,’ The American Historical Review, 98:5 (1993),
pp. 1500-1524.
22 TNA, PREM 11/1309, Graham (Hong Kong) to Lennox-Boyd (London), 20th May 1955.
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they often came to him with complaints about their activities.23 In de Silva’s words, the situation was
one of ‘never-ending burlesque, except that people did die performing it’.24
Burma
The competition that characterised sabotage and subversion along China’s borders formed the
backdrop to similar covert activity in Burma. Although both Britain and the United States feared
Burma’s loss to the Communists, again, the Americans took a much more interventionist approach to
influencing the Burmese political landscape. In 1949, at the end of the Chinese Civil War, some
Nationalist forces had escaped into Northern Burma. Providing the Chinese Nationalist warlord,
General Li Mi, and his Kuomintang forces with considerable support, the CIA sought to distract
Chinese forces from Korea with pinprick raids in the south, partly in line with the ideas of US defence
officials in the Pentagon. Within American circles, this controversial plan was kept confined to
President Truman and the National Security Council, and presumably, the British too.25 Similar
operations were launched from India with a focus on Tibet.26
These American-backed operations were a real source of friction not only with the British in
Hong Kong, but also with French officials in Hanoi. With a much greater focus on Burma’s internal
dynamics, both countries were aware that US operations not only threatened retaliation from the
Chinese Communists, but also risked worsening Burma’s already fragile domestic instability. The
French High Commissioner (and Commander-in-Chief in Indochina) had expressed his frustration
with these groups to British and American intelligence his frustration with such groups, and that he
was ‘imprisoning every Chinese nationalist he could get his hands on’.27 Moreover, from the British
perspective, fears that Burma would fall into internal chaos also dashed any hopes that it might have
23 Peer De Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence, (New York, 1978), pp. 194-5.
24 Ibid.
25 Ralph E. Weber, Spymasters: Ten CIA Officers in Their Own Words, (Wilmington, 1999), p. 119.
26 M. Dunham, Buddha's Warriors: the Story of the CIA-backed Tibetan Freedom Fighters, the
Chinese Invasion, and the Ultimate Fall of Tibet, (London, 2005); J.K. Knaus, Orphans of the Cold
War: America and the Tibetan Struggle for Survival, (New York, 2008).
27 Aldrich, Hidden Hand, pp. 298-9.
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had of drawing Burma back into the Commonwealth. These tensions culminated at an intelligence
conference in 1952, in which British officers openly confronted their American counterparts over their
covert operation, delineating their threat to Burma, and more broadly, to regional stability through the
risk of provoking China into an attack. Although the Americans refused discussion of the matter, they
eventually agreed to keep Britain better informed of their operations involving Kuomintang rebels in
Burma, and by 1960 were using the CIA’s private air force to fly Nationalist fighters from Burma to
Taiwan.28
India
India’s strategic value as a potential counterbalance to China rendered it another key node in the
Special Intelligence Relationship in Asia. Significantly, in the post-war period, and later into the Cold
War, intelligence activity in India was indicative of broader political relationship dynamics as they
related to empire. India’s ties with Anglo-American intelligence within its territory were complex; an
underlying aversion to such agencies stemmed from Britain’s imperial past. India’s new rulers had
been subjected to years if surveillance by Britain’s secret services, Therefore, as McGarr argues, by
the time the British had retreated from the subcontinent in 1947, its manipulation of the Indian
political system had left behind a political paradigm ‘rife with paranoia and conspiracy’.29 However,
with European decolonisation across the continent, both Indian and Pakistani policymakers eventually
came to establish clandestine partnerships with both British and American intelligence agencies.
Though purporting to value India’s strategic position as a bulwark against Communism in the region,
in reality, Britain and the United States developed an intelligence presence in India because of its
28 Ibid.
29 Paul McGarr, ‘Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Subversive: India, Pakistan and the Cultural Politics of Cold
War Intelligence’, in Elizabeth Leake and Leslie James, (eds.), Decolonisation and the Cold War:
Negotiating Independence, (London, 2015), p. 285.
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strategic location near to the Soviet Union, China, and Persian oilfields. In fact, by the mid-1960s, this
had even attracted attention from Soviet foreign intelligence.30
Imperialism cast a shadow over all intelligence relations with India. Rooted in the East India
Company’s network of indigenous spies, political informants, and propagandists it co-opted to
safeguard British interests in the eighteenth century, Britain had a substantial presence in India well
into the twentieth century.31 Despite having once controlled India – and suppressed South Asian
nationalism – following Indian independence, Britain sought to continue cultivating its relationship
there, seeking to preserve its own interests in the region. As McGarr has argued, Britain’s intelligence
interest in India stemmed not only from seeking to create a barrier to Communism, but also to
strategically align India with the West, as well as to demonstrate to the US its worth as an
international partner. Whilst SIS established a station in India in the late 1940s, much to the
displeasure of the British High Commissioner there, it was really MI5, with its extensive SLO
network stretching across all of Britain’s empire that provided Britain’s core intelligence link.
Stationed with the intention of providing security advice to local governments, the SLOs acted as a
conduit for the exchange of information between London and Britain’s imperial outposts.32 Whilst
MI5 enjoyed ‘notably close’ relations with India’s intelligence service, the Intelligence Bureau, owing
to various factors - most notably India’s aversion to foreign intelligence activity - SIS’s interactions
with them were characterised as ‘prickly and often adversarial’ in nature. The Foreign Office’s
Information Research Department, which conducted a secret information offensive, also boasted of a
substantial covert presence in India, having built substantial relationships with independent research
centres in India to disseminate British propaganda, as well as Indian government departments.33
The CIA’s experience in India was rather more tempestuous. Seeking to emulate the intimate
relationship that MI5 held with the Indian Intelligence Bureau, Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
sought to develop an intelligence presence in India, regarding it as a ‘crucial strategic counterweight’
30 Paul McGarr, ‘’Quiet Americans in India’: The CIA and the Politics of Intelligence in Cold War
South Asia’, Diplomatic History, 38:5 (2014), p. 1062. By the mid-1960s, the KBG had devoted
operational resources towards India.
31 McGarr, ‘Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Subversive’, p. 285.
32 Ibid, p. 288.
33 McGarr, ‘Quiet Americans in India’, pp. 1053, 1060.
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to Communism.34 However, as this relationship grew under the auspices of the CIA, Tibet proved to
be a real thorn in America’s side. Utilising Indian airspace for sponsored resistance operations in
Chinese-controlled Tibet, as well as support to the Indo-Tibetan Special Frontier Force, the CIA also
oversaw the establishment of nuclear-powered surveillance equipment in two of Indian’s Himalayan
peaks, for atomic intelligence on China.35
Into the 1950s, however, this relationship eroded owing to a damaging mix of political issues.
As airdrops and commando activity provoked a Chinese backlash, America’s 1953 security agreement
with Pakistan threw the Indian relationship into jeopardy. Furthermore, the Communist defeat of the
Tibetan Army (and subsequent expulsion of the Indian diplomatic mission from Lhasa) lead to an
Indian withdrawal of assistance to Tibet, forcing the CIA to suspend its operations there.36
Additionally, the arrival of Nehru as Indian premier, followed by an explosive series of revelations in
the Indian press of CIA activity – and penetration of the highest levels of Indian government –
damaged relations even further. American sentiment at the situation was exemplified in CIA Director
Richard Helm’s fury at the disclosure in the Washington Post of a commentary by former director
Galbraith, concerning the CIA’s operational remit in India, which conceded that some activities were
known to ‘conflict’ with Indian local authorities. In Helm’s words, this, like other press reports before
it, had ‘raised unshirted hell in India’.37
Britain’s main problem in India was, by contrast, impecuniosity. The last MI5 officer in India
was withdrawn in the late 1960s, owing to ‘sweeping cuts’ forced upon the Security Service by
London, which sought savings overseas to relieve the financial burden on Britain’s economy at
home.38 As McGarr observes, although the British intelligence presence in its former colony attracted
‘far less political opprobrium’ than its American counterparts, this reflected, to some extent, upon
34 Ibid, p. 1051.
35 Thomas Laird, Into Tibet: the CIA’s First Atomic Spy and His Secret Expedition to Lhasa, (New
York, 2003).
36 McGarr, ‘Quiet Americans in India’, pp.1051-5.
37 McGarr, ‘Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Subversive’, p. 291.
38 Ibid, p. 288.
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Britain’s waning international influence and ‘increasingly junior role’ alongside its American
partner.39
Indonesia
All nationalist leaders in post-war Asia were intelligence targets. On 11th July 1947, an MI5 officer
paid a visit to Lord Killearn, Britain’s most senior official in Asia. He confessed that they had been
opening letters between Nehru and Sukarno, Indonesia’s popular nationalist leader, as they passed
through Singapore. On this occasion, they had ripped one of the envelopes in their efforts and did not
know what to do. Killearn recorded that it has been ‘very clumsily tampered with’ and while he was
fascinated by the contents of the long letter, he also complained of ‘bungling’ by the security
agencies, declaring it overall to be ‘very clumsy and rather unwise’. He agonised over the possibility
of banning MI5 from ‘tampering or opening any such high level communications’ in future.40
Sukarno was of no less interest than Nehru because of the complex relationships between
Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and Indonesia. In the 1950s, the peculiar dynamics of
cooperation, exchange, and ultimately, subversion, continued to plague the Special Intelligence
Relationship in Indonesia. In 1958, Britain and America backed separatist rebels in Indonesia’s vast
island chain. Thereafter, Indonesia replied with what was known as the ‘Confrontation’. This was an
undeclared war between Britain, Malaysia, and Indonesia, in which Indonesia attempted to break up
the Malaysian Federation, Indonesia sponsored a guerrilla movement against the British, who covertly
backed the Malaysians. The eventual deposal of Indonesia leader Sukarno and subsequent changes
that took place in Indonesia in 1965 were of such importance that Easter has labelled them ‘a
watershed into the history of Southeast Asia, and a major reverse for Communism in the Cold War’.41
39 Ibid, p. 296.
40 Entry for 11th July 1947, Killearn Diary, Middle East Centre, St Anthony’s College Oxford. The
local branch of MI5 was Security Intelligence Far East or SIFE.
41 David Easter, ‘’Keep the Indonesian Pot Boiling’: Western Covert Intervention in Indonesia,
October 1965-March 1966’, Cold War History, 5:1 (2005), p. 55.
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Whilst America did involve itself in the conflict to subvert the Communist cause in Indonesia
– indeed, UK Prime Minister Wilson played upon American fears of Sukarno’s increasing
collaboration with the Chinese, to entice American support - the same policy divergences that echoed
across Asia between Britain and the United States reverberated through Indonesia.42 President
Kennedy disagreed with Britain’s tough stance in the Confrontation, seeking to arrive at some sort of
modus vivendi with Sukarno owing to Indonesia’s strategic position regionally. Moreover, according
to Easter, London regarded American diplomatic efforts to persuade Sukarno as ‘tantamount to
appease’, and therefore sought to ‘rein in Washington’, convincing it of Indonesia’s hostility towards
Malaysia.43 Furthermore, as Jones observes, British efforts to elicit American involvement over covert
action in Indonesia need to be regarded within the broader context of Macmillan’s determination to
repair the Special Relationship, following the earlier Suez crisis.44
The death of Kennedy in 1963 offered an opportunity for a fresh appeal by London to
Washington for support against Sukarno. Indeed, with somewhat indecent haste they began this effort
while attending Kennedy’s funeral. Central to this appeal was British use of intelligence gathered
from Indonesia. In his extensive research on the Confrontation, Easter points to two main forms of
intelligence the British were able to draw upon, not only to inform British policymakers and the
military, but also their American counterparts: human and signals intelligence. In human intelligence
terms, Britain had agents within both the Indonesia government and military, supplemented by
intelligence derived from indigenous border peoples, interrogations of prisoners, and captured
documents.45 The SIS effort was led by John Colvin, described as the ‘architect of the more deniable
aspects of an undeclared war’.46 SIS was key in this regard; such was its reach in Indonesia that at one
critical stage in Britain’s assessment of Sukarno’s health, the service had even managed to obtain X-
42 R.J Aldrich and R. Cormac, The Black Door: Spies Secret Intelligence and Prime Ministers
(London, 2016), pp. 221, 267.
43 David Easter, ‘British Intelligence and Propaganda during the ‘Confrontation’, 1963-1966,
Intelligence and National Security, 16:2 (2001), p. 86.
44 Jones, ‘Maximum Disavowable Aid’, p. 1179.
45 Easter, ‘British Intelligence and Propaganda during the ‘Confrontation’, pp. 84-85.
46 Aldrich and Cormac, The Black Door, pp. 264-73.
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ray scans of Sukarno when he was admitted for kidney stones, as well as his medical specialist’s
recommendations!47
Furthermore, GCHQ provided Britain with a strong source of signals intelligence from its
bases in Malaysia and Australia. There is evidence from a range of government documents that
suggest London had broken Indonesian cyphers, whilst air photo reconnaissance from clandestine
overhead flights was a source of information on border areas, airfields, guerrilla infiltration bases, and
even Indonesian military deployments. Britain also waged a substantial propaganda effort, conducted
in part by SIS and the Army, but mostly through the Foreign Office’s IRD.48 Whilst Easter is careful
to note that intelligence and propaganda ‘were not in themselves war-winning weapons’,49 they lent
enough credibility and confidence to the British effort to enable them to depose Sukarno with the
assistance of the Americans. Furthermore, despite broader policy divergence, Indonesia led to a
baseline level of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation; one result of a meeting to gain American
support resulted in the establishment of various working groups – one devoted to Indonesia - intended
to formalise cooperation through the production of joint Anglo-American intelligence assessments,
thus institutionalising collaboration.50
As can be seen, secret intelligence became an increasingly important component in
international relations in the twentieth century, and a vital tool in prosecuting the Cold War in Asia
through covert action. Cooperation was a vital part of intelligence success, with the British-American
Special Relationship the most important example. Yet, the US-UK arrangement reached what
Jeffreys-Jones has called its ‘Churchillian apogee’ in the 1940s and 1950s. By the 1960s, there were
signs of change. A generation of leaders who had fought the Second World War together was passing.
Moreover, tensions in American society, challenges to US foreign policy including the Vietnam War,
vicious disagreements over issues such as the 1973 Middle East Crisis, together with a decline in
British capabilities, did not destroy the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, but they raised
questions over it. For those who wished to sustain the Anglo-American intelligence relationship in
47 Easter, ‘British Intelligence and Propaganda during the ‘Confrontation’, p. 86.
48 Ibid, pp. 91-93.
49 Ibid, p. 99.
50 Jones, ‘Maximum Disavowable Aid’, pp. 1194-1195.
89
Asia, the watchtowers provided by British outposts at Hong Kong, Hanoi and Peking could not have
been more important.51
51 R. Jeffreys-Jones, ‘The End of an Exclusive Special Intelligence Relationship: British-American
Intelligence Co-operation Before, During and After the 1960s’, Intelligence and National Security,
27:5 (2012), pp. 707-21.
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The Watchtower:
British Intelligence in Hong Kong
Located on China’s periphery, Hong Kong’s advantageous position lent it a huge strategic value in
intelligence gathering terms. Historically, overseas representation in the British colony had brought
tangible benefits including direct economic value through foreign exchange earnings and trade, which
the British in particular sought to preserve through their presence in Hong Kong. As the European
Empires found themselves amidst the throes of decolonisation, increasing attention was directed
towards the Far Eastern sphere as a key theatre for intelligence gathering activity.
Whilst the Soviet strategic nuclear threat had previously been Britain’s top intelligence
priority, as Lord Mountbatten, Chief of the Defence Staff affirmed, ‘China also became a major area
of interest’ into the 1960s, earning the status of ‘a first priority target’ with the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC) in London. Such was its importance that in 1966, the JIC even discussed re-orienting
resources from the Soviet Bloc towards China instead, with the latter described as a ‘growth target’.1
In the post-war period, and certainly later at the height of the Cold War, having a sizeable human
presence in the British colony enabled ‘China-watchers’ of various intelligence services to monitor the
degree of rapid - even chaotic - political change China underwent under Maoist rule. Moreover, it also
allowed them to assess Chinese military developments, with an eye to the tense Sino-Soviet rivalry
that dominated geopolitics across Asia during the Cold War. Located well to the south, Hong Kong
also facilitated some monitoring of Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War.
1 David Easter, ‘GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s’, Intelligence and National Security,
23:5 (2008), p. 689.
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Yet, as with other parts of its empire in the mid-twentieth century, Britain struggled to contain
the nationalist tide that swept across China. The British presence in Hong Kong experienced an
increasingly violent existence into the 1960s; characterised by strikes, protests and violent attacks in
the centre of the colony, and a notorious bombing campaign that the British sought to downplay, this
culminated in series of riots in 1967, as anti-British sentiment increased in intensity in step with the
radicalism of the Cultural Revolution on the mainland. Nonetheless, for London, retaining its grip on
the colony had clear benefits, above all when it came to intelligence collection. Noting the
‘invaluable’ nature of Hong Kong as a base for intelligence activities, the Foreign Office pointed to
the utility of the colony ‘as a listening post and staging point’, above all given the rapidly changing
situation in Southeast Asia.2 In fact, such was Hong Kong’s strategic importance that the Foreign
Office observed even China seemed to have ‘swallowed their ideological pride’ with regard to Hong
Kong and accepted that they were hosting a ‘flourishing colonial society’ so close to the Chinese
mainland, given the extensive benefits that Hong Kong brought.3 Underpinned by consultations in the
Foreign Office in 1969 about designating an exclusive ‘China-watching’ role, the discussions opened
with the statement that Hong Kong was ‘the best source of information outside China about affairs in
China’.4 Such sentiment was not confined to the British either; discussing the ‘special advantage’ not
shared by other British diplomatic posts, James Murray, Head of the Far East Department, underlined
Hong Kong’s ‘continuing value as a reservoir’ of expertise on developments in China, ‘attested by the
fact that so many foreign governments have chosen to send China watchers to their Consular posts in
the colony’.5 Meeting over cocktails at diplomatic receptions, this growing band of observers
constituted a multi-national university seminar on the volatile events in China in the 1960s.6
Yet, at the same time, Hong Kong was also the backdrop to a different, emerging dynamic
between intelligence allies, complicated by the plethora of intelligence organisations operating - and
2 T[he] N[ational] A[rchives], FCO 40/316, Far Eastern Department (FCO) ‘Background Note: Visit
of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Mr. Royle, to Hong Kong: Chinese Policy Towards Hong
Kong ’, October 1970.
3 Ibid.
4 TNA, FCO 21/494, FED (London) to Tomlinson (London), ‘Consultations with the Governor of
HK: ‘China-watching’ in Hong Kong’, 25th November 1969.
5 TNA, FCO 21/494, Murray (London) to Maddocks (Hong Kong), 29th January 1969.
6 Private information,
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competing - in Hong Kong. In addition to the British SIS station in Hong Kong, and GCHQ’s post in
Little Sai Wan, and indeed various RAF electronic intelligence (elint) sites, Hong Kong hosted one of
the largest CIA stations in Asia, housed within the US Consulate-General. The US lacked diplomatic
representation in mainland China, its embassies and consulates having been forced to close in 1949
with the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which shifted the US to its
peripheries in Hong Kong and Taiwan.7 The US did not recognise the PRC until the mid-1970s and so
lacked a physical presence on the mainland for a quarter of a century. These changes in diplomatic
relations had clear implications for intelligence collection. As Aid and Richelson have highlighted in
their short survey of US intelligence gathering and China, 1949 was the ‘beginning of the end of the
US intelligence presence in China’. Having been formally asked by the State Department to withdraw
all its personnel from China, CIA stations at Shanghai and Canton were consequently closed, and by
September 1949, ‘virtually all’ CIA agent networks left in China were ‘collapsed or destroyed’ by the
Chinese Communist security services.8
This had an important consequence in rendering the US Consulate-General ‘one of the largest
consulates in the world ... but with a more important function’, owing to the CIA’s presence.9
Intelligence gathering at the Consulate-General was not confined to CIA officers alone - the
Consulate’s political and economic sections, and military liaison officers were all involved in
cultivating sources in Hong Kong, and extracting information from Chinese language newspapers.10
Although this lent itself well to intelligence exchange, the Americans’ presence also raised
considerable tensions between the two countries; Hong Kong’s value to the Americans was also about
conducting sabotage operations, encapsulated in Frank Wisner’s comment to Kim Philby that
‘whenever there is somewhere we want to destabilise, the British have an island nearby’.11 From the
7 Chi-kwan Mark, ‘American ‘China Hands’ in the 1950s’, in Cindy Yik-yi Chu (eds.), Foreign
Communities in Hong Kong, 1840s-1950s, (Basingstoke, 2005), p. 173.
8 Matthew Aid and Jeffrey T. Richelson, ‘US Intelligence and China: Collection, Analysis, and Covert
Action’, p. 3. On the early CIA stations in China see Yu Maochun, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold
War (New Haven, 1997), pp. 294-348.
9 Ibid.
10 Johannes R. Lombardo, ‘A Mission of Espionage, Intelligence, and Psychological Operations: The
American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, Intelligence and National Security, 14:4 (1999), p. 66.
11 Philby, My Silent War, p.117.
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American perspective, Hong Kong was a ‘springboard’ to China - it offered opportunities to
ideologically convert the Chinese, economic opportunities to exploit, and political interests to
protect.12
The tensions were early to manifest themselves; whilst Britain was anxious to preserve its
longstanding commercial interests and to protect Hong Kong, it sought to avoid provoking China. By
contrast, the United States, which was already pursuing a rigid economic embargo of China, and
lacked diplomatic representation in Beijing, could pursue a more aggressive approach in Hong Kong.
As Lombardo has discussed, this stemmed from fundamental differences in approach to foreign
relations with China during the Cold War, which anchored itself in different understandings of the
Communist regime; whilst Britain believed the Chinese Communists would maintain control of the
mainland in the long-term, economic and territorial interests suggested a conciliatory approach to
Beijing was the more sensible course of action. By contrast, the US saw China’s communist turn as a
failure for the ‘free world’, and regarded Communism as a monolithic ideology; Maoist China was a
satellite of the Soviet Union, which determined a much more belligerent policy for the US.13 Although
this seemingly carved a path of divergence between the two allies, the UK nonetheless sought to
balance the Special Relationship, through concessions in its regional foreign policy in Asia, such as
supporting the US military effort in South Korea. Critically, Lombardo argues that this had a
destabilising effect on Hong Kong; Britain’s ‘laissez-faire attitude’ to governing Hong Kong
effectively created space for the Americans to conduct intelligence gathering and covert activities
directly from the colony.14
In fact, such was the delicate balance that Menzies, SIS chief in the 1950s, insisted that SIS
personnel, and the CIA, kept ‘at arm's length’ in this ‘sensitive spot’, to the point that for a period,
intelligence material was only allowed to be exchanged in Singapore, where the CIA had a much
smaller station.15 Hong Kong was thus illustrative of broader tensions at play in the ‘Special
Relationship’ between the United States and Britain. The Hong Kong government held ‘serious
12 Chi-Kwan, ‘American ‘China Hands’ in the 1950s’, p. 171.
13 Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, p. 64.
14 Ibid.
15 J.B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, (New York, 1976), pp. 147-8.
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reservations’ about the American activities in the colony, particularly concerning running agents,
stemming from surprise raids conducted against Communist and Nationalist organisations earlier in
the 1950s that uncovered covert contacts within the US Consulate-General.16 This was personified
through officials such as Hong Kong Governor, Alexander Grantham, who was particularly averse to
US intelligence in Hong Kong, at one point calling the CIA ‘extremely ham-handed’. Tensions
therefore stemmed from underlying fears that the US would turn Hong Kong into a base for
subversion against China, as opposed to simply intelligence gathering. Indeed, there was considerable
tension between the political and financial elite in Hong Kong, which prioritised stable relations with
the mainland, and London, which was more inclined to accommodate the Americans.17
Whilst historians have written extensively about Britain and Hong Kong with regard to the
decolonisation process, paying particular attention to the violent episode that gripped Hong Kong in
1967,18 substantially less coverage has been given to the intelligence aspects of Britain’s presence in
the colony. This is significant for two reasons: firstly, Britain’s imperial roots in East and Southeast
Asia meant that it had an established cadre of intelligence officers operating from its colonial
outposts, such as Hong Kong with excellent language skills. Whilst much has been documented about
its earlier operations, particularly during the Second World War,19 literature on the later operations of
the SIS station in Hong Kong into the 1960s is noticeably thin, though it must be noted that this is
due, in part, to the difficulty of accessing various archival files pertaining to the British government
and Hong Kong on this period. Certainly, substantial pieces have been written on both American
intelligence activities and covert action in Hong Kong, and yet, the literature remains quieter on
British SIS activities or indeed the activities of Hong Kong’s own Special Branch.
16 Chi-Kwan, ‘American ‘China Hands’ in the 1950s’, P. 177.
17 Ibid.
18 See Gary Ka-Wai Cheung, Hong Kong’s Watershed – The 1967 Riots, (Hong Kong, 2009); Richard
Hughes, Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and its Many Faces, (London, 1976); Robert
Bickers and Ray Yep (eds.), May Days in Hong Kong: Riot and Emergency in 1967, (Hong Kong,
2009).
19 See Andy Thomas, ‘British Signals Intelligence after the Second World War’, Intelligence and
National Security, 3:4 (1988), pp. 103-110; Desmond Ball, ‘Over and Out: Signals Intelligence
(Sigint) in Hong Kong’, Intelligence and National Security, 11:3 (1996), pp. 474-496; Richard
Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, (London, 2010)
also contains a section on Hong Kong; James Louis Hevia, The Imperial Security State: British
Colonial Knowledge and Empire-Building in Asia, (Cambridge, 2012);
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Secondly, Hong Kong was illustrative of what can be considered ‘transatlantic antagonism’ in
the Special Relationship. As this chapter will endeavour to show, intelligence gathering by both
Britain and the United States in the colony took place against a backdrop of constant tension between
the allies. On the one hand, SIS and CIA intelligence was complementary; British material was able to
fill in gaps on China where the CIA experienced shortcomings, particularly in terms of conducting
interrogation and extracting information from travellers. On the other hand, the subversive activities
of the CIA put it at odds with its British counterpart, creating a strain that reverberated at higher
political levels. Nonetheless, this period demonstrated the utility of British intelligence collection
from Hong Kong, underlining its status as ‘watchtower’ on mainland China, during an especially
tense period in the Cold War in Asia.
Intelligence and chaos in Hong Kong
For much of the Cold War, the political and intelligence scene in Hong Kong was characterised by
low level chaos. As Lombardo has emphasised, to the extent that the Cold War in Asia was a
‘recurring confrontation’ between the US and China, Hong Kong was very much the ‘battleground of
ideological conflict’.20 A key manner in which this manifested itself was through the sheer level of
intelligence activity taking place within the colony. A myriad of Chinese, British, and American
intelligence services (in addition to other nationalities such as the French) operated from Hong Kong,
due to a combination of the ‘relative degree of openness’ in Hong Kong (contrasted with the Chinese
mainland), which arguably facilitated the presence of so many foreign agents within the colony.21
However, it was the conflict between the Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists that
was the key backdrop against which British and American intelligence gathering took place. The
political struggle between the Communist Chinese, and the Kuomintang (KMT) Nationalist Chinese
led to prolonged violent outbursts, culminating in terrorist campaigns, and the outbreak of civil unrest
20 Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, p. 64.
21 Ibid.
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and riots in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, in April 1955, the KMT bombed an Air India aircraft
carrying Chinese Communist journalists from China to the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, the
explosion having occurred after the aircraft’s refuelling in Hong Kong. Mao Zedong accused the
British government of being responsible as it had warned the British Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing
‘prior to the departure of the Indian aircraft … that efforts would be made to sabotage the aircraft’.22
Moreover, according to Hong Kong Governor Alexander Grantham, the aircraft was supposed to be
carrying Zhou Enlai, but Zhou’s travel plans to the conference had been rescheduled at the last minute
for fear of precisely this sort of event.23 For Hong Kong, the international situation in the region
therefore continually affected its internal stability.
Significantly, this was further complicated by the CIA’s engagement with KMT Nationalists
(and other anti-Communist organisations), as it sought to undermine the Chinese Communist regime.
These groups engaged in numerous sabotage and guerrilla campaigns against the Communists in
mainland China, as well as pro-Communist elements in Hong Kong. This proved to be a key source of
antagonism for the British; not only was the American Consulate-General in Hong Kong using some
KMT agents as sources of intelligence, but it also encouraged more violent activities. This
contravened British law in the colony, which stated that no official agency, group, or organisation was
‘to use the colony as an anti-Communist base’.24 This stemmed from earlier British policy towards
China in Hong Kong - having offered recognition to China in early 1950, Britain outlawed anti-
Beijing activities that could be seen as provoking the People’s Republic. For example, in one
particular case in January 1951, the Hong Kong police arrested a KMT agent whom the Consul
General considered ‘one of the more respected contacts of the Consulate’s Political Section’. To
officials in the US State Department, the incident presented ‘an example of the sensitiveness with
which the British’ viewed various American ‘activities in Hong Kong’. 25
22 Steve Tsang, ‘Target Zhou Enlai: The Kashmir Princess Incident of 1955’, China Quarterly, 139
(1994): p. 766-82; Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, p. 71.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, p. 67.
25 Walter McConaughy (Hong Kong) to State Department (Washington), No. 113, ‘Arrest of Chinese
Contact of Consulate General by Hong Kong Police’,15 February 1951, 746G.00/2-1551, RG 59,
United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
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It was also seen as evidence of British suspicions of American intentions in Hong Kong.26
Indeed, the British SIS was all too aware of the CIA’s sponsored activities in Hong Kong; in the early
1950s, the CIA and its Nationalist allies in Chinese were remarkably active, conducting variants of
guerrilla warfare, economic warfare, or propaganda against Beijing from locations as varied as
Taiwan, Pakistan, India, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Japan, and Korea.27 As Lombardo has shown,
American operations expanded their scale significantly during the Eisenhower presidency from the
mid-1950s onwards, in part due to the 1953 ‘Country Plan’, which grew propaganda, intelligence,
consular, and trade activities in Hong Kong. Although this was intended to ‘foster the understanding
and cooperation of British officials, businessmen, and Armed Forces’,28 in reality it stood in stark
contrast to British objectives of not antagonising the Chinese regime. The tension mounted into the
1960s too. In discussions with the Americans, British suspicions surfaced; the Hong Kong authorities
wanted Washington to pressure the KMT to cease its violent campaign, whilst they prosecuted
Nationalist saboteurs, though without deporting them to Taiwan, as had previously been the case. The
US, however, resisted, fearing the prosecution of Nationalist operations would lead to a subsequent
loss of its principal intelligence sources on China.29
It was worth reflecting upon just how extensive CIA involvement in anti-Beijing or pro-
Nationalist operations was. In addition to Hong Kong, Taiwan was used as a particular base for
launching operations.30 In the 1950s, for example, the CIA conducted its activities through numerous
cover organisations such as ‘Western Enterprises Inc.’ or the airline ‘Civil Air Transport’.31 The CIA
occasionally used operatives who were former Chinese prisoners of war; having been captured during
the Korean War, they had chosen to be repatriated to Taiwan, rather than back to mainland China.
They were used in various covert operations, which consisted primarily of either resistance missions
in remote areas (to develop a long-term resistance movement), or commando raids, using flotillas of
26 Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, pp. 75-77.
27 Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America, and Cold War Secret Intelligence (London,
2001), p. 295.
28 Ibid, pp. 67-70.
29 Ibid, p. 77.
30 Aid and Richelson, ‘US Intelligence and China’, p. 4.
31 Ibid, pp. 26-27; William M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert
Operations in Asia, (Alabama, 2006).
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small attack boats against particular installations. Furthermore, the CIA, in agreement with American
military chiefs, also embarked upon a programme of ‘aggressive’ clandestine raiding missions,
launched from Taiwan. Targeting Chinese Communist communications and other installations, the
operations were intended to keep the Communists ‘off-balance’, and crept into the realm of Western
economic warfare through their detrimental impact upon China’s coastal trade.32 It was this
programme of raids that helped to trigger the First Taiwan Straits Crisis in August 1954.
However, this programme of covert warfare was hardly covert, and raised real tensions with
the Chinese regime, which was keen to retaliate. The opportunity was raised in November 1952, when
two CIA officers were captured on a mission in mainland China, in which CIA plans to collect an
agent from Manchuria for debriefing were foiled: the original infiltration team had been captured and
‘doubled’ by communist forces, who instead ambushed the incoming C-47 aircraft with disguised
anti-aircraft guns as it attempted to land, causing it to crash before reaching the collection point.
Although the two pilots were killed, two CIA case officers - Richard G. Fecteau and John T. Downey
- survived, only to be captured by the Chinese, and incarcerated for almost two decades until President
Nixon was able to secure their release in 1971.33 When finally released they were returned to the
American via an RAF base in Hong Kong.34
Furthermore, in addition to its covert operations, the US also ran an extensive psychological
operations campaign in Hong Kong. Officially housed in the American Consulate-General, the United
States Information Service (USIS) in Hong Kong, in collaboration with covert CIA operations,
became a key means of disseminating anti-Communist propaganda across the region. Again, this was
significant in exacerbating tensions with the British, as not only did American psychological
operations reach mainland China, but they also targeted the overseas Chinese population. Not only did
these operations attempt to destabilise the Communist regime, but they also sought to erode sympathy
32 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1735/224, 'Coastal Raiding and Maritime Interdiction Operations (China)', 5
April 1954, Section 81, RG 218, NARA.
33 Nicholas Dujmovic, 'Two CIA Prisoners in China, 1952–73: Extraordinary Fidelity', Studies in
Intelligence, 50:4 (2006), pp. 21-36; Ralph W. McGehee, Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA,
(New York, 1983), p. 25; Ted Gup, The Book of Honor: The Secret Lives and Deaths of CIA
Operatives (New York, 2007).
34 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982), p. 70
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between the Chinese mainland and overseas population, thus targeting audiences across Asia. For
example, one of USIS’s most successful ventures was a World Today - a seemingly independent
magazine published in Mandarin, which enjoyed a wide circulation in Taiwan and Southeast Asia.35
Other secondary targets included any areas thought to be under threat from the Chinese Communists,
and of course, the local population of Hong Kong.36 Such operations therefore threatened the delicate
balance that the British sought to preserve by not inflaming Chinese political sensitivities in Hong
Kong.
Economic warfare proved to be another key area of confrontation provoked by the United
States. Centring around on the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)
restrictions, a programme of Western economic blockade to Communist countries, issues over
products imported from China into Hong Kong proper (or vice versa) were a regular source of friction
between British and American officials in Hong Kong, and directly impacted upon Britain’s approach
to preserving trade with Hong Kong. Even during the Korean War, Britain had sought to resist such
restrictions in order to enable exports and greater trade. Tensions certainly mounted into the 1950s, as
US officials went to lengths to ensure trade regulations were appropriately enforced. At one point, US
officials even rode along with British patrols intercepting smuggling boats in Hong Kong waters,
effectively ‘policing’ the British in their own operations.37
By the end of the 1950s, tensions ran high between the British and Americans, as the CIA’s
foray into covert operations and economic warfare threatened to undermine British policy towards the
Chinese in Hong Kong. But why was it that the Americans were intervening to such a notable extent
in Hong Kong? What was it exactly that they sought to achieve through their covert efforts? The
explanation lay in their broader approach to the Cold War in Asia; with a watchful eye on the
Communist regime in mainland China, the US sought to gain intelligence on pro-Nationalist groups in
China and Hong Kong, particularly with regard to their efforts to retake power in the mainland,
prospects for reunification with the Communists (or Nationalist resistance to reunification), and their
35 Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., 13 July 1989, transcript, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Library of
Congress, Washington, DC.
36 Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, p. 68.
37 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 308-309.
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efforts to build a nuclear weapon.38 The US was so averse to the notion of reunification between the
Nationalists and Communists in the Chinese leadership, and this was reflected in the CIA’s changing
partnerships and quasi-alliances. For example, it did not immediately regard Chiang Kai-shek and the
KMT as ideal partners. Noting the corrupt nature of the KMT regime, at one point, American ‘China
hands’ considered creating a middle-of-the-road option was that was also anti-Communist. This was
envisaged to be an alternative to Chiang Kai-shek’s corrupt KMT, and a better means of resisting
regime consolidation in Beijing. This was not without controversy, however; some State Department
officials considered this tantamount to treachery against Taiwan, despite other elements of the
American establishment, such as Dean Rusk, preparing plans to depose Chiang Kai-shek using
military, CIA, and KMT Army representatives.39 This continued well into the late 1950s, and lay
behind the US’s reasons for running amok in Hong Kong, much to the chagrin of the British.
Failed networks and blind spots
As the CIA’s covert activities grew in Hong Kong, so did Chinese suspicions. Inevitably, this proved
to be another source of consternation between the Americans and British, above all when it implicated
the latter through association or collusion. Beijing devoted considerable efforts to exposing both US
covert activities and propaganda in Hong Kong. Using the press as an intermediary, the Communist
regime issued stories of American spy rings attempting to influence the ‘softer’ aspects of Hong Kong
life, such as education or culture, using them to ‘poison the minds’ of the Hong Kong population, and
to ‘carry out criminal activities’ against China. Moreover, it correctly identified the efforts of the Asia
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Mercius Foundation to engage local schools with offers of
grants, and to recruit graduate students as agents, with a view to sending them into mainland China. It
38 Aid and Richelson, ‘US Intelligence and China’, pp. 1-4.
39 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 304-305.
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also managed to identify American front organisations, including the Asian Film Company,
established in 1954, and publishing houses such as the Asia Press Ltd., or Union Press Ltd.40
This gathered pace in the late 1950s, as the Communist press in China (and the pro-
Communist press in Hong Kong) grew particularly vehement in its accusations that the US Consulate-
General in Hong Kong was a base for administering espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare against
China. This proved to be a real thorn in the side of the British, as the pro-Communist process accused
the British of colluding with American operations, through various articles published in Hong Kong.
For example, in December 1957, two Hong Kong newspapers, Ta Kung Pao and Wen Hui Pao,
alleged that the American Consulate-General in Hong Kong was involved in KMT ‘terrorist activities
in and based in Hong Kong’. Additionally, pro-Communist daily newspapers accused the American
Consulate of aiding the Chinese Nationalists in ‘training agents and sending them to the mainland’ to
conduct espionage and sabotage. Such were the accusations that one newspaper even outrightly
accused the Americans of having converted their ‘listening post’ into a base for assassinations,
robbery, shipping arms, and training and despatching agents.41 Moreover, and illustrative of the extent
to which Beijing had involved itself in countering US activities, an article in January 1958 in Ta Kung
Pao attacked the size of the American Consulate-General, as surpassing the size of any embassy
(including Moscow), and proceeded to accurately list all of the offices and agencies that were based in
the Consulate-General.42
At the outset of the 1960s, the Special Intelligence Relationship was thus already under strain
in Hong Kong. Yet, this was to become exacerbated by additional constraints on the US’s intelligence
gathering capability. Throughout the 1950s, the CIA continually failed to successfully run agents or
create clandestine networks in mainland China, its efforts described as ‘a series of abysmal failures’
by Aid and Richelson.43 It must be noted that there were occasional agent successes, including
predictions on China’s decision to intervene in the Korean War, based on the stationing of PLA troops
40 Ibid, pp. 310-311.
41 Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, p. 74.
42 Ibid. See also G.D. Rawnsley, ‘Taiwan's Propaganda Cold War: The Offshore Islands Crises of
1954 and 1958,’ Intelligence and National Security 14:4 (1999), pp. 82-101.
43 Aid and Richelson, ‘US Intelligence and China’, p. 3
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on the Chinese border, which US signals intelligence had missed from its stations in Tokyo and
Washington.44 Nevertheless, despite these occasional successes, the majority of agent-insertion
operations were futile. Demonstrative of the fruitless nature of the operations, between 1953 and
1955, as part of a CIA-funded project to build human intelligence (HUMINT) networks deep inside
China, Chinese Nationalist transport aircraft were dropping two agents a month into the mainland.
However, by late 1955, these agent insertion operations were deemed by the CIA to have been a
complete failure; almost all of the agents were either captured, or killed shortly after landing. As the
CIA’s station chief in Taipei during 1958 to 1962 later observed, although the operations occasionally
produced a useful piece of information, these were low-level - and not especially cost-effective -
efforts, resulting overall in little intelligence.45
Additionally, the CIA also worked with the Taiwanese to insert human agents into China
through boat or by aircraft. However, these operations rapidly resulted in failure; labelled as an
‘exercise in frustration’, the relative inexperience of the CIA case officers running the programme
harmed efforts severely. Combined with the ‘sophisticated, multi-layered’ Chinese internal security
system, this raised too many obstacles for the CIA to successfully penetrate the Chinese mainland.
According to Aid and Richelson, all evidence indicated that the CIA was unable to recruit any high-
level agents within the Chinese government or military, or to operate ‘for any significant period of
time’ networks of low-level agents on the mainland.46 Despite warnings from the CIA, and even
recommendations for the programme’s discontinuation, including from the chief of the CIA’s
Clandestine Service Far East Division, the Chinese Nationalists insisted on sending more agents into
the mainland, the numbers of which reached into the hundreds. The agents were simply sent to their
deaths in China, rendering the operations of little intelligence value.47
Yet, despite these clear setbacks, the scale of the programme - and its rate of failure -
escalated into the 1960s. In 1962, President Kennedy allowed for the resumption of a range of covert
44 Ibid, pp. 3-4.
45 Ibid, pp. 4-5.
46 Ibid, p. 2.
47 Ibid, pp. 4-5. See also Tom Grunfeld, ‘" God We Had Fun": The CIA in China and Sino-American
Relations,’ Critical Asian Studies, 35:1 (2003), pp. 113-138.
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action programmes to establish intelligence networks. Consisting of commando raids, sabotage
operations, and agent parachute drops into China, particularly in Kwangtung Province near the border
of North Vietnam, these operations were considerably large in scale, involving almost one thousand
commandos. However, as with the operations staged throughout the 1950s, they rapidly resulted in
defeat; almost one quarter of the commandos sent in were killed, and little information of intelligence
value was produced. For example, in July 1963, a twenty-six man team of agents belong to the Anti-
Communist National Salvation Corps was destroyed by North Vietnamese security forces, not long
after landing on the coast of Quang Ninh Province. Although the CIA officially withdrew from the
programme in 1964, also reducing the size of its station in Taipei, the Nationalists continued their
programme unabated.48 Collectively, what these failed operations demonstrated was the way in which
China had become somewhat of a quagmire US intelligence.
The CIA’s ability to penetrate Chinese internal security was visibly limited, and had
hampered the US’s efforts to understand Chinese society as it underwent fundamental change.
Although the US Consulate-General in Hong Kong had absorbed many of the US Foreign Service’s
more experienced Sinologists, many of whom had been ejected from mainland China,49 its reach
outside of Hong Kong was still severely limited. As Chi-Kwan has noted, social interactions between
Americans and local Chinese were restricted at best, confined to contact with the Chinese staff within
the US Consulate-General, and members of the Chinese elite in Hong Kong.50 The CIA - and
particularly its Clandestine Service - had thus failed to penetrate the Bamboo Curtain.51 The
consequences of not having sufficient human sources were clear for both the American foreign policy
establishment and intelligence community in Washington; in addition to making the US rely more
greatly upon technical intelligence, it also placed greater weight upon Hong Kong as a ‘watchtower’
from outside China and the possibility of interviewing refuges or visitors there, as well as running
agents.
48 Aid and Richelson, ‘US Intelligence and China’, pp. 29-30.
49 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 306.
50 Chi-Kwan, ‘American ‘China Hands’ in the 1950’s’, p. 186.
51 Aid and Richelson, ‘American Intelligence in China’, p. 2.
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Importantly, there were parallels in this field when it came to US signals intelligence
gathering (SIGINT). The US also made efforts to expand its sigint capabilities in Asia during the
1950s; during the Cold War, it established a network of radar aerials and electronic posts around the
edge of Hong Kong, whilst in 1956, as part of the NSA’s COMINT Communications Relay System, it
set up a station in Hong Kong proper, which was linked with sigint activities in Japan, Formosa,
Thailand, and Guam.52 The US was also able to glean a considerable volume of SIGINT intercepts
through a vast US Army site in Okinawa, Japan. Following the Korean War, when sigint had been
poor, the US had allocated more resources towards deciphering Chinese codes, though it still
struggled to make progress with higher-level traffic.53 From Okinawa, the US read Chinese en clair
messages, which yielded background information on the state of the Chinese economy, transportation,
and logistics, and even pieces of information on the movements of military units inside China -
information that was difficult to obtain in such a restricted, security state. It was also able to gain
diplomatic SIGINT, reading the communications of other diplomats from smaller countries with
weaker cyphers to their respective governments, over matters such as Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai.54
However, as with the HUMINT networks, this form of American intelligence collection was
also fraught with problems. By 1955, the US was still negotiating for new SIGINT sites in Asia,
looking to Taiwan to establish an ‘aerial farm’ from which to intercept communications in the
region.55 However, against the backdrop of clashes between the US and Communist China over the
Taiwan Straits in the late 1950s, the US found much difficulty in securing the site. Moreover,
expanding American SIGINT arrangements in Hong Kong proved difficult when it came to the
British. As US intelligence requirements rose steeply with the onset of the Korean War and the US
sought to send greater numbers of US Air Force SIGINT units to Hong Kong (approximately eight
hundred officers), the US encountered stiff resistance from the Hong Kong Governor, Alexander
Grantham, who had become extremely averse - even hostile - to the myriad of intelligence activities
52 Ball, ‘Over and Out’, p. 478.
53 Matthew M. Aid, ‘American Comint in the Korean War (part ii): From the Chinese Intervention to
the Armistice,’ Intelligence and National Security, 15:1 (2000), pp. 14-49.
54 Aid and Richelson, ‘US Intelligence and China’, pp. 8-9.
55 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 400.
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taking place within Hong Kong’s territory. Moreover, real estate for sigint, a land-hungry activity was
hard to come by and even GCHQ’s activities had to be accommodated by terracing precipitous coastal
areas.56
Hong Kong’s own government not only looked upon the activities of the CIA and NSA with
scepticism, but were also lukewarm about the British agencies. When visiting Honk Kong for
intelligence conferences, senior British intelligence officials felt they were in a foreign country
somehow half-way between Britain and China, rather than a British colony and place where the local
security officials had their own way of doing things, not unlike the intelligence services of India
before 1947. Nevertheless, they were not without humour: on one occasion in the 1970s when the
British agencies visited in some strength and were billeted incognito in a hotel in the centre of Hong
Kong, MI5 officers were nevertheless all placed on the fifth floor, MI6 on the sixth floor and GCHQ
on the eight floor, reflecting their military designation as MI8.57
Hong Kong therefore raised several complex dynamics within and between the two allies
when it came to intelligence gathering. Whilst, on the one hand, a strong degree of cooperation existed
between the US and UK, on the other hand, the CIA’s array of covert activities was a constant source
of tension with the British, bordering on hostility. Involving itself in the conflict between Chinese
Nationalists and Communists, the destabilising nature of its operations ran contrary to the delicate
balance the British sought to preserve with regard to the Chinese regime. Moreover, lacking
diplomatic representation in mainland China, at the outset of the 1960s, the US found itself facing
numerous holes in its intelligence gathering capacity regarding China. The value of Hong Kong as a
listening post thus rested upon an uneasy intelligence alliance between the British and Americans.
British Intelligence and the Residue of Empire
56 Ibid, pp. 400-1. Also private information.
57 Private information.
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Britain’s advantage gathering intelligence in Asia was firmly rooted in its legacy of empire across the
continent. Although the UK and US clashed on foreign policy terms regarding China, drawing on
former imperial territories meant that Britain could provide a source of intelligence unparalleled by
the Americans. In human intelligence terms, Britain has a ‘long-established network of agents and
contacts, often established through commercial conduits’, as well as staff with a lifetime of experience
interpreting events in Asia’, epitomised in the SIS station in Hong Kong.58 Furthermore, - and in stark
contrast to the Americans - throughout the Second World War, SIS had boasted of ‘excellent
relations’ with the Chinese Communists. Such was the nature of their relations that the wartime Head
of Station in Chungking, Colonel Harmon, was close to Chinese Foreign Minister, Zhou En-lai.59
Britain’s signals intelligence network also owed much to its residual empire, illustrated in GCHQ’s
station at Little Sai Wan in Hong Kong. This was reflected in the ‘clear hierarchy’ Britain operated
amongst its former territories; whilst Washington might have been the senior partner in its sigint
alliance, the old Commonwealth often staffed the sites, with Australia being quite prominent in Hong
Kong.60 The new Commonwealth countries which provided Britain with bases, were also
(unknowingly) hosts to GCHQ collection sites.61 This section examines both the covert and overt
intelligence collection Britain undertook from its watchtower.
At the outset of the 1950s, British intelligence in Southeast Asia had been focused on the
Malayan Emergency, a long and gruelling conflict that lasted between 1948 and 1960. Thereafter,
Britain tried to group the emerging independent states of the region into a Malaysian Federation,
which was not successful and which annoyed Indonesia, resulting in a further low-intensity conflict
between 1960 and 1965. These two conflicts absorbed a vast proportion of Britain’s military resource,
at one point a third of the Royal navy were on active service off Indonesia; as result intelligence in
Southeast Asia tended to have a military/policing counter-insurgency texture. Intelligence in the
58 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 305.
59 Ibid, pp. 305-306.
60 Desmond Ball, Signals Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era: Developments in the Asia-Pacific
Region, (Canberra, 1993); See also R. Hunt et al, Mandarin Blue: RAF Chinese Linguists -1951 to
1962 – in the Cold War (Oxford 2008).
61 Ibid, p. 401. For example, Ceylon, made independent in 1948, allowed Britain to maintain a
‘communications relay station’ at a base called HMS Anderson, near Colombo.
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context of these two related conflicts have been dealt with at length elsewhere and are not subjected to
analysis in this thesis.62
Elsewhere in Asia, British intelligence was geared towards collecting information on the
Russians, and resources had been heavily allocated this way. However, as the Joint Intelligence
Committee was all too aware, this meant that resources and information on Communist China were
lacking.63 Although this created greater pressure to gather more information on China, it also
generated opportunities for intelligence exchange with the US, due in part to debates on the ground
about the degree of risk involved in gathering intelligence by crossing the border into mainland China.
This also presented London with an opportunity to recalibrate foreign policy relations with the US;
although the two clashed over approaches to China, the UK could still generate some degree of
influence over its partner through its contribution to the American intelligence picture on a key
adversary.
Overshadowed by Communist violence and political protests that shook the colony in 1967,
Britain’s ability to gather intelligence on China was placed under considerable strain. Discussions in
the Foreign Office as to the British position in Hong Kong, and indeed, possible evacuation plans
were revealing of broader imperial decline; a widely-circulated defence review of Hong Kong by the
Commonwealth’s Defence and Overseas Policy Committee inadvertently acknowledged Britain’s
withdrawal in other parts of the world in its calculations for Hong Kong. It stated that, ‘at a time when
we are reducing our other commitments and forces east of Suez’ this precluded Britain from making
any major reduction to its presence in Hong Kong.64 The review underlined Britain’s intelligence
interest as being ‘primarily concerned with China’s ability to affect our interests outside the area’,
62 The academic debates are as labyrinthine as the conflicts: Leon Comber, Malaya's Secret Police
1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency, (Canberra, 2008); Georgina
Sinclair, ‘’The Sharp End of the Intelligence Machine’: The Rise of the Malayan Police Special
Branch 1948–1955,’ Intelligence and National Security 26:4 (2011), pp. 460-477; Karl Hack, ‘British
Intelligence and Counter‑Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation: The Example of Malaya,’
Intelligence and National Security 14:2 (1999), pp. 124-155; Simon Smith, ‘General Templer and
Counter-Insurgency in Malaya: Hearts and Minds, Intelligence, and Propaganda’, Intelligence and
National Security, 16:3 (2001), pp. 60-78.
63 Chi-Kwan Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations, 1949-1957, (Oxford,
2004), p. 180.
64 TNA, FCO 21/199, Commonwealth Office, ‘Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee
Defence Review Working Party: Hong Kong: Long Term Study’, 18th August 1967.
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pointing to regional trade and investment as key concerns, as well as Britain’s commitments to
maintain regional peace through SEATO, and its obligation to Commonwealth countries.65 Yet, in
addition to political and military reasons, intelligence was cited as a principal reason for maintaining a
presence in the colony. Although most of Britain’s intelligence on China was derived from overt
sources, London conceded that ‘even these are heavily restricted and frequently less available than in
other Communist countries’. Thus, London depended ‘for a great deal of the most vital kinds’ of
intelligence collected by clandestine means, stating that, ‘should we be denied the facilities presently
available to use in Hong Kong it would be impossible to replace them’.66
Since the 1950s, Britain had therefore sought greater military and political intelligence on the
Maoist regime in China. From its diplomatic, consular, and military stations in Beijing, Mukden,
Shanghai, and Canton, the SIS and Foreign Office were able to gather intelligence on China, albeit
restricted by operating in a security state.67 Both British SIS and MI5 maintained ‘sizeable’ stations in
Hong Kong in particular.68 Working along British military intelligence officers, under the cover of
‘political advisors’, these officers harvested a range of overt intelligence gained from Chinese
publications, human intelligence from interrogations, and political intelligence through their access to
the diplomatic community in Hong Kong. However, to some extent, they were inferior to members of
the Hong Kong Police Special Branch, who enjoyed an extensive presence across the colony, and ran
their own undercover operations. Cooperation between the security services and Special Branch was
regular, aided by the existence of Local Intelligence Committees (LICs).69 Additionally, the SIS
station in Hong Kong worked closely with the military, being positioned within an Army base in the
colony.70
The SIS station in Hong Kong in the late 1960s was headed by John Colvin, and later, Brian
Stewart - both SIS officers who were also stationed in Hanoi at the peak of the American bombing
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand p. 3.
68 Ibid.
69 Georgina Sinclair, At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame 1945-1980:
(Manchester, 2006), p.198.
70 Private information.
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campaign over North Vietnam. Both worked closely with Murray Maclehose, the most senior
diplomat in Hong Kong (and former wartime SIS officer), and the Director of the Hong Kong Police
Special Branch to gather intelligence on China. Often travelling around the region to other stations in
locations such as Singapore and Beijing, they also sought to set up or strengthen intelligence liaison
with other intelligence agencies.71 As the defence review noted, SIS was also able to use its Hong
Kong base for mounting covert operations against China. The document noted that SIS ‘already
provide valuable coverage of Chinese foreign trade, currency dealings, gold, and foreign exchange
holdings’, also having been able to mount marine operations against Chinese naval targets and ports.72
It is worth noting that China’s own intelligence activities in Hong Kong provided valuable
opportunities for SIS. Correspondence to the Foreign Office over one of Britain’s covert channels to
China – used primarily for negotiating the release of British journalist Anthony Grey, taken captive in
Hong Kong – revealed that ‘just as the West had China Watchers in Hong Kong, so China had
Southeast Asia Watchers and Western World Watchers in Hong Kong’. Although it stated that for
China, ‘of greatest importance’ was the fact that Hong Kong enabled its agents to ‘easily and readily
obtain foreign exchange in or through Hong Kong’,73 without which it would have been difficult to
obtain funds for its intelligence agents overseas, this presented SIS with another means for
intelligence exploitation. As London observed, Chinese use of Hong Kong as a centre for both
intelligence and subversive operations ‘has enabled MI6 to penetrate certain of these operations’
particularly concerning subversion into Thailand, which provided intelligence on Chinese ‘operational
methods, personnel, and intentions’.74
The SIS station spearheaded human intelligence gathering in Hong Kong, through a
combination of covert and overt means. Having previously mentioned the advantageous nature of
British trade in Hong Kong, SIS exploited this relationship, working closely with prominent banks
and trading companies in Hong Kong, as well as the Chinese mainland. However, this came with
71 Brian Stewart, in discussion with the author, November 2014.
72 TNA, FCO 21/199, Commonwealth Office, ‘Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee
Defence Review Working Party: Hong Kong: Long Term Study’, 18th August 1967.
73 TNA, FCO 21/490, Cater (HK) to Murray (London), 20th June 1969.
74 TNA, FCO 21/199, Commonwealth Office, ‘Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee
Defence Review Working Party: Hong Kong: Long Term Study’, 18th August 1967.
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some strings attached; the practice resulted in the companies being on the circulation list for the
finished intelligence product.75 In terms of more clandestine methods, however, SIS sought to exploit
a key advantage it had discovered with regard to travellers passing through China - their movement.
An idea attributed to Colvin, by cultivating networks of human agents on Chinese railway routes, SIS
was able to garner intelligence from areas of China that were either too remote, or inaccessible to SIS
officers due to the political and physical risks involved. In additional to general political observations,
these agents were able to report on information of a military nature, such as intelligence on military
movements.76 Additionally, the SIS officers received technical training in photography, meaning that
they - or their agents - were able to obtain the occasional photograph of scientific and atomic
development plants deep inside China.77
Crucially, Hong Kong’s HUMINT value also came from intelligence derived through the
interviewing of defectors and travellers from mainland China. Numerous scholars have pointed to
Hong Kong’s centrality as a location for gathering human intelligence on China owing to the steady
flow of refugees from mainland China.78 There is mild dispute as to whether the British or the
Americans held the advantage when it came to processing refugees and thus extracting information.
Lombardo claims that the British ‘frequently allowed US officials to interview refugees fleeing
China’, which, in addition to sources cultivated by the CIA, essentially enabled the US Consulate-
General to act as a ‘processing plant’ for intelligence in Hong Kong.79 This is in contrast to Chi-
Kwan, who states that the Hong Kong Special Branch and British SIS interrogated the majority of
Chinese refugees, underlining that ‘unless by special arrangement with the British, the American
Consulate was not allowed to interrogate Chinese nationals on a large scale; its proposals for a joint
interrogation team were consistently rejected’. Chi-Kwan also emphasises that the only interrogated
individuals permitted for the US were ‘walk-ins’, or Westerners allowed to leave the mainland, which
75 Private information.
76 Stewart, in discussion with the author, November 2014.
77 Ibid.
78 See Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, p.64; Chi-Kwan, ‘American
‘China Hands’ in the 1950s’, pp. 174-175.
79 Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, p. 66.
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included missionaries, travellers, and journalists.80 Although mention is made of the CIA branch in
Hong Kong being involved in interrogating refugees, he underlines that ‘direct evidence of this is
scarce’.81
Drawing upon their diplomatic cover under the auspices of the Foreign Office, the SIS
officers were also able to extract political intelligence from the diplomatic community in Hong Kong.
This was with particular focus on the Russians, and the broader Sino-Soviet rivalry. In comments to a
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) report at the height of the Cultural Revolution, the Foreign Office
noted that although official contact with the Soviets in Beijing was often ‘desultory and
unproductive’, unofficial contacts with them at diplomatic receptions proved ‘extremely useful’ to
them.82 For example, the intelligence officers would often exchange with the Eastern Europeans
information on Chinese internal affairs, derived from post-reading. Moreover, through these
exchanges, the British gained access to ‘the most interesting sections of the Chinese provincial press’,
to which the Eastern Europeans still had access, with Western countries having been denied such
publications several years before.83
The Foreign Office found this to be especially useful with regard to the Soviets, because the
Eastern Europeans operated a ‘pooling system of information’, from which the Russians could quite
freely draw, asserting that the British ‘obtained very much the best of the bargain in these exchanges’.
Nonetheless, formal exchanges still had their merits. Taking place primarily with Czech, Polish, and
Bulgarian officials, and it was assumed that these exchanges were conducted ‘at the very least with
Soviet acquiescence’, and under tight Soviet direction. Furthermore, the Foreign Office also noted that
contact with the Mongolians with advantageous, because they were able to essentially exploit their
ethnicity to ‘travel around Beijing much more unobtrusively’ than Westerners or the Eastern
Europeans. The utility of such political intelligence was clear in the Foreign Office’s eyes, which
80 Chi-kwan, ‘American ‘China Hands’ in the 1950s, p. 175.
81 Ibid.
82 TNA, CAB 190/9, FCO comments on report, 30th November 1970 (Attached paper to Joint
Intelligence Committee, ‘Working Party on Soviet Interest in Intelligence on China’, SIS Draft Paper,
24th November 1970).
83 Ibid.
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steadfastly wrote that it was ‘hardly necessary to underline how useful these exchanges are, especially
in the context of JIC’.84
Running parallel to SIS efforts to gather a range of intelligence was British signals
intelligence, through the GCHQ station at Little Sai Wan. The Commonwealth Defence Review
affirmed that Hong Kong’s value for intelligence procurement ‘lies primarily in the cover it provides
for SIGINT operations’. GCHQ’s ‘largest overseas station’ was situated in Hong Kong, and
‘responsible for the main UK contribution to SIGINT coverage of Chinese communications’.85 As
confirmed through official documents, this was both collected and shared by and with their American
counterparts, the National Security Agency, and their Australian counterparts, the Defence Signals
Bureau.86 Based at an RAF station, the alliance went under the cover name of the Combined Signals
Organisation for the Services (CSOS).8788 Certainly, according to defence officials, the post was
stressed to be the ‘main source of British intelligence on China’, alongside signals intelligence
facilities at Tai Mo Shan, were regarded as ‘of great important to the United Kingdom and United
States intelligence on China’.89
British signals intelligence from its ‘watchtower’ largely concerned China’s nuclear weapon
development, or military and nuclear-related matters. Indeed, as the review confirmed, SIGINT was
the main source Britain’s information on the Chinese Armed Forces in mainland China, and on the
Chinese military presence in North Vietnam.90 Furthermore, it also ‘provide valuable information on
the Chinese missile and nuclear testing programme, on Chinese defence-related industries, and
scientific and technical progress’, as well as some material on economic and political activity,
84 Ibid.
85 Commonwealth Office, ‘Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee Defence Review
Working Party: Hong Kong: Long Term Study’, 18th August 1967.
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and Booker, Under Secretary in the Australian Department of External Affairs, confirmed the
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including international trade and finance.91 Although GCHQ did not break much high-grade Chinese
traffic, it still intercepted intelligence that detailed China’s moves towards developing and testing a
nuclear weapon in the early 1960s.92 Requiring a significant technical and industrial effort in its move
towards acquiring a nuclear weapon, this process was captured through overhead flights that were able
to record imagery, alongside relatively low-level signal intercepts. Archie Potts, the UK’s Deputy
Director of Atomic Energy Intelligence noted that for about five years they had been aware of an
important secret programme controlled by a ‘special ministry’ in China. In fact, as signs of the
weapons programme underway, plant construction had begun in 1958, involving efforts to produce
uranium ore, and publicly, the Chinese had become silent in their complaints about other superpower
nations possessing nuclear weapons. This prefaced China’s first nuclear test in 1964.93 Lower-grade
intercepts also gave the British some idea of Chinese military support to the North Vietnamese army
throughout the 1960s.
However, British sigint was limited in the extent that it was able to provide real-time
intelligence on China. Chinese communications security practices were so stringent and well-observed
that they frustrated the efforts of both the British and Americans in intercepting high-level traffic,
meaning that imagery intelligence from U2 missions, and satellite reconnaissance was a more
immediate source of intelligence upon China.94 Moreover, the British station at Little Sai Wan
suffered from significant internal security deficiencies. Not only were large numbers of highly
classified documents stolen with relative frequency by Chinese staff, but the station ‘was evidently
seriously penetrated by Chinese intelligence’, demonstrated through the arrest of a Chinese linguist in
1961, reported to have sent daily reports into China for two years.9596 In this way, it is important to
91 Ibid.
92 Ball, ‘Over and Out’, p. 482.
93 TNA, FO 371/149546, Potts (DD/AEI) minutes, ‘Chinese Interest in Nuclear Weapons’ 15 and 17
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94 Aid and Richelson, ‘US Intelligence and China’, p. 2.
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underline that, despite British sigint efforts, much of the picture of China during the Cultural
Revolution came from British commercial telegrams through the Foreign Office.97
In addition to SIS and GCHQ, other sources continued to provide valuable intelligence from
Hong Kong. Importantly, a key agency in Hong Kong was the Special Branch. Responsible for a
range of reports and publications, including interrogation reports of refugees from the Chinese
mainland, these provided ‘valuable information mainly about conditions in provinces in South and
Central China’.98 The Defence Review also pointed to ‘a major radar installation’ location in Hong
Kong, that was ‘of unique value’ in providing intelligence on air movements.99 Additionally, archival
documents suggest that the British MoD’s main intelligence-gathering outfit in Hong Kong - JSIS -
was the organisation concerned ‘largely with the interrogation of refugees from the mainland’.100
Whilst the answer is still unclear as to who lead interrogations and processing of the refugee sources,
what remains is that interrogation reports were exchanged between the Americans and British.
According to one interrogation officer, there was a ‘good working arrangement with the Brits’.101
As previously mentioned, the majority of intelligence gathered in Hong Kong was overt.
Furthermore, much of the covert material had overlaps with overt intelligence gathered from a range
of public sources in Hong Kong. A considerable amount of the overt material found its way into
memoranda published by the Research Department of the Foreign Office. Crammed full of detail,
these memoranda were usually based on hundreds of overt intelligence reports (between one and four
hundred) that comprised of information gained from travellers, as well as extensive interviews with
emigrants (many single overt intelligence reports dealt with over fifty emigrants).102 For example,
typical sources would include farmers, reports from hospitals and clinics, students, and individuals
97 Aid and Richelson, ‘US Intelligence and China’, pp. 8-9.
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who operated on the black market.103 This was aided by ‘Operation Debenture’, which Britain
launched in 1954, designed to stimulate more defectors from China to Hong Kong. A covert radio
project that constituted one of the first UK operations for penetrating mainland China, the operation
sought to establish an undercover broadcasting station that through increasing the desire for contact
between the West and Chinese middle classes, could also increase defections across the border in
Hong Kong. Emphasis was very much upon the ‘intelligence’ angle of the operation, as SIS human
agent coverage of China had been patchier in the 1950s. Although originally intended to be located in
Hong Kong itself, the black station was eventually established in Singapore, hidden at a British
military base.104
Intended for specialist audiences such as the Foreign Office’s Sinologists, these reports were
often left unedited for their recipients, for fear of prejudicing the interrogation process through which
the intelligence was obtained.105 At the height of the Cultural Revolution’s violent phase in 1967 and
1968, the overt intelligence reports yielded information of political and military value. Saturated with
details of clashes between different Red Guard factions, interventions by the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), and violent incidents whereby Red Guard officers killed civilians, such
details illuminated the military aspects of China’s unsteady and rapid political change. The reports
also occasionally yielded information of a military intelligence nature. For example, a Research
Department memorandum from May to August 1967, which was based on 284 overt intelligence
reports, made mention of a Peking Radio Components Research Centre. Situated just outside Beijing,
this centre for applied technology research produced high-frequency transistors, power valves, and
high-speed switches, for which almost the total output was deemed to be ‘for military use’.106
Furthermore, observations on rations, wages, the black market, medicine, militia recruitment,
education, and radio broadcasts lent a broader context to the social impact and reach of the Cultural
103 TNA, FCO 51/6, FED (London) to China and Korea Research Department (London), comments,
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Revolution.107 Moreover, the reports’ distribution list was revealing of the intelligence’s utility in
contextualising events in China; British recipients included the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of
Defence (MoD), Security Service, GCHQ, and JSIS Hong Kong, whilst American counterparts
included the CIA, United States Information Service (USIA), and the United States Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR).108
When combined with another core component of the intelligence machinery in Hong Kong -
Local Intelligence Committees (LICs) - the British were able to piece together a detailed picture of
political events in China. With a particular focus on information of a military nature, monthly external
intelligence reports detailed violent clashes between pro and anti-Maoist groups, local propaganda,
communications and transport, unit movements and strength of the ACCA Army, and refugee
movements. Extra attention was paid to the PLA, whose involvement as a mediating force between
the central and provincial party machinery made it an important intelligence target.109110 Such
information had its use in defence intelligence circles in particular. The British Defence Intelligence
Service (DIS), for example, in discussion of the ‘new and more dangerous situation’ emerging in
China during the Cultural Revolution, affirmed that its focus lay ‘not on the day-to-day events in
Hong Kong’, but in trying to deduce the attitude of the Beijing Government, through understanding
local dynamics.111
These reports also captured local political dynamics at play in Hong Kong. Through their
coverage of local protects, the flurry of communist delegation and trade union activity, local labour
movements, and border area activity, 112 the LICs produced weekly assessment to the JIC that enabled
the British to understand the parameters of the Cultural Revolution in terms of its physical reach or
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limits, its violent impact through casualties, and ultimately, its sustainability in terms of political
momentum.113 For example, one report based on information obtained from travellers noted the
manner in which fighting between rival factions had earned them the ‘enmity of the local people’, thus
shedding light upon local political tensions.114
The intelligence provided by the LICs was particularly valuable across 1967 and 1968, as a
bombing campaign in Hong Kong by the Chinese Communists reached its peak. Detailing to London
a wide range of details on the bomb campaign, the LIC drew upon reports compiled by the district
police and military, which was in turn collected by the colony policy and military forces, who
produced their own weekly report.115 The LIC was therefore to report to London information on
targets (security forces, public utilities, and government installations), but also determined that the
‘haphazard nature’ of bomb placements away from strategic targets, as well as the use of hoax bombs,
indicated that aim of the campaign was not so much to cause damage, but rather to ‘frighten the
population generally and sap their will to resist’, thus undermining the Hong Kong Government in the
process. Other intelligence included finer detail on bomb manufacture, recruits, materials, design
sophistication, etc.116
Such intelligence was not without its constraints, however. In the case of the LIC monthly or
weekly assessments of Hong Kong during the bombing campaign, there were clear reliability issues
with the raw intelligence gathered. As previously mentioned, using reports compiled by district police
and military, one LIC noted that a ‘considerable amount’ of information received by the police on
bomb factories and workers was anonymous. Moreover, this raised issues of vagueness, inaccuracy,
and in some cases, it was noted that the information provided was ‘clearly malicious’, pointing to
issues of distortion.117 DIS also experienced similar issues in their interrogations of refugees and
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defectors. One particular instance of an illegal immigrant who had served in the Chinese Communist
Army (CCA) typified the flaws in raw intelligence that JSIS extracted from such sources. Codenamed
‘Grand Arkle’, although it was believed that the source would produce ‘some invaluable information,
some of it being very controversial’, JSIS acknowledged key source limitations too, including their
limited knowledge ranked as only a private soldier, their submission to poor political indoctrination,
and their service during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, which would have heavily shaped the
soldier’s understanding of the CCA.118
Additionally, in the case of the overt intelligence that made its way into the Foreign Office
Research Memoranda, the intelligence was often outdated, to some extent. Acknowledging that the
reports were subject to a time lag, an official in the China and Korea Research Department conceded
that, since the memoranda covered a four-monthly period, ‘in order to have a substantial amount of
material available for the production of a summary of conditions in a given period’, they had to wait
‘for at least a month beyond the period’ in question to receive the reports. This had an analytical
purpose, however; without waiting for this duration, the conditions described in the reports would be
based on too few accounts.119 Thus, although the time lag allowed for a greater degree of reliability, it
paradoxically prevented use of up-to-date intelligence for the British.
The Regional Information Office (RIO) in Hong Kong was also another component of SIS’s
structure in the colony. Located in Ridley House, RIO was housed as an analytical department of the
Foreign Office, but essentially a sub-section of the British SIS in Hong Kong. Maintaining contact
with SIS, RIO took on a variety of roles pertaining to monitoring, accessing, and producing Chinese
publications, both official and unofficial. One of RIO’s key roles was to monitor the supply and
circulation of official and black market newspapers and periodicals from China, though efforts in this
regard were often ‘unavailing’ due to strict security restrictions in China, which made it risky to
smuggle publications across its border. It also monitored broadcasting operations, as well as general
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publications output from other governmental departments, China specialists, and foreign
correspondents.120
The BBC World Monitoring Service was an important component part of the overt collection
effort. A dedicated team listened in to the output from twelve radio stations across Southern and
Western China. Under a long-standing agreement with the CIA’s equivalent organisation the
Americans covered Chinese broadcasts from Northern and Eastern China form their own station in
Okinawa. This division of labour had much to do with the technical issues of reception at Hong Kong
and Okinawa.121 The BBC Monitoring Service was a fascinating example of overt/covert collection.
Its product was freely available to journalist and academies and was in no sense secret. Yet it was at
the same time funded from the British intelligence budget and some of its collection sites were
disguised.122
The RIO was at the centre of information exchange over China, receiving information sources
from the BBC monitoring office, correspondence from the British Mission in Beijing, Foreign Office
material, and Hong Kong Police Special Branch reports on the results of interrogations of Chinese
refugees.123 In the case of the British Mission in Beijing, it received publications that SIS officers
there collected and forwarded to Hong Kong, arranging for their distribution and usage elsewhere.
Additionally, it also made purchases for other offices, and bought Chinese and Communist
publications from left-wing bookshops in Hong Kong.124 Significantly, RIO also produced its own
information output. Amongst duplications, the China Series, and its Radio Report, was the China
News Summary, a weekly bulletin that was distributed to all Hong Kong newspapers, foreign
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Consulates-General, journalists, and academics.125 Observing that its office was ‘frequently resorted
to’ by foreign correspondents in Hong Kong for special briefings, the RIO’s information output often
ended up in British and American newspapers and magazines, making it a real locus of information
exchange in Hong Kong.126 This was underlined in the fact that amongst its total recipients were
fifteen American agencies, illustrating its prowess as an information hub on China.127
Sino-Soviet Tensions and Espionage
Framing the British approach to intelligence collection in Asia was the broader Sino-Soviet rivalry
that engulfed most of East and Southeast Asia during the Cold War. Evident through discussion in JIC
reports from the late 1960s, this impacted British intelligence requirements significantly, particularly
as nuclear weapon development - or rather, competition - underlay tensions between the two powers.
It raised questions for discussion at two key levels; firstly, at a macro level, it required JIC to produce
assessments on how the broader diplomatic and strategic balance in Asia would be affected by the
Sino-Soviet dispute. In addition to Soviet anxieties over China and vice-versa, doctrinal differences,
broader alliances with Western nations, differences over Vietnam, and differing tactics in the Third
World, were all areas that JIC sought to produce assessments on, especially in terms of what this
meant for the West, in terms of splintering the broader Communist movement in the region.128
There was a distinct nuclear dimension to these intelligence requirements too; not only was
the Chinese nuclear deterrent capability a real issue, but the practicalities of a Sino-Soviet nuclear
confrontation were also on the JIC’s agenda, both in terms of pre-emptive strikes by the Russians, and
the involvement of third parties.129 This was particularly following efforts by British agents in the
1950s to gain intelligence on various nuclear-related plants at Lanchow and Pao Tou in north-central
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China, which had resulted in little success.130 Resultantly, intelligence on nuclear development turned
out to be a key aspect of British-American intelligence on China. CIA briefings for Commonwealth
Liaison Officers often sought to discuss weaponry as it pertained to the Sino-Soviet dispute, such as
weapon development, tactical nuclear weapons as they related to territorial disputes, and even Soviet
preventive strikes against Chinese nuclear installations (despite the Foreign Office’s belief in Soviet
restraint, the Americans ‘took even this unlikely possibility quite seriously’),131 especially towards the
late 1960s.
Secondly, at a micro level, this altered on-the-ground requirements for intelligence collection
in Hong Kong. In addition to monitoring Soviet and Chinese officials and looking for signs of nuclear
military development, China’s status as a ‘high priority intelligence target of the Soviet Union’ meant
that the British also took it upon themselves to monitor Soviet approaches to Chinese contacts in
Hong Kong. For these purposes, the JIC established a Working Party on Soviet Approaches for
Intelligence on China, that discussed areas including Soviet approaches to various officials,
definitional issues of ‘approaches’ versus ‘intelligence’ in Chinese eyes, and also Soviet difficulties in
penetrating Hong Kong, relating the latter ‘not only to xenophobia, but also to the efficiency of the
Chinese security service and the restrictive social structure’.132
The latter was a particular area of concern for the JIC, as Soviet attempts at espionage in the
colony steadily grew into the late 1960s. According to a research paper written by SIS in 1970, the
first recorded instance of a Russian Intelligence Service (RIS) briefing of a secret agent to obtain
intelligence on Communist China occurred in 1964, whilst a defector (albeit one whose reliability was
then in dispute) also reported in 1964 that new sections directed against the Chinese had been created
in the internal and foreign directorates of the KGB in 1963.133 Importantly, this served as the context
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against which Russian Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Alexei Kosgyin, sought to establish
Soviet representation in Hong Kong, during a visit to the UK in February 1967. Since his request, SIS
recorded twenty-seven recorded instances of ‘unprompted approaches’ by Soviet officials to Western
officials, either directly or through an intermediary, seeking intelligence on China, or ‘emphasising
Soviet ignorance of developments in that country’, as well as twelve instances of Soviet efforts to
obtain intelligence through secret agents. Although Kosgyin had provided reassurances to the British
that Soviet intelligence efforts would be directed against the Chinese, and not the British, SIS
observed a significant increase in Soviet approaches towards officials in 1969, coming on the back of
more open approaches towards officials in 1967. Moreover, exchanges with the CIA revealed that by
June 1967, the Americans had already received six to eight ‘similar approaches’ (then twice as many
made towards the British), usually involving Military Attachés, and members of the RIS.134
The British were swift to turn down Kosgyin’s request for Soviet representation. Suggesting
in its place a ‘regular exchange of information, but not intelligence’, the British offered for this to be
formally and centrally coordinated, via either London or Moscow.135 Whilst core considerations had
included avoiding antagonising relations with China (which was likely to interpret admission of the
Russians into Hong Kong as a hostile act), there were also ‘strong technical objections from the
intelligence point of view’.136 Moreover, officials in the British Embassy in Beijing were particularly
averse to a Russian presence in Hong Kong, arguing that, firstly, the British would receive nothing in
return, but secondly, that it opened the British up to Russian treachery. Noting that any information
passed to the Russians would likely originate from Hong Kong, and given the Russians’ ‘known
propensity for creating trouble between Her Majesty’s Government and the Chinese about Hong
Kong’, there was every chance that the Russians might arrange for leaks of this material to the
Chinese ‘with this end in view’. This was in light of the perception that ‘the Chinese already regard us
Kong) to Carter (London), 26th May 1967 - the Japanese had identified three Russian officials in
Hong Kong as intelligence officers, including a member of the GRU.
134 Ibid.
135 TNA, FCO, 40/72, Hall (London) to Trench (London), 20th April 1967.
136 TNA, FCO 40/72, Brown (London), Smith (London), ‘Russian Proposal for an Intelligence
Establishment in Hong Kong’, 17th April 1967.
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as American spies’.137 Indeed, SIS observed that the Russians had surreptitiously established an
informal means of representation in Hong Kong in 1969, through two engineers, who supervised the
repair of Soviet ships at the Hong Kong and Whampoa Docks, although there were no obvious signs
of intelligence activity being conducted by these two individuals.138
The episode was a clear illustration of Hong Kong’s value outside of mainland China. In its
discussion of the Russians’ approach, SIS were quick to note the Russians’ interest in line with
growing borders with China, underlining the political value of having a base in Hong Kong.
Moreover, in intelligence terms, it demonstrated Hong Kong’s ‘obvious attractions as a listening post
and operational base’ against China. Noting that Chinese xenophobia had ‘adversely affected Soviet
capability’ to run Chinese agents, having a base in Hong Kong would therefore make it easier for the
Soviets to conduct ‘China-watching’ activities, and to gain access to valuable communications
intelligence (COMINT) through intelligence exchange with the British, which the Soviets were
themselves ‘unable to intercept’.139
Furthermore, the episode also implied a distinct operational tone to the Russians’ request; SIS,
noted that having a base in Hong Kong would enable the Russians to operate against Chinese targets
in Hong Kong, which would also include American and British China-watchers themselves.140 This
did not go unnoticed by the Foreign Office, which pointed out to JIC its own fruitless attempts to
facilitate exchanges with the Russians earlier in 1967 in Beijing. The Foreign Office thus affirmed
Russian aspirations to establish a base, ‘which they would undoubtedly use extensively for operations
against ourselves and the Americans’.141 Having a foothold in Hong Kong therefore improved
intelligence and operational capability with regard China, rather than having to ‘tap’ the product of
other established intelligence services already operating there.
137 TNA, FCO 21/122, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Tel. no. 493, 17th May 1967.
138 TNA, CAB 190/9, Attached paper to Joint Intelligence Committee, ‘Working Party on Soviet
Interest in Intelligence on China’, SIS Draft, 24th November 1970.
139 Ibid.
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141 TNA, CAB 190/9, Eastern European and Soviet Department (London), comments, Attached paper
to Joint Intelligence Committee, ‘Working Party on Soviet Interest in Intelligence on China’, SIS
Draft Paper, 24th November 1970.
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The Special Intelligence Relationship in Hong Kong
Despite the earlier tensions displayed between the British and the Americans in the 1950s, Hong Kong
still demonstrated a high degree of intelligence cooperation between the two allies. Moreover, it
revealed the centrality of British intelligence to the American intelligence community, which,
although it possessed a vast Consulate-General in Hong Kong, lacked a direct window into Beijing.
This is underlined by Lombardo, who in drawing upon the words of Whiting in 1965, highlighted the
significance of the Consulate-General when he stated that, ‘for all intents and purposes’, the American
Consulate-General in Hong Kong was effectively the US’s ‘Peking Embassy’.142
Britain’s ability to make a contribution to American intelligence was particularly strong in the
area of non-Soviet targets, as previously discussed.143 As Aldrich notes, because of America’s long-
term commitment to confrontation with Communist China over Korea, Taiwan, and later, Vietnam,
British territories in Asia therefore proved ‘invaluable’, particularly in light of the US’s total absence
in Beijing.144 In fact, the degree of American appreciation for the British intelligence became clear to
Foreign Office officials at a time when the British Embassy’s very existence was under threat. In a
review as to the benefits – and risks – of maintaining the Hong Kong post, the Commonwealth Office
underlined its importance to the Americans as a vital factor in the embassy’s continued operation,
acknowledging that ‘the Americans who have a considerable intelligence staff in Hong Kong working
on China, attach great importance to the British effort’, particularly concerning covert collection
facilities.145
Although the value of Britain’s output from Hong Kong was clear to the Americans, there
were broader concerns that factored in. Such was the American appetite for the material, that the loss
of Hong Kong would have been considered not only a pitfall for the American defence and
intelligence community on China, but also a ‘setback for the efforts of the West’ to gain intelligence
142 Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, p. 77.
143 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 347.
144 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ during the
Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 24:3 (1998), p. 347.
145 TNA, FCO 21/199, Commonwealth Office, ‘Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee
Defence Review Working Party: Hong Kong: Long Term Study’, 18th August 1967.
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on China.146 As the review stated, the information Britain was able to produce on China ‘provides an
important element in present arrangements for the exchanges of intelligence worldwide between the
Americans and ourselves’. In particular, Britain’s sigint output from Hong Kong was held up as ‘one
of this country’s main contributions to the worldwide exchange of signals intelligence between the
UK and the US, an exchange on which the UK is heavily dependent’.147
As the US deepened its involvement in nearby Vietnam, and sigint requirements geared
themselves towards supporting the US campaign there, the US made little progress against Chinese
traffic in the 1960s. Echoing the CIA’s failed humint efforts, the US found itself frustrated by such
‘strict and pervasive’ Chinese communications security practices, that these ‘strangled’ US efforts to
eavesdrop on China According to Aid and Richelson, this thwarted the NSA’s efforts to crack
‘virtually all’ high grade Chinese codes and cyphers.148 Furthermore, illustrative of changing US
intelligence requirements, in 1968, just over eight per cent of the National Security Agency’s (NSA)
sigint resources were allocated on China, as opposed to fifty per cent for the Soviet Union.149 British
intelligence in Hong Kong therefore had a key role in offsetting this imbalance for their Americans,
by relieving the US sigint community of a significant resource burden. Described as being ‘of critical
importance’ to the US,150 discussions with Britain’s intelligence partners were revealing of the utility
of intelligence from Little Sai Wan. According to the Director of the Australian Joint Intelligence
Organisation in 1974, in Washington it was ‘fully accepted’ that when it came to sigint, the US was
‘willing to rely for its national intelligence purposes on the contribution of its partners under the
shared [UKUSA] arrangements’.151
A similar situation prevailed for the Americans concerning human intelligence. This was
above all during the Cultural Revolution – a period of rapid, violent change, where the Americans
lacked first-hand contact with ordinary Chinese or any sort of observational intelligence from their
own people on the ground. American usage of the material was indicative of how British intelligence
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
148 Aid and Richelson, ‘US Intelligence and China’, p. 2.
149 Ibid, pp. 8-9.
150 Ball, ‘Over and Out: Signals Intelligence in Hong Kong’, p. 493.
151 Ibid.
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could make up for the void in American capabilities. This was evident in the fact that as late as 1969,
CIA reports on the Chinese secret police were still based primarily on material from interrogations
conducted in Hong Kong.152 Furthermore, CIA reports from Hong Kong continually made their way
onto the US President’s desk, illustrating their high-level readership. Indeed, this practice went as far
back as 1950, in which Hillenkoetter, then Director of the CIA, forwarded informant reports to
President Truman.153 The significance of information from informants should not be understated
either; Edwin Martin, the Consul-General in Hong Kong in the late 1960s recalled the period during
the Cultural Revolution as being the most productive, because of the flow of refugees; factional
rivalry amongst Red Guards and other communist groups meant that individuals were happy to
divulge information believed to expose past crimes of the Party. Martin stated that, ‘they published
their own little papers, they published documents’, illustrating a ‘real explosion of information’ about
what was going on inside China.154 Thus, nowhere was Hong Kong’s value demonstrated that in a
1960 statement by the US National Security Council, affirming the British colony to be ‘the most
important source of hard economic, political, and military information on Communist China’ that the
Americans had access to.155
But the Special Intelligence Relationship in Hong Kong also pointed to a different tension
between the British and American intelligence services. Controversially, despite CIA efforts to
undermine the Communist regime, British intelligence from Hong Kong was vital to CIA efforts to
assess its own destabilising operations. Although the Americans had access to the usual forms of
political, economic, and military intelligence through their Consulate-General in Hong Kong, British
intelligence also offered them a window into Chinese society, which was inaccessible without a
152 Joint Intelligence Committee, 'Estimate of Effectiveness of Anti-Communist Guerrillas Operating
in China' 12 February 1951, 551, RG 218, US National Archives; CIA Report RSS No.0035/69, 'The
Political Security Apparatus', 20 February 1969, Frame 186, Reel IV, CIA Research on China, BRO.
153 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 308.
154 Ibid; Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64, p. 51; 51; Ambassador Edwin
W. Martin, transcript, 17 March 1988, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Library of Congress,
Washington, DC.
155 Lombardo, ‘The American Consulate in Hong Kong, 1949-64’, p. 71.
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human presence in Beijing.156 This also extended to other parts of China, where the CIA directed
much of its efforts to assessing the effect of CIA support for guerrilla activity, particularly in
Southeast China, where the target had been to curb Chinese assistance to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam.
Reinforced by information operations involving propaganda leaflets and radio broadcasts, the large
numbers of refugees passing through Hong Kong which the British processed, allowed the CIA to
measure levels of dissent.157 Similar efforts were made to assess the effectiveness of the Communist
secret police, run by the Ministry of State Security, which often had to counter resistance groups that
the CIA supported.158
Lastly, it is worth noting that Britain recognised itself that support for its ally was a potential
area of weakness. In its discussion of the post’s future, London conceded that Britain’s position in
Hong Kong ‘makes us vulnerable to pressures’ from China, in the sense that the Chinese could
leverage this particular dynamic – ‘e.g. our support for America’ – to influence Britain’s policies
towards the Special Relationship.159 Nonetheless, this was a political calculation that had broader,
tangible benefits; London received ‘much of the product of US intelligence work on China’ in return.
But, more importantly, at a higher level, for all that Britain was considered the junior partner in the
Special Relationship, London noted that it drew ‘substantial advantage for our political relations with
the United States in return for the facilities we provide’.160
Conclusion
As a political terrain, Hong Kong epitomised the complexity – and chaos – of the dynamics between
Britain, the United States, and China. Nonetheless, the plethora of intelligence organisations operating
156 Chi-kwan Mark, Hong Kong and the Cold War: Anglo-American Relations, 1949-1957, (Oxford,
2004), p.188; William Egan Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA, (New York, 1978), p.103;
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from Britain’s colony were but one indication of Hong Kong’s utility as a vantage point onto
mainland China. Constantly marred by the friction between Chinese Nationalists and Chinese
Communists, the intelligence activities of both Britain and the United States were merely but one
facet of the broader Special Intelligence Relationship as it pertained to China. If British penetration of
some of these Chinese operations pointed to its skill in covert intelligence operations, Hong Kong also
demonstrated the depth of overt intelligence collection that Britain was able to provide; this was
particularly so in the field of human intelligence derived outside of interrogations, and published
material that the British Embassy strove to collect and analyse. Crucially, this demonstrated the notion
of intelligence as a ‘spectrum’ – inclusive of both overt and covert types of intelligence, both of which
entered into assessment by Britain’s key intelligence customers (primarily, the United States).
Aside from Hong Kong’s palpable intelligence function, it was also the prime example of the
advantages of Britain’s residual empire. As American military involvement in Asia grew, particularly
in Vietnam under the Johnson administration, although the American’s had their own extensive CIA
station guised in their Consulate-General in Hong Kong, their use of British material was evident in
their own reporting and intelligence assessments. To a considerable extent, this owed to the
‘diplomatic divergence’ that created a divide between Britain and America – whilst Britain recognised
Communist China, the American refusal to formally acknowledge regime resulted in clear reporting
gaps for its intelligence and defence community. Yet, through Britain’s long-standing networks,
contacts, and former imperial resources, it was able to fill this gap, some of which held ‘critical
importance’ to the Americans, as acknowledged in the US Joint Intelligence Organisation’s report of
1974.161
Lastly, whilst Britain’s intelligence contribution to the American assessment machine
flourished during the 1960s, Britain’s technical bases grew less and less immune to technological
developments as time passed. Despite Britain’s prestige in intelligence terms, as Britain’s reliance
upon its military footprint decreased in Southeast Asia, American technological advances in the field
of signals intelligence grew; the NSA – the American counterpart to GCHQ – eventually overtook
161 Ball, ‘Over and Out: Signals Intelligence in Hong Kong’, p. 493.
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Britain’s facilities, epitomised in the fact that Hong Kong, despite operations such as ‘Geranium’ and
‘Kittiwake’, was declared to be ‘of less importance in the trade-off between allies’ into the mid-
1970s.162 Changing political priorities – and certainly political leadership - in Southeast Asia were
sealed by the establishment of the US’s own sigint station at Khon Kaen in Thailand, indicating a
stronger US reliance upon remote operations in line with its own technological advancements.163
However, that the British station in Hong Kong was utilised to such an extent by allies until the late
1970s was testament to the utility of British reporting.
162 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, pp. 483-484.
163 Ibid. See also Aldrich, ‘British Intelligence and the Anglo-American Special Intelligence
Relationship’, p. 347.
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6
Beijing: An Embassy in Flames
An Embassy in Flames
The summer of 1967 in Beijing was a vicious, bloody episode in modern Chinese history, to which
British diplomatic premises bore witness. Experiencing a period of brutally intense, fast-paced change
at the height of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Beijing (then Peking) was a crucible of revolutionary
fervour. Although mass political rallies and demonstrations were commonplace, they often descended
into violent episodes, the collateral damage of which included political executions, public humiliation,
and beatings. In fact, such incidents began to characterise political life in the capital, as unsettling events
that were once sporadic became the norm. Hostile demonstrations outside embassies in the diplomatic
quarters gathered pace and potency; clashes between workers and students consumed daily life, and in
June 1966, an ordinary Chinese person stabbed two foreigners, leading to his public trial before the
masses, and subsequence summary execution. These incidents were emblematic of the perforating of
China’s political and social fabric during the explosive Cultural Revolution. As Percy Cradock, then
British Counsellor in Peking stated, what had begun as a ‘wave of iconoclasm, turned to extravagant
persecution, and finally plain violence’.1 The diplomatic corps in Beijing were not immune to this, as
the British experience that summer came to show.
The staff in the British Embassy was quite small, but contained huge analytical talent. Cradock
would soon leave China and spent five years in charge of the Assessments Staff that drafted JIC papers
in the Cabinet Office. The First Secretary was Tony Blishen, one of SIS’s most talented sinologists.
Meanwhile Ray Whitney, a dedicated Cold Warrior would move on to be the last head of the
1 Percy Cradock, Experiences of China, (London, 1994), p. 39.
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Information Research Department, before it was closed down by David Owen in 1977. Alongside them
were a dedicated team from the Diplomatic Wireless Staff and the Diplomatic and Technical
maintenance staff, whose duties include running a ‘technical operation’ from the embassy which
undertook short-range sigint against both Chinese targets and other embassies.
With the exception of a few close allies, Beijing’s relations with the international diplomatic
community in the capital had slowly been fraying. Whether Communist or non-Communist, violent
outbursts came to characterise the experience of numerous embassies and other diplomatic offices.
Earlier in 1967, the Mongolian Embassy had been under siege, held by members of the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA), who had also set fire to the Ambassador’s car, in response to the alleged
manner in which the Mongolian Ambassador’s driver had ‘callously treated’ a portrait of Chairman
Mao. Similarly, both the Indian and Indonesian Embassies in Peking were besieged, the latter having
been almost entirely destroyed to the extent that the Indonesians at one point were forced to improvise
a makeshift telephone out of the broken telephone, and a ‘the remnants of a teapot’.2 No-one was safe,
and the smallest incident had the potential to attract trouble. In addition to the Russians experiencing an
attack on their Consulate, the Kenyan office was ‘in trouble’ over a traffic incident involving Red
Guards, and demonstrations took place against the Ceylonese, for alleged interference with a shipment
of Mao badges.3 Along with growing tensions in the Sino-British relationship - particularly over the
fraught issue of Hong Kong - London and the Beijing Embassy watched the tide of violence drifting
their way, concerned for the vulnerability of the Embassy, as it became clear that ‘diplomatic immunity
was virtually at an end’.4
On 22nd August 1967, it was the turn of the British. Relations between Britain and China had
slowly deteriorated over the course of the year, and May saw an acceleration of trouble; a labour dispute
in Sanpokong artificial flower factory in Hong Kong had rapidly descended into violent demonstrations
across the colony, the ripple effects of which were felt in Beijing. For example, on 15th May 1967,
around one million demonstrators marched past the British Office in Peking, whilst a large rally took
2 Ibid, pp. 59-60.
3 Ibid, p. 60.
4 Ibid.
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place at a nearby stadium. This quickly escalated, with the Chinese government deciding to shutter the
British Consulate in Shanghai in response to ‘intemperate language’ used by the Secretary of State,
George Brown in a diplomatic meeting. The Consul, Peter Hewitt, had his dignified withdrawal from
Shanghai marred by a mob breaking into his residence, who ‘frog-marched’ him around and destroyed
his belongings, only to later be spat upon, struck, and smeared with glue upon leaving the airport.5
Broader international events impacted upon the atmosphere within Peking too; accusing Britain of
collaborating with America and Israel in the Six Day War, which took place in June 1967, a group of
anti-British protestors - which included amongst others, British, African, American, and Arab
participants - broke into the British Office, tore down the Union Jack, and smashed a portrait of the
Queen.6 Such was the state of popular protest against the British, that by the time of the Queen’s
Birthday Party celebration at the British Office on 9th June, all guests were barred from the event by
Red Guard cordons, leaving the British to drink their champagne alone, as their Chinese office staff
marched around the garden protesting. Indeed, the sole guest was the Danish Chargé d’Affaires, who
had managed to climb over the garden wall into the British compound.7
By late August, the mob violence typical of the Peking summer reverberated upon the British
embassy again. As tensions flared over Hong Kong, it appeared that the events of June were simply a
preview of what was to transpire. On 22nd August 1967, Sir Donald Hopson, the British Chargé, was
summoned to the Chinese Foreign Ministry to be told that within forty-eight hours, the British were
expected to cancel the ban on three ‘patriotic’ newspapers in Hong Kong, to free nineteen ‘patriotic’
journalists held there, and to abrogate pending lawsuits against two Hong Kong newspapers and printing
firms. Whilst from the British perspective, total compliance was close to impossible owing to legal
processes, it was clear that the British Office could expect ‘consequences’ of some kind. Indeed, as later
exchanges between the Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Office reveals, the ensuing attack on the
5 Ibid, pp. 56-57.
6 TNA, FCO 21/33, FCO (London), Memo, ‘Demonstrations Against Her Majesty’s Charge
d’Affaires Office and Residence in Peking on 7 June’ (no date)
7 Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 60.
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British Embassy in Beijing was acknowledged as ‘the direct result of our failure to comply with a
Chinese ultimatum on the treatment of Communist Representatives in Hong Kong’.8
These consequences were quick to occur. Later that day, the Chinese staff of the British Office
held a meeting on the office’s terrace, to which they asked Hopson to attend. What unfolded next was
less so a ‘meeting’, than a manoeuvre designed to draw in other members of the British staff, cutting
them off from the building, and leaving them locked outside, in the intense Beijing heat and sunlight.
Although the Chinese staff left after several hours, the British staff found the gates of the compound
closed; they were effectively under siege in their own quarters, with crowds of demonstrators growing
rapidly outside. The main focus was the Office of the British Charge D’affaire, where much of the main
embassy business was carried out including cyphers and messaging. Fortunately, the previous day, the
British had prepared well for this eventuality, as small-scale demonstrations took place outside the
Office. With the shadows of disturbances at the Russian, Indian, and Indonesian Embassies looming
over them, they had prepared contingency plans, fitting out riot shutters, stockpiling food, mattresses
and other emergency supplies in the Chancery and adjoining Charge’s residence. They had also begun
to destroy sensitive documents in advance. Such was the sense of calm preparation that Cradock even
managed to fit in an evening swim in the compound!9
At 10.20 pm on the evening of 22 August, most of the staff were watching the end of a Peter
Sellers film, The Wrong Arm of the Law. Given that the embassy was under a vague ultimatum, and
given that the Indian and Mongolian embassies had recently been overrun, the attitude of the staff seems
to have an almost caricature sang froid about it. But with the crowds of demonstrators outside seemingly
having reached a zenith, the situation had appeared under control. However, this soon changed;
interrupting a game of bridge on the upper floor of the Office, Ambassador Hopson shouted in warning
to the rest of his staff, ‘they’re coming!’, as the crowd surged and began to break into the Office. As
8 Commonwealth Office (London) to Bolland (London), ‘Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy
(Official) Committee Defence Review Working Party: Hong Kong Contingency Planning: ’Feasibility
Study on Evacuation of HK, Draft reporting of Special Planning Unit’, OPDO (DR)(67) 56, 6th
September 1967.
9 Cradock, Experiences of China, pp. 60-62. For many survivor accounts of the embassy attack, see
also: FCO 21/33.
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Cradock recalled, ‘there was a rushing sound of feet, heavy blows against the door, then flames as cars
were set alight’.10
More by chance than design, a contingency plan Cradock had prepared just days before -
somewhat ironically named ‘Armageddon’ – quickly came into effect: the staff retreated behind various
‘defence points’ in the British Office, such as the guard’s desk or metal grille protecting the ‘secure’
area of the building. Such was the momentum of the protestors, that ‘each line was barely manned
before it fell’.11 Eventually making it to the strong room, where all the classified papers were held, the
staff remained in the dark for a short period to avoid attracting attention, where they could hear the
sound of rushing feet, the noise of breaking glass, heavy blows against the registry door, and even flames
as the diplomatic cars were set alight, accompanied by chants of ‘Sha! Sha!’ (‘kill! kill!’). Exchanging
looks, the Chinese speakers amongst the staff knew better than to translate at that moment. At one point,
an unidentified liquid began pouring through the wooden riot shutters, until one staff member threw a
mattress over the hose supplying it. Some thought it was petrol. Fortunately, it had turned out to be little
other than water.
Nonetheless, as the protestors outside set fire to effigies, and eventually the Office building
itself, smoke built up inside the strong room, leaving the staff with little option other than to force an
exit. With their hands raised in the air, Hopson and Cradock were the first to leave, followed by the rest
of the staff, only to be met with ‘howls of exultation’ from the crowd, and to be set upon with ‘everything
they had’. Swept away by hostile protestors, the staff were separated from one another, and found
themselves ‘half by our hair, half-strangled with our ties, kicked, and beaten on the head with bamboo
poles’. They were repeatedly forced to bow their heads in submission to Chairman Mao, whilst
photographers stood ready to capture images of the staff in this position of humiliation.12 Eventually
being escorted away from the riotous masses by police officers, the British staff were reunited at the
diplomatic flats next to their compound. Suffering from bruises, torn clothing, and even concussion -
First Secretary Blishen, an SIS officer, had a ‘fine black eye’, whilst Ambassador Hopson was ‘bleeding
10 Ibid. ‘Personal Account for the Burning of the British Office, 22 August’.
11 Ibid, p. 63. TNA, FCO 21/34, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 29th August 1967.
12 TNA, FCO 21/34, Hopson (Peking) to Brown (London), ‘The Burning of the British Office in
Peking’, 31st August 1967.
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copiously’ from a head wound. Although the staff has escaped relatively unscathed, the British
Residence had been sacked, with all of its contents destroyed, the Office was burnt down, and the official
means of transport destroyed, save one bus kept for emergencies.13
There was also a somewhat more obscure technical casualty to result from the incident; as the
Chinese stormed their way through the registry Office, it transpired that a Rockex cypher machine had
been stolen by the Chinese during the attack. Photographs of the Registry after the attack show the
distinctive tubular frame of the Rockex machine standing empty. Originating as military technology in
Bletchley Park in 1944, before being appropriated for civilian and espionage activity after the Second
World War, the Rockex cypher machine used automated one-time pad traffic to send encoded messages.
Described as ‘super-secret’, it also served the purpose of providing extra security for the
communications networks of SIS agents around the world, as part of a long-range wireless network to
support overseas stations.14 Co-opting the SIS Section VIII that produced the Rockex machines, the
Foreign Office made it the backbone of a new communications system – the Diplomatic Wireless
Service, of which the Beijing Embassy had two to four operators, supported by the Diplomatic Technical
Maintenance Staff (DTMS). The DWS was technically banned by international diplomatic convention,
but nonetheless, took on a second function within Britain’s overseas territories – it doubled as a ‘secret
monitoring service working from within British Embassies and High Commissions’, with many DWS
operators effectively acting as ‘forward collectors’ for Britain’s Government Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) intelligence service.15
Fortunately, the Chinese did not get their hands on the crown jewels. They had despatched a
dedicated team who ‘broke into the cypher machine by breaking through a wall’. However, ‘all really
sensitive equipment had been removed to the strong room on 21 and 22 August’ by the technical
operators ‘whence it was later recovered and destroyed’. The safes in the strong room remained secure
13 Ibid.
14 Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency,
(London, 2010), p. 57.
15 Ibid, p. 57; p. 192.
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and were not penetrated. This was the equipment used for GCHQ’s short range interception work. All
they lost in this regard were two Astro and CEI receivers ‘from the loft’.16
Nevertheless, the loss of the Rockex cypher machine was highly significant for Britain’s
communications and operations from Beijing. As a result of what Cradock referred to as ‘sins of
omission’ in a despatch to London not long after the embassy’s destruction, he conceded that the
decision to ‘smash the cypher machines’ was taken by Hopson too late into the attack. As smoke filled
the registry and the final stages of the attack took place on the secure zone of the Office, for Hopson
and Cradock the issue became ‘a matter of saving lives’ above anything, and thus security the machines
fell down the list of priorities. Upon return to the Office, London conjectured that the ‘only important
piece of classified material missing’ was a cypher machine. In 1968, at an inter-departmental meeting
of the Cypher Systems Working Group in 1968, most worryingly, this Rockex cypher machine was
confirmed as having fallen into the hands of the Communist Chinese.17
What then is the significance of this tumultuous episode? Numerous historians have drawn upon
this case to illustrate the precariousness - and chaos - of Beijing’s diplomatic relations during the
Cultural Revolution.18 However, the burning of the British Embassy in Beijing also offers some insight
into a core - and often overlooked - component of British diplomatic history: intelligence. The history
of British intelligence in China reaches back at least into the late 1800s, where British ‘China-watchers’
sought to understand Chinese military capabilities as Britain approached the height of its empire.19
Additionally, substantial literature exists on British intelligence in Asia during the Second World War.20
16 TNA, FCO 21/34, Cradock to London, 29 August 1967.
17 TNA, FCO 19/18, Cypher Systems Working Party, Minutes of Third Meeting, 12th June 1968.
18 For example, see Chi-Kwan Mark, ‘Hostage Diplomacy: Britain, China, and the Politics of
Negotiation, 1967-1969’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 20:3 (2009), pp. 473-493; James Hoare,
Embassies in the East: The Story of the British Embassies in China, Japan, and Korea, (Richmond,
1999); Ronald C. Keith, The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai, (New York, 1989); Harold C. Hinton, China’s
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19 See Eric Setzekorn, ‘The First China-Watchers: British Intelligence Officers in China, 1878-1900,
Intelligence and National Security, 28:2 (2013), pp. 181-201.
20 For example, see, Richard J. Aldrich, Gary D. Rawnsley and Ming-Yeh T. Rawnsley, The
Clandestine Cold War in Asia: Western Intelligence Propaganda, and Special Operations, (London,
2000); Antony Best, British Intelligence and the Japanese Challenge in Asia, 1914-1941, New York,
2002); Richard J. Aldrich, Imperial Rivalry: British and American Intelligence in Asia, 1942-46,
(Cambridge, 1987); Christopher Baxter, ‘A Closed Book? British Intelligence and East Asia, 1945-
1950’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 22:1 (2011), pp. 4-27; Richard J. Aldrich, ‘British Secret
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And yet, academic work on Sino-British relations in the 1960s remains noticeably quiet with regard to
intelligence.
Moreover, this turbulent period also provides an excellent opportunity to examine the crossover
between intelligence and diplomatic activity. This can be seen from three angles: firstly, from 1966
onwards, various Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officers were stationed at the British Embassy in
Peking, and their reporting, as well as those of their Foreign Office colleagues was a key source of both
overt and covert intelligence flowing out of Beijing, particularly during such a volatile events of the
Cultural Revolution, which caused an upsurge in demands for reporting in the West. Secondly, the
British Embassy ransacking was characteristic of what has been referred to as an era of ‘embassy wars’,
in which embassies were co-opted into the shadows of the Cold War, and ‘gradually transformed into
technical fortresses from which espionage was both launched and repelled’.21 Typified by a ‘feverish
battle with bugs and telephone taps’, what underlay this violent episode was therefore a distinct
undertone of espionage. This was also embodied through fears about the raiding of the embassy’s
documents and archives. Thirdly, the episode reflects upon the difficulties of intelligence collection
from a diplomacy outpost under severe security restrictions, owed in large part, to the ‘spy phobia’ that
pervaded Beijing and hindered the efforts of the British officers to conduct even simple, overt
observation.
This carries significance not only in terms of the implications of intelligence’s lingering
presence in diplomatic relationships, but also because it bore upon the Anglo-American ‘Special
Relationship’ in Asia more broadly. Although the United States had a substantial intelligence presence
in Hong Kong through the US Consulate-General (as previously explored), it lacked its own presence
in Beijing at a time when local knowledge was key to understanding the rapid fluctuations in Chinese
leadership, which in turn held repercussions for the way China conducted itself during the Cold War.
As such, the US intelligence community relied to a notable extent upon intelligence reports from the
Intelligence Service in Asia During the Second World War’, Modern Asian Studies, 31:1 (1998), pp.
179-217.
21 Aldrich, GCHQ, p. 197.
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British Embassy in Peking to fill a gap, while also receiving information from smaller states and lesser
outposts.
This chapter therefore seeks to analyse the kinds of intelligence gathered in Peking, and by
tracing its journey to its intelligence customers, evaluates its worth on a broader scale. Furthermore, it
seeks to evaluate an episode of intelligence and diplomatic history that was especially violent in nature.
Relative to similar stations in Hong Kong or Hanoi, where although the consular staff were faced with
considerable hostility, but were not in immediate danger, in Beijing, intelligence gathering and
observing was hampered by the constant, daily threat of violence. This raises an interesting paradox in
comparison to Hanoi, where, despite an ongoing war and the city’s strategic significance - particularly
to the Americans - life for the British staff was comparatively stable, and innocuous. By contrast, in
Beijing, conditions were far from favourable for the British when it came to gathering information. A
powerful political undercurrent dictated attitudes towards the British; in addition to centuries-long anti-
imperialism, an intense ‘spy phobia’ capturing Beijing’s society was compounded by a general degree
of xenophobia towards foreigners in the capital. This was perhaps epitomised in the embassy burning
and subsequent loss of the cypher machine. As such, this meant that the British witnessed the events of
the Cultural Revolution ‘only darkly and fragmentarily at the time’.22 Nonetheless, as this chapter aims
to show, the British were able to offer insights into a regime and society in the midst of turbulent –albeit
temporary - change.
Diplomatic Encounters in the Forbidden City
During the late 1960s, the British Embassy’s experience in Beijing oscillated curiously between the
usual comforts of a diplomat’s existence, and the violent upheaval of the Cultural Revolution. Located
on the eastern outskirts of the old city, the British Residence and Office were two identical concrete
villas near to the diplomatic compound in Beijing. According to Cradock, the British staff there lived
22 Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 37.
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in ‘reduced circumstances’, the initial English Palace – originally the residence of a descendant of a
Chinese Emperor – had been lost to the Chinese government, allegedly being used as offices for the
Public Security Bureau (the local police).23 Described as ‘blank, ugly, virtually treeless’, the new
premises still boasted of luxuries usually afforded to diplomats, including a ‘ pleasant piece of garden,
a swimming pool and swings for the children, and even two tennis courts’.24 However, the changing
atmosphere in Beijing could not have been further from the days of ostentatious parties at the Summer
Palace ‘at which boatmen towed the revellers over the lake as the sun went down’, paper lanterns were
lit, and dances held near the Dowager Empress’s apartments.25
Beijing itself was something of a ‘walled city’, in which the staff’s movements were
circumscribed, according to political dynamics. Described as the ‘darker colours of the picture’,26 the
staff were restricted to circulating only around the city centre, in which even several historical sites were
out of bounds, ‘though not clearly marked, so that we had regular brushes with the police’.27 Although
the staff were able to take trips to the Ming Tombs and Western Hills, and could dine at local restaurants
and visit the International Club, driving had to be undertaken with care, given that ‘a simple traffic
infraction can easily become an ugly political incident’. Furthermore, travel to places outside Beijing
had ‘virtually ceased’ by 1967, whilst travel to Canton and Hong Kong was often interrupted. Entry and
exit from Beijing was therefore only possible for the British by air or train to Moscow, by train to Ulan
Bator, or by air via Shanghai.28 The only other British post in China was the Consulate in Shanghai,
described as a ‘town in itself’, with lawns, law courts, a chapel, and rows of staff houses.29
For most of 1967, the underlying hostility towards the diplomatic community in Beijing was
partly dictated by the official regime, and partly by the attitudes of the revolutionary masses. In the case
of the former, milder forms of deliberate antagonism were clear, such as the re-naming of the road
housing both the British office and the North Vietnamese Embassy to 'Support Vietnam Street'. The
23 Ibid, p. 22.
24 TNA, FCO 21/33, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 16th August 1967.
25 Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 35.
26 TNA, FCO 21/33, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 16th August 1967.
27 Cradock, Experiences of China, pp. 23-24.
28 TNA, FCO 21/33, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 16th August 1967.
29 Cradock, Experiences of China, pp. 23-24.
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British Chancery occasionally wrote to London to complain of various ‘pin pricks’ – essentially the
same types of harassment that consumed other British diplomatic offices such as Hanoi. For example,
the British staff were continually not invited to events which other members of the Diplomatic Corps
were invited to, refused travel to Shanghai or other provinces to collect stores, and denied plumbing
repairs to their premises.30 Furthermore, although a certain degree of low-level hostility affected most
foreign diplomatic offices in Beijing, Cradock pointed to a second group of problems that were
particular to the British Embassy. The Chinese office and domestic staff serving the Embassy were
‘generally uncooperative’, to the point where they too participated in protests against the British
Embassy itself.31 This corresponded with what Bolland described as an ‘unprecedentedly hostile
campaign’ against Britain in Beijing and Shanghai, including ‘extremely insulting and slanderous’
propaganda against the British, and persistent discrimination against Hopson and his staff.32
However, in 1967 the degree of hostility towards the British Embassy took on a somewhat more
sinister tone. As a diplomatic outpost, Beijing was unique for the prolonged and outright levels of
violence it experienced. The ‘violent turn’ of Beijing’s summer was due in large part to the Red Guards,
who orchestrated and conducted most of the attacks on diplomatic premises. Thus, the British staff
became witness to the more commonplace violence that tore at Beijing’s social fabric. As Cradock
notes, ‘beatings and killings soon become common’, recalling ‘the noise of destruction, blows, cries,
the sound of breaking glass and furniture’ he heard whilst at a party at an Indian colleague’s house.33
Indeed, a thin partition was all that separated the diplomatic staff from the routine violence of the
Cultural Revolution – though, by the summer of 1967, this partition had eroded almost completely.
The summer of 1967, epitomised what Cradock termed ‘the absurd violence in which we
lived’.34 Regularly subjected to direct and constant threats, the walls of the Chancery, Residence, and
staff quarters were ‘liberally plastered’ with posters condemning the British (and Hong Kong)
30 TNA, FCO 21/33, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Memo, enclosed in Peters (Chancery,
Peking) to Bolland (London), 7th June 1967; Peters (Peking) to Bolland (London), 1st August 1967,
‘Pin Pricks’.
31 Ibid, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 16th August 1967.
32 Ibid, Bolland (London) to de la Mare (London), 5th July 1967, ‘The Future of the British Mission in
Peking.
33 Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 40.
34 Ibid, p. 76.
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government, including slogans such as ‘the Debt of Blood will be Paid!’.35 Hopson was threatened by
foreign visitors at the Office who stated that they would ‘come back and burn your house and you in
it’.36 Furthermore, in June 1967 demonstrations gathered pace outside the office against supposed
British support for the Six-Day War, which manifested a violent undertone. In addition to straw effigies
often set fire to by demonstrators, crowds installed three almost life-size clay figures outside the gates
of the Office, representing President Johnson, and the British Prime Minister ‘attached by ropes to
General Dayan represented as a dog (presumably running) with a patch on its eye’, which the staff had
to mount a covert operation to remove.37 Moreover, a ‘motley crowd’ of ‘foreign experts’ including
Arabs, Africans, Americans, and even some British nationals (supporters of Communist China) broke
into the Office courtyard, breaking several windows, destroying the Queen’s portrait, tore up the Union
Jack, and even attempted to set fire to a car. Having broken into a diplomatic reception, First Secretary
and the senior SIS officer Blishen was ‘hit on the head and jabbed in the neck and stomach with a
placard’, and had his car vandalised, only for it to be returned covered in political slogans painted on
with oil paint, inside and out.38 Violence was thus a regular feature of the British experience in Beijing.
Both scholars and officials involved in the embassy attack have also identified another key
dimension to the politics of the embassy ransacking. By the end of 1967, the British staff’s movements
were subject to new restrictions, effectively confined to an area consisting of the diplomatic flats, the
remains of the Chancery Building, and the former residence – a sort of house arrest.39 Although London
reciprocated, applying the same restrictions to Chinese officials in London, enforced by Special Branch
who followed Chinese diplomats about, this was maintained until the Foreign Office made a
concessionary move – what scholars have termed ‘hostage diplomacy’ between the two sides. Rather
than local politics, this was indicative of fraught relations between the British and the Chinese at a
higher level. In effect, the Chinese were linking the British Embassy in Beijing with British conduct in
Hong Kong, posing a dilemma for the Foreign Office; whilst London sought to extract its staff from
35 TNA, FCO 21/33, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Telno. 487, 16th May 1967.
36 Ibid, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Telno. 669, 10th June 1967.
37 Ibid, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Telno. 678, 12th June 1967.
38 Ibid, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Telno. 665, 9th June 1967; Peters (Peking), 21st June
1967, ‘Pin Pricks’.
39 Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 73.
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Beijing, it also needed to maintain British authority in Hong Kong, all whilst avoiding further provoking
communist extremist activity in Hong Kong – which risked drawing China into the equation to support
them.40 Without exit visas, Cradock lamented that the British staff enjoyed a dual status – ‘diplomats in
name, hostages in fact’.41 There were other precedents too; Frank Van Roosebroeck, a British national
in Shanghai, had been held for around twenty years there because the bank he worked for ‘would not
meet Chinese blackmail’. The arrest of a Japanese press correspondent in June 1967 underlined ‘the
intensity of the current spy mania’.42
The people who they were most anxious to extract were Tony Blishen, who had suffered
concussion during the embassy attack, and his wife, who was dangerously ill. Ambassador Hopson was
incensed about their ‘inhumane’ treatment and enounced the Chinese as ‘gangsters’.43 It was partly to
secure the release of the Blishens that the Foreign Office worked with MI6 to put counter pressure on
the Chinese mission in London. MI6 were asked to make overt and visible efforts to recruit Chinese
diplomats to make them uncomfortable and perhaps to engineer the withdrawal of some of their staff.
MI6 thought that this would be difficult since the Chinese embassy in London was fortress- like and its
staff well protected, but they tried their best. The Blishens were soon released, and, unusually for an
MI6 officer, arrangements were made for Tony Blishen to talk to press on his return to London.44
Britain had a more significant example that demonstrated how political relationships were able
to hamper information gathering efforts in other parts of China. Having been subject to increasingly
vociferous protests, in May 1967, the British Consulate in Shanghai experienced the violent
undercurrent of the Cultural Revolution, supposedly orchestrated by Red Guards. What began as
protests against the Consulate rapidly descended into an invasion of the premises; the Consulate
Residence was vandalised by over-zealous protestors, and ended with Hewitt being hit by protestors
with small, beflagged sticks, as his family hid in a laundry room. 45 Such was the ‘noise and venom’
40 TNA, FCO 21/34, Murray (London) to Wilkinson (London), ‘British Mission in Peking and Policy
towards HK’, 18th December 1967.
41 Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 73.
42 TNA, FCO 21/38, date unknown, 1967.
43 TNA FCO 21/34, Murray minute, 18 December 1967.
44 Ibid. Murray, Minute, 6th December 1967; private information.
45 TNA, FCO 21/33, Hewitt (Peking) to PM (London) 29th June 1967; 1050711 - Hewitt (Peking) to
PM (London) 29th June 1967.
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that Hewitt, his family, and a member of staff sent from Peking to retrieve them were struck and spat
upon en route to their plane. The attack bore political significance in that days after, the Chinese
government publicly announced its decision to close the British post in Shanghai, which London was
unable to rescind.46
The incident was also a window into the political dynamics at play during the height of the
Cultural Revolution. It seemed that London’s interpretation of events in China put it at odds with those
of its diplomatic staff on the ground; for example, Consul Hewitt – at the heart of the attack in Shanghai
– understood the protest in its own political terms as it related British policy in Hong Kong, emphasising
the ‘indignation against Britain…apparent in every demonstrator’s face.’ By contrast, - and from a
distance – the Foreign Office placed emphasis upon the role of the Cultural Revolution as the root of
the disturbance, insisting upon the somewhat far-fetched argument that the Shanghai Office provided
an ‘excellent target to keep the revolutionary pot boiling without causing internecine strife’.47 Bearing
in mind the attacks on the Mongolians and Russians, it was clear that regardless of motivations, the
Shanghai attack satisfied the Red Guard’s ‘taste for violence…which could be indulged in the name of
nationalism’.
Spy Phobia
With this political context in mind, the general hostility towards the British also manifested a distinct
degree of ‘spy phobia’. This was evident not only from Chinese actions towards the British, but also
from British perceptions of their own activities. Writing in 1968, as the chaos of the Cultural Revolution
had begun to subside, subsequent staff members at the British Office noted the ‘current spy mania’
engulfing Beijing, visible through the increase in arrests and detentions of foreigners in the capital
accused of spying.48 Hunter attributed this to being one aspect of the ‘Chinese xenophobia’ that
pervaded Beijing in 1967,49 exacerbated to a considerable extent by the arrest and expulsion of an Indian
46 Ibid, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Telno. 559, 24th May 1967.
47 Ibid, Memo, ‘Shanghai: Mob Attacks and the Closure of the Office’, 29th June 1967.
48 TNA, FCO 21/14, Appleyard (Peking) to Wilson (London), 19th March 1968.
49 TNA, FCO 21/13, Hunter (Peking) to Wilson (London), 2nd January 1968.
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diplomat in June 1967 on charges of spying. The Chinese had accused the Indian Second Secretary, and
subsequently a Third Secretary, of spying; the Indian Second Secretary Raghunath was accused of
disguising himself as variously Nepali and Pakistani in order to penetrate into Chinese government
offices.50 Depriving him of diplomatic immunity by rescinding his diplomatic identity card, and thus
status as a diplomat, the Chinese then carried out judicial processes against him,51 immediately creating
an alarming precedent for foreign diplomats accused of espionage in the midst of the Cultural
Revolution.
In this context, the loss of the British cypher machine during the attack on the British Embassy
was even more troublesome. The reasons were twofold; firstly, it suggested that British self-perceptions
were correct, in that the Chinese held suspicions of the British as spies and questioned the purpose of
the post. Secondly, it suggested an element of cold warfare at play on the part of the Chinese. It was
clear that the Chinese attack on the British Office was ‘not an irrational outburst of mob violence’, but
a well-planned and coordinated operation by elements of the Red Guards. As London retrospectively
learnt, such were Chinese suspicions of the British, that prior to the attack, the Embassy’s telephone
lines had been cut, preventing other friendly offices from being able to send warning calls to the British
staff.52 Both suggest that perceptions of intelligence ultimately lay in the eye of the beholder.
Both these issues were raised most interestingly through the theft of the cypher machine, but
also the status of a map of Beijing accidentally left pinned to the wall of the safe room. In a key despatch
to London detailing the Embassy’s ‘sins of omission’, Cradock observed that whilst the revolutionary
masses had been given licence to destroy to the British premises, the secure zone of the Office – housing
the DWS and cypher equipment - was ‘deliberately preserved from fire’. Furthermore, Cradock
emphasised that the protestors who broke into the secure zone ‘were not indiscriminate criminals’, again
highlighting that they had made for the rooms where the Chinese house staff had not been allowed.
Aldrich observes that ‘mingled in with the revolutionary mob was a specialist team of Chinese code
experts’, affirmed by the view of Blishen, who stated that particular protestors entering the embassy
50 TNA FCO 21/29, Bolland (Head of Far Eastern Dept., FCO) to Private Secretary (London), 14th
June 1967.
51 Ibid, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Telno. 681, 12th June 1967.
52 FCO 21/34, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 29th August 1967.
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‘knew exactly what they were looking for’.53 In fact, it transpired that in addition to the Rockex cypher
machine having been stolen, a few technical items, including Astro and CEI receivers were stolen, as
were two cases of DTMS defensive anti-bugging equipment, though he noted that these may have been
burnt during the attack. Noting a ‘further mark of selectivity’, Cradock drew attention to the fact that
the DWS room, housing much bulkier Piccolo cypher equipment, was left alone, apart from a
‘perfunctory attempt at burning by flinging in an oil lamp’.54
This aspect of the embassy raid takes on particularly significance in the context of what scholars
have called ‘embassy wars’. As previously discussed, DWS operators also worked in effect as ‘forward
collectors’ for GCHQ, placing such communications security personnel at ‘the forefront of secret battles
between the embassies’. This rendered the DWS both an offensive and defensive organisation, in
combining a ‘multitude of curious tasks that were at the gritty interface of technical and human
espionage.55 However, it also presented a vulnerability; if other embassy precedents were anything to
go by, the Soviets were ‘almost certainly aware’ of the British practice of using the DWS for the short-
range monitoring of communications from embassies.56 For example, in 1964 at the Soviets attempted
to use a low-frequency radio beam to induce a malfunction in a teleprinter in the code room of the
British Embassy in Moscow. This caused a small fire, necessitating a response from firemen, some of
whom were in fact bugging technicians from the KBG’s sigint department.57Thus, whilst the DWS held
an important intelligence function, it may also have been a point of vulnerability to the Chinese.
The other item of interest – or, perhaps, fluster – to both sides was revealing of attitudes to do
with ‘spy phobia’. The other key ‘sin of omission’ was that amidst the commotion of the attack, the map
of Beijing on the wall of the strong room became an ‘oversight’; though it was hidden behind curtains,
the Cradock and Hopson had forgotten to remove it, having focused upon removal of all classified
documents into the safe room first, and staff safety as the attack worsened and staff safety became the
53 Ibid, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 29th August 1967; Aldrich, GCHQ.
54 TNA FCO, 21/34; Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London) via French channels, 24h August 1967 –
Hopson noted that ‘one cypher machine and manual is missing’, not found in the wreckage of the
cypher room, and assumed to have been removed by Chinese hands.
55 Aldrich, GCHQ, p. 192.
56 Ibid, pp. 189-190.
57 Ibid, p. 193.
146
primary concern. Although the map was little more than an outdated street map identifying government
buildings, factories, and railways, the British Embassy was all too aware that if fallen into Chinese
hands, the map’s only use would be ‘evidence’ if Beijing decided to level charges of espionage against
the British staff. What exacerbated this scenario was the fact that the map was marked Secret, and of
United States’ origin. 58 This did not go unnoticed by London either; requesting a full report of the attack
from Cradock, Secretary of State Rodgers had ‘particularly asked’ about the status of the map left in the
safe room.59 It was thus clear from both British and Chinese perceptions that the Embassy was tinged
with a hint of intelligence gathering, whether the accusations were valid or not.
Information Insecurity
Prior to the attack, the embassy enjoyed a speech safe room designed to resist bugging. Speech security
was precarious at best for the British Embassy in Beijing following the attack, and this held significant
repercussions for a core function of the post: intelligence gathering. This applied not only to the security
of classified material that was passed between London and the Beijing Office, but also to retaining the
very communication channels that made such intelligence exchange possible. It is here that the impact
of the attack on the British Office was the greatest, creating deep repercussions that jeopardised the
post’s utility, and by extension, its very existence, exacerbating what Cradock described as ‘the
precariousness of existence here’.60
The preparations made by the British Embassy in anticipation of an attack by the masses made
it clear that maintaining information security – however fragile – was of the utmost importance. This
was a particularly delicate issue given the climate of hostility between Britain and China. Both London
and the British Embassy made frequent references to destroying files upon warning of an impending
attack, in order to prevent sensitive material falling into the hands of the Chinese.61 Such an environment
58 TNA FCO, 21/34; Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London) via French channels, 24h August 1967.
59 Ibid, de la Mare (London) to Samuel (London), memo, 7th September 1967.
60 TNA, FCO 21/33, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 16th August 1967.
61 See FCO 21/33.
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therefore lent even further gravity to ensuring no trace was left behind of sensitive British documents,
or anything incriminating.
Accordingly, the Foreign Office had prepped the Embassy staff well when it came to rapidly -
though perhaps not efficiently - destroying sensitive material. In the aftermath of the Embassy
ransacking, although the strong room had remained intact, so did the classified papers it had withheld
during the time of the attack. Whilst some of the staff attempted to destroy the papers in coal-burning
stoves, burning bulk papers required other methods. Cradock recalled a futile effort involving a
‘remarkable chemical compound’ provided to him by the Foreign Office; according to instructions, ‘this
only needed to be scattered on the files, left for a period with the doors closed’, and upon return, the
staff would find a ‘tidy pile of ashes, all secrets consumed’. Yet, in reality, the powder did little - having
employed it as instructed, the staff simply discovered the files ‘neatly charred around the edges, rather
like funeral stationery, but still perfectly legible’. Moreover, an unforeseen side-effect hindered efforts
even further, as the powder had generated rather ‘powerful and tenacious fumes’. According to Cradock,
this meant that the only way to retrieve the files was for each staff member to ‘wrap a towel around his
face, plunge into the gas chamber, seize the nearest file, and get out before succumbing’. Taking on a
greater sense of emergency in the aftermath of the embassy burning, Whitney even slept with a device,
described as an ‘incendiary deed box’ nearby, intended to consume its contents in a crisis, whilst at the
same time emitting a high-pitched whistle. Cradock commented that he had ‘the same faith in it as the
incendiary powder’. Given the high priority afforded to maintaining information security, ultimately,
the bulk documents were resigned to being burnt in perforated petrol drums, an ‘old-fashioned, but
effective’ technology.62
Fortunately, records have survived that detailed the kinds of classified material to be destroyed
by Embassy staff. Examining the documents at hand in the British Office offers some clues as to what
was at stake. In light of a threatened ‘take-over’ by the Chinese at the British Consulate-General in
Shanghai, for example, Consul-General Hewitt had immediately begun to destroy files, of which he
kept a list detailing what had been destroyed, to be passed onto London. Amongst documents on visas,
62 Cradock, Experiences of China, pp. 67-69.
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security reports on individuals, and observational reports on China (including its industry, politics,
agriculture, and everyday life) kept in Shanghai, were a range of more sensitive documents relating to
intelligence collection and security. For example, the ‘Guard’ procedure detailed criteria for which
documents not to pass onto the Americans; other documents detailed ‘security and security equipment’;
codes and cyphers were amongst some of the most sensitive documents to be destroyed, particularly in
the context of losing the Rockex machine later that year; the latest Foreign Office Security
Memorandum was destroyed; and lastly, local intelligence reports, as well as documents relating to the
Joint Intelligence Bureau were amongst those destroyed.63
However, other reasons underpinned the decision to destroy the documents with such
immediacy. As previously mentioned, underlying tensions between the Chinese government and the
diplomatic corps present in Beijing were suspicions of espionage by the foreign community, unaided
by the arrest of an Indian diplomat in June 1967 on accusations of spying. As such, it was a real concern
of the British that discovery of any of their sensitive material in the event of an attack could incur
accusations of espionage against their staff, or at the very least, as an excuse for detention,
imprisonment, or expulsion (as was the case with the Indians). In addition to the aforementioned
documents, cypher machine, and the troublesome map, American sensitivities also factored into the
decision to destroy the documents with such immediacy. Nigel Trench, for example, had noted to the
Foreign Office a conversation with the Director of Asian Communist Affairs in the State Department
in June 1967, in which the latter enquired into the fate of British archives in Shanghai following its
shuttering, given that the Consulate-General there would have had custody of a ‘certain quantity’ of US
papers.64
Importantly, the loss of the cypher equipment and destruction of the Office seriously
jeopardised the Embassy’s ability to report to and exchange intelligence with London. The loss of secure
communication channels was twofold; firstly, the British Embassy was seriously impeded in its capacity
to receive and store classified material from London and other British stations. Just as in Shanghai, the
63 TNA, FCO 21/33, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), ‘List of Files Destroyed in Shanghai on
27th January 1967.
64 Ibid, Trench (London) to Bolland, (London), 2nd June 1967.
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staff engaged in a ‘crash burning programme’, quickly destroying all classified files that had survived
the attack. As a total last resort, the files were to be removed to the strong room of a friendly Embassy
(‘probably Dutch’). Book cyphers and one time pads for laborious hand encypherment were also
destroyed, and the emergency DWS equipment transferred out of the compound and into friendly
keeping.65 Using ‘every available burning device’, this was undertaken to the extent that according to
Cradock, there was nothing left that could have been of incriminating or intelligence value to the
Chinese.66
Retaining equipment and documents posed the greatest challenge in the days immediately
following the attack. Almost a month after the embassy’s destruction, the staff were operating out of
Whitney’s diplomatic flat as a makeshift office, and such was the poor nature of the office’s speech
security that the only room shut off from their Chinese servants was used a registry. Illustrating how
vulnerable the Embassy’s security was, the only cypher pads and book were kept in an incendiary deed
box kept by Whitney’s bed, whilst the only classified material they felt able to retain safely was held in
a ‘foolsafe envelope’ that was to be carried off in the Duty Guard or Chancery Guard’s pocket, and if
need be, left for safe-keeping with a friendly mission.67 Such was the impact upon the Embassy’s
information security that until at least the end of 1967, the staff destroyed most incoming telegrams and
letters after reading them, and did not keep copies of outgoing correspondence other than a registry
book. In essence, London did not send any material marked Top Secret to Beijing, and Beijing did not
retain papers classified as ‘Secret’ or above. Files were destroyed so quickly after reading that an
internal memo from the Diplomatic Service Administration circulated to all departments noted that the
Beijing office was ‘relying upon simply the collective memory’ of the Embassy as so little of importance
was recorded or filed. 68
65 TNA, FCO 21/34, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Tel unnumbered, 25th August 1967.
66 Ibid, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 29th August 1967.
67 Ibid, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 13th September 1967.
68 Ibid, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 13th September 1967; TNA, FCO 21/29, Hopson
(Peking) to FCO (London), 12th October 1967; Wilson (London) to Ball (Comms. Dept., London),
memo, 26th October 1967; TNA, FCO 21/34, Diplomatic Service Administration Office (London) to
All Posts and Departments, 6th October 1967, ‘Communications with Peking’.
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The other core risk posed by the loss of the cypher machine was that in order to maintain a basic
level of communication with London, the Embassy had to rely upon the communication channels of
friendly missions. Not only did this affect the content that could be sent over such channels, but also
exposed the British to charges of espionage if detected by the Chinese; writing to Beijing, Murray, for
example, warned of caution in sending en clair telegrams to Beijing, noting that one report was sent
through a DWS channel, ‘which China doubtless monitor’.69 Furthermore, although the British Embassy
still had recourse to commercial telegraphic channels, and mail channels, these were ‘easily intercepted
by the Chinese’, who knew that the British had not used their own cyphers since the attack upon the
embassy. Although in early September 1967, the Diplomatic Wireless Service was on the point of re-
establishing a cypher link, having renewed contact with the Embassy in Beijing,70 the Embassy’s
capacity to send and receive classified files was seriously hampered. To circumvent this major obstacle,
London therefore used the ‘consortium bag’ – a shred diplomatic bag - operated by the Dutch and
Scandinavians (particularly the Norwegians), which was exchanged in Moscow, to get sensitive
material to Beijing.71 This essentially creating a means of getting material to Beijing using the
Norwegians’ regular weekly bag facilities.72
Furthermore, until the British Embassy had managed to get their own communication channels
back up and running again to full capacity, telegrams to and from Peking were being transmitted by a
‘friendly mission’ – the French.73 Using particular prefixes on telegrams that indicated the use of French
channels,74 this practice – however temporary – raised all sorts of security risks for the British and their
allies. As it narrowed circulation of the telegrams even further to a strict ‘need-to-know’ basis, this
69 TNA, FCO 21/29, James Murray (FCO, London) to Hopson (Peking), 5th October 1967.
70 Ibid, Shepherd (Comms. Dept, London) to Denson (FED, FCO, London), 8th September 1967.
71 Ibid, Scott (Oslo) to FCO (London), Telno. 274, 1st September 1967; TNA, FCO 21/34, Bolland
(London) to de la Mare (London), ‘Burning of the British Office in Peking’, 11th September 1967.
72 TNA FCO 21/31, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Telno. 20, 28th August 1967.
73 TNA FCO 21/30, FCO (London) to Polad (Singapore), Telno. 896, 5th September 1967.
74 Ibid, FCO (London) to Peking, FOPEK 1 (via Paris no. 2932), 29th August 196; TNA, FCO 21/29,
Reilly (Paris) to FCO (London), Tel no. 883, 1st September 1967. The prefix ‘FOPEK’ indicated
telegrams passing through French channels to Beijing, whilst the prefix ‘PEKFO’ indicated telegrams
passing from Beijing to London via French channels. A statement was attached to the top of each
telegram stating ‘the greatest care should be taken not to make known more than necessary the fact
that such messages are being transmitted to and from Peking on our behalf’.
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meant that key allies – most notably the Americans and Canadians – were not in the know.75 Moreover,
within the Quai d’Orsay (the French Foreign Ministry) itself, knowledge of the practice was highly
restricted; observing the ‘strictest secrecy’, copies of British telegrams passed to them only went to two
recipients in the Quai, and overall knowledge of the link was confined to only five diplomatic officers,
which included the Secretary-General, and Manac’h (Director for Far Eastern Affairs). Additionally,
the Quai was careful not to distort its normal signal pattern in wireless communication with Beijing (so
as not to give away British use of the channel), which passed through two routine schedules at midday.76
Although a partial cypher link (of a limited capacity) was established via Singapore by mid-September,
and a full cypher link restored by late October 1967,77 the British continued to make use of the French
channel, allowing it to cope with the full volume of material being sent its way.
Paranoia at the risk of leak was high. Though happy to lend its channels to the British, the Quai
d’Orsay was ‘scared stiff of a leak’, underlined by the fact that the French political leadership in the
Elyseé itself was not aware of the practice! Furthermore, various clues pointed to the fact that
individuals within the American and Canadian embassies in Paris had figured out British use of the
French link. Moreover, in discussions between different embassies, the British were aware that the
French Embassy in Beijing was passing on material (such as newspapers) to allied Governments, ‘the
study of which, as you know, would…constitute espionage in Chinese eyes’, and implicate the British.78
Despite the caution taken, London experienced a few minor embarrassments at the hands of close allies.
For example, the Canadian Third Secretary revealed to Campbell that he knew about the ‘help’ the
French were giving the British, whilst a ‘less than friendly’ American colleague at the American
Embassy in Paris accused the British of receiving telegrams through these channels.79
However, the loss of cypher channels in Beijing following the attack on the Embassy also
revealed another aspect to intelligence exchange between allies. In the attack’s immediate aftermath, it
75 TNA FCO 21/30, FCO (London) to Polad (Singapore), Telno. 896, 5th September 1967.
76 TNA, FCO 21/29, Fielding (Paris) to Denson (FED, FCO, London), 2nd September 1967,
‘Communications with Peking’; Campbell (Paris) to Denson (FCO, London), 1st September 1967.
77 Ibid, Denson (FED, FCO, London) to Campbell (Paris), 16th October 1967; Shepherd (Comms.
Dept, London) to Denson (FED, FCO, London), 8th September 1967.
78 Ibid, Campbell (Paris) to Denson (FED, FCO, London), 5th October 1967.
79 Ibid, Campbell (Paris) to Denson (FCO, London), 1st September 1967; Denson (FED, FCO,
London) to Campbell (Paris), 16th October 1967.
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seemed at moments that British-French proximity was stronger than the UK-US alliance when it came
to exchanging information. For example, immediately following the Embassy attack, London had relied
upon French material that they were able to glean from Red Guard sources ‘which are unavailable to
us’, via Paris.80 Moreover, correspondence from the Foreign Office implied at this delicate juncture a
closer alliance between the British and French in Paris; part of the reason for keeping such strict
information security over British use of French cypher channels was so as not to undermine British
trustworthiness in French eyes. This was underlined in a discussion between British staff in Paris and
London; maintaining secrecy at that point was vital so as not to ‘imperil whatever marginally extra
things the French may be ready to give us and not the Americans’.81
London’s reaction was also noticeable for the somewhat ill-conceived responses it considered
in the aftermath of the Embassy attack. Though these were, for the most part, unworkable based on
resources, or sheer political feasibility, it reflected the Foreign Office’s anxiety as to the future of the
British Embassy in Beijing. For example the loss of cypher channels to and from Beijing prompted
London to consider sending ‘dummy’ telegrams (false, undecipherable telegrams) to Beijing in order to
deceive the Chinese.82 Additionally, Rawalpindi even made the suggestion that the Beijing office use
the Pakistanis to send messages to London, thus involving a third country.83
Perhaps the most unconventional idea, involving the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was to
consider using Ho Chi Minh to exercise his influence with the Chinese.84 Though labelled by de la Mare
as ‘so dicey and problematical’ to the point that Ministers may rule it out as hopeless, the Foreign Office
considered exploiting a degree of leverage that Britain had over Ho Chi Minh; a British lawyer, Loseby,
had prevented his extradition from Hong Kong in the 1930, giving him status as a political refugee and
preventing his release to the French. The French wished to try him, and almost certainly would have
80 TNA, FCO 21/30, FCO (London) to British Embassy (Paris), Telno. 3098, 15th September 1967.
81 TNA, FCO 21/29, Campbell (Paris) to Denson (FED, FCO, London), 5th October 1967.
82 Ibid, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Telno. PEKFO 11, 7th September 1967.
83 Ibid, Commonwealth Office to Rawalpindi, Tel. no. 1109, 1st September 1967.
84 On this fascinating episode see Dennis Duncanson, ‘Ho-Chi-Minh In Hong Kong, 1931–32’, The
China Quarterly 57:1 (1974), pp. 84-100. See also Heather Streets-Salter, ‘The Noulens Affair in East
and Southeast Asia,’ Journal of American-East Asian Relations 21:4 (2014), pp. 394-414; Christopher
Baxter, ‘The Secret Intelligence Service and China: The Case of Hilaire Noulens, 1923–1932,’ Britain
in Global Politics, 1:1 (2013), pp. 132-152.
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executed him. In London’s eyes, the British justice system therefore prevailed; ‘it is therefore not too
much to say that Ho owes his liberty, and perhaps his neck, to us’. The British had quietly allowed Ho
Chi Minh to flee Hong Kong and run away over the border into China. Weighing different means of
approaching him, including through Brian Stewart, and MI6 officer serving as Consul-General in Hanoi,
it then transpired that Loseby had passed away earlier that month. Temporary excitement turned to
disappointment and one official minuted: I understand Mr Loseby is dead and that the idea must die
with him’. His colleague added: ‘Yes R.I.P. for the project’.85
The American Intelligence Appetite
Despite the various obstacles and environment in which the British Embassy operated, it still managed
to produce valuable secret intelligence. However, British intelligence gathering from Peking was framed
by broader geopolitical tensions between Britain, the United States, and China. In fact, as suggested by
scholars such as Aldrich and Ruane, China was a thorn in the side of the Special Relationship. China’s
political and military intervention across Southeast Asia, manifested through its military aggression,
military assistance, and propaganda, ‘linked all trouble spots’ across Asia, but it was Britain and
America’s diverging foreign policy responses to China’s intervention that caused a rift between allies.
Whilst Britain sought a more neutral approach to dealing with China, the US sought to contain China
using all means possible short of war, including subversive activity and covert operations as seen in
Hong Kong. The latter’s provocative approach in China had been a longstanding source of tension with
Britain, the dynamics captured perfectly in Nitze’s statement from 1951 that the UK ‘…fears that we
[America] have a secret policy in the Far East – namely, to overthrow Peiping’ [Peking].86 As Ruane
argues, since 1949, China had therefore been ‘a major irritant’ in Anglo-American relations in the
region.87
85 TNA, FCO 21/34, de la Mare (London) to Rodgers (London), ‘Evacuation of Peking Staff’, 13th
September 1967; Denson (London) to Bolland (London), 21st September 1967.
86 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 293.
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Yet, just as in Hong Kong, and later in Hanoi, Britain’s approach to foreign policy and
intelligence gathering offset the ‘diplomatic divergence’ between the two allies. This occurred on two
levels: firstly, Britain’s official recognition of China granted it access to territory the Americans lacked
access to. Secondly, Britain’s placement of intelligence officers in specifically diplomatic outposts
afforded Britain access to a broad spectrum of intelligence, ranging from diplomatic reporting to covert
material gathered secretly. This proved to carry a significant advantage in political terms, as it lent the
Americans eyes and ears into the heart of Peking. And indeed, London hoped, perhaps helped
Washington see China through British eyes. As this section aims to show, several factors rendered the
intelligence valuable: its content gave it considerable value to defence intelligence agencies in both
London and Washington; its context – the Cultural Revolution – lent a richness to the material as it
emanated from the heart of Beijing; and finally its use by its respective intelligence ‘customers’
indicated its worth, particularly with regard to the ‘Special Relationship’ between the UK and US in
Asia.
It is worth pausing to note the extent to which Beijing was a veritable blind spot for the
Americans. Despite a sizeable intelligence presence in Hong Kong (in the American Consulate), they
lacked a human presence on the ground in Beijing in any form – diplomatic or intelligence-based.
Importantly, this was compounded by a marked contraction in the technical forms of intelligence that
they gathered. In 1968, the US effectively abandoned its capacity to conduct imagery intelligence
(IMINT) gathering owing to growing political tensions with the Chinese government. The dynamics
with China were of such a fragile, if somewhat volatile nature, that overhead reconnaissance flights
conducted by drones had inflamed already fraught political relations. According to a memo sent to
intelligence representatives on the US 303 Committee, an oversight and planning committee for covert
operations, the level of drone reconnaissance over South China, combined with the frequency of
‘inadvertent overflights’ of the Chinese border by American pilots bombing North Vietnamese targets,
had been perceived by China as somewhat provocative. As a measure of de-escalation, the Johnson
administration thus ceased overhead drone flights over China; as the memo stated, with the exception
of satellites, ‘no overhead reconnaissance has been conducted over mainland China since 27th March
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1968’.88 Although the Americans retained a degree of IMINT through satellite imagery, their
intelligence diet was further starved of another key source of information on Beijing. As will be
discussed later, this was of particular importance when it came to gathering defence-related intelligence
material.
The British Embassy in Beijing was therefore a key point of interest for some members of the
US intelligence community, in producing raw material from the raucous capital of Beijing, above all
during the height of the Cultural Revolution in 1967. It was clear through correspondence from
numerous British stations across Asia that the US had a palpable intelligence deficiency when it came
to China, generating an appetite for material from Beijing. In early January 1967, for example, the
British Embassy in Seoul received a request from the Americans there for information on current
developments in China, the top US official there having stated that, ‘quite frankly…they are completely
in the dark about the significance of present developments in that vast country’.89 The British Embassy
in Washington made a similar observation in relation to the Cultural Revolution; Gilmore commented
that ‘…the American Government’s knowledge of day-to-day developments and their ability to
influence events is so limited as to dictate continued official silence’ when it came to policy regarding
China.90
This pointed, in particular, to the crucial human element of the British reporting from Beijing.
Whilst the US Consulate-General provided a steady stream of signals intelligence (sigint) from its
monitoring station in Hong Kong, and received some human intelligence (humint) from travellers and
refugees passing through the area, it lacked a reliable means of assessing the credibility and validity of
information in Beijing. Bolland had remarked upon the same issue for the British, highlighting a report
on the difficulty of assessing events in China due to ‘the lack of reliable information in a rapidly moving
and complicated situation’, and the fact that most of the information available in China, even for those
on the ground, was either official party line, or gathered from posters, which were themselves ‘often
88 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China,
1969-1972, Document 10, ‘Aerial Reconnaissance over Communist China – Political Factors’, March
14th 1969. Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d10.
89 TNA, FCO 21/30, Rainsford (Seoul) to Denson (London), 25th January 1967.
90 TNA, FCO 21/8, Gilmore (Washington) to Wilson (London), 11th January 1967, ‘The Cultural
Revolution’.
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contradictory and misleading’, and propagandistic in nature.91 This therefore raised real issues of source
reliability and information validation, for which the Americans were heavily reliant upon the British.
Stewart, for example, noted the manner in which Washington was ‘avid for reliable news from China’,
the Johnson administration being ‘particularly grateful for what we can pass on to them (not least, of
course, because it is more reliable than most of what comes their way)’.92 In practice, this was reflected
in individual instances where an agency such as the CIA would ask the Foreign Office if it could confirm
stories in Beijing it had heard rumours of. A typical example was a Tass report (Russian media, and
thus prone to distortion), which reported slogans posted up in Beijing calling for the overthrow of all
who opposed Mao – the British Embassy responded confirming that it had not seen such posters, and
advised taking such reports with a pinch of salt, given that Tass was the source.93
This anxiety over information validation was reflected, to some extent, in Washington’s
informal intelligence requests or requirements, often sent in an informal manner to both London and
Beijing (usually through correspondence). Having discussed the Red Guards with the Americans,
Wilson relayed to Beijing that they were ‘naturally very anxious to lay their hands on as much Red
Guard material as possible’; Beijing consequently sent copies of Red Guard newspapers to the US
Consulate in Hong Kong.94 Similarly, the British Embassy in Washington affirmed to London a notable
demand – not just amongst the American intelligence community, but also academics and museum
directors – for ‘some reliable feel of the human background to whatever is happening in China’. As will
be discussion later in consultations between the British Embassy staff and the US defence and
intelligence community in Washington, key questions surrounded basic issues on what daily life was
like in Beijing.95
Taking into account the American demand for material out of Beijing, the transmission of
information between the two allies gives us a useful profile of the dynamics of the Special Intelligence
Relationship. Writing to the Foreign Office, Trench confirmed the informal arrangements that
91 TNA, FCO 21/9, Bolland (London) to SecState (London), 26th January 1967, ‘The Present
Situation in China’.
92 TNA, FCO 21/30, Stewart (Washington) to de la Mare (London), 11th January 1967.
93 TNA, FCO 21/491, Boyd (London) to Walden (Peking), 11th February 1969.
94 TNA, FCO 21/30, Wilson (London) to Whitney (Peking), 15th February 1967.
95 TNA, Ibid; Stewart (Washington) to de la Mare (London), 11th January 1967.
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characterised intelligence exchange from Beijing to the Americans, affirming that ‘we pass on to the
Americans practically all the reporting which comes our way from Peking’, either copied and passed
directly to the US State Department, US Information Agency (USIA), and Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). In cases where greater restriction was needed, material was copied directly to an officer in the
State Department, known to be the ‘more discreet’ of the agencies.96 As will be discussed later, the
material from Beijing proved to be of particular military value, and arrangements were therefore made
for greater intelligence exchange with the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), reflecting the fact
that defence intelligence was burgeoning on both sides of the Atlantic. Liaising with the Defence
Intelligence Staff (DIS) in London, Fradd stated that it was ‘in London’s interests to maintain and further
liaise with US intelligence on China’, particularly after a recent visit. Until that point in early 1967, the
DIA confided to Air Marshal Harold Maguire, the head of DIS, that they had never seen any of the
Beijing material; the passage of information had thus far been ‘distinctly a one-way business’, with the
DIA passing to London ‘very good summaries of current intelligence from Vietnam’. Trench described
the intelligence liaison with the Americans at technical levels as ‘productive and well worth fostering’;97
as such, it was decided that the UK Military Representative in DIS would pass Beijing material directly
to DIA.98
Intelligence Gathering in Beijing
Although there was usually at least one SIS officer present in Beijing during the 1960s, there were few
attempts to run agents from the Embassy. The security risks made such a plan close to hopeless. Agent
missions into China were run from more secure locations including Delphi, Singapore, and Hong Kong.
During the late 1960s, the SIS officer in Beijing was Tony Blishen, holding the rank of First Secretary.
96 FCO 21/30, Trench (Washington) to Bolland (London), 13th March 1967, ‘China: Transmission of
Information to the Americans’.
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This was not his first tour in a ‘secret town’: in the 1950s he had been the junior SIS officer at the station
in Vienna, and had undertaken various forms of Cold War espionage. But in Beijing, his experience as
an intelligence observer was valued, but he was rarely called on to carry out real ‘special operation’ of
the kind that required formal approval in London, nor did he do much agent running.99
Instead, the intelligence material to emerge from Beijing was largely a mix of human
observations, translations, and information evaluated from official material. In this respect, its value
derived largely from the human element in selecting such information – then analysing and evaluating
official material, somewhat in contrast to the Americans’ reliance upon the more technical intelligence
collated in Hong Kong. This carried special importance with regard to official material put out by the
Chinese leadership – information garnered from newspapers, posters, and press summaries often were
replete with distortions, deception, and of course, propaganda. Nonetheless, the Sinologists in the
British Embassy – were thus crucial in offering analysis from the capital, at a time of sheer political
chaos and instability.
British reporting on China’s internal situation was a key source of intelligence at the peak of
the Cultural Revolution in 1967-68. The tone of the reports varied, from generalised observations on
everyday affairs at the heart of Beijing, to detailed discussion of leadership, personalities, political
rumours, and policy. Satiating the American appetite for impressions of daily life in Beijing, the reports
contained assessments of the Cultural Revolution as a movement and general information on ‘what life
in Peking [Beijing] looks like’, which London relayed as being the material of greatest use.100 George
Walden, for example, an official stopping over in Canton en route to Hong Kong, reported on a stroll
he took through the town to sample the general atmosphere amidst a flurry of revolutionary activity.
Gauging an ‘atmosphere of normality tinged with pregnant tension’, he observed the manner in which
loudspeaker ‘screamed abuse’ at political opponents late into the night, parades of people in dunce’s
caps took place through the streets surrounded by ‘strikingly hostile crowds’, and lorry loads of workers’
rebels roamed the streets.101
99 Private information.
100 Ibid, Wilson (London) to Whitney (Peking), 22nd September 1967.
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Against the political backdrop, in which official news and information from the Chinese regime
was both constrained in content and nature, these observations provided a useful means of gauging the
everyday impact and extent of the Cultural Revolution. Although travel for the British staff was limited,
just as the Chinese sought to constrain their footprint within Beijing, their movements still yielded some
insight into the impact of the Cultural Revolution upon ordinary Chinese citizens, and the failure of
governance in the countryside. For example, Cradock, who would later rise to be one of the most
distinguished chairs of the Joint Intelligence Committee, recalled a journey from Canton to Beijing in
the winter, observed passing ‘the bleak evidence of failure, smokeless factories, and walls covered with
exploded slogans’. He pointed out that the most striking feature of the journey was the shortage of food;
he was served meals in his train compartment, not being allowed to enter the dining so as not to see the
‘desperate nature of Chinese rations’, noting that, for ordinary Chinese, food was simply ‘cabbage and
a little rice, with virtually no meat’. The impact was clear in Beijing, where he observed Chinese
students eating ‘the buds and bark of trees’, also noticing local staff being near collapse.102
In political terms, despatches from Beijing provided considerable insight into the organisational
chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Uncovering the different dynamics at play between political factions,
supposed takeovers versus real takeovers of power and infighting, the reporting shed light on the power
structure – or rather, the corrosive forces impacting China’s power structure.103 Cradock, for example,
relayed to London how, although the Central Committee still issued political directives, it was ‘merely
a façade’, behind which lay individuals in the Politburo, Military Affairs Commission, and Cultural
Revolution Group, who exerted the real influence. Below this, he stated that the provincial party and
state machinery were ‘in a state of disintegration’, rendering the Army the ‘only reliable instrument for
transmitting and executing instructions’.104
There was a certain uniqueness for the British staff in being able to observe the changes taking
place from the epicentre of the Cultural Revolution. Labelling the period one of ‘great interest and
excitement’, Cradock understood the importance of being ‘in the presence of a greater historical
102 Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 26.
103 TNA, FCO 21/8, Cradock (Peking) to Wilson (London), 31st January 1967.
104 Ibid.
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convulsion’…’a movement whose course I understood and which I could analyse and report’.105
Importantly, he stated that, despite the obstacles it created, the Cultural Revolution essentially punched
holes in the ‘screen normally interposed between the Chinese authorities and their foreign guests’,
asserting that the British were ‘increasingly being supplied with information by the revolutionaries
themselves’ through posters. Their access to information grew, as Cradock pointed to increasing reports
appearing that were critical of government and Party leaders, ‘apparently drawing on privileged or secret
material’. Although written by Red Guards, these leaks ‘clearly came from much higher, presumably
the Cultural Revolution Group itself’, allowing the British a vital window into higher-level politics.
Being at the heart of Beijing therefore presented unique opportunities for gauging the
convulsions Chinese experienced both politically and socially. Despite the potential for the information
to be distorted, given its sources, as Cradock underlined, ‘in a tightly closed society, where any
information, however harmless, was secret, such revelations were pure gold’.106 Indeed, the extent to
which almost any solid information about China was ‘intelligence’ reflected the nature of closed
societies, which are hard to imagine in the post-Cold War period, except for North Korea. This degree
of access not only enabled the British staff to attain information normally closed to the foreign
community, but also ‘to virtually all Chinese’. Moreover, these kinds of observations served two key
purposes: firstly, they rendered the internal workings of the Communist state and body politic ‘briefly
visible’ – a degree of access not only denied to most of the foreign community in Beijing, but also ‘to
virtually all Chinese’. 107 Secondly, it offered a window into the psychology of the Cultural Revolution,
in terms of the mind-set, strains, and day-to-day pressures of a country undergoing rapid change. For
Cradock, under such conditions, ‘the downward potential of human nature was brutally exposed’;
stating that however much their observations ‘confirm the darkest views of human nature, or evoke
cynical laughter, it was nevertheless a unique insight’.108
Away from the more human side of the Cultural Revolution, higher-level political intelligence
gleaned from diplomatic circles was of particular value, especially seeing as certain other nationalities
105 Cradock, Experiences of China, pp. 44-45; 90.
106 Ibid, p. 45.
107 Ibid, p. 90.
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had closer relationships to the Chinese. As Cradock noted, the Western Europeans did not have much
business with the Chinese, ‘nor, I fancy, did we have a deep insight into what was going on in the
government or the Party’ alone. Although the British Chargé met Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign
Minister, ‘very occasionally’, usually meeting with no higher than a vice foreign minister, Cradock
added that ‘the real leaders were out of reach’.109 Information gleaned from other foreign diplomats was
therefore vital, as they were able to divulge more sensitive information the regime otherwise sought to
conceal. As with Hanoi, a subject explored in the next chapter, contact with diplomats from other
Eastern Bloc countries was especially valuable and some were surprisingly friendly. For example, the
Embassy learnt from the Poles of a ‘special farm’ where Chinese functionaries would go to carry out
stints of labour reform, and found out the ‘uneven’ nature of rectifying and rebuilding the Party once
the Cultural Revolution had passed, through information a Chinese official had let slip to the
Rumanians.110 Such was the appreciation for the ‘excellent and useful reports’ on the internal situation,
that Wilson, writing from London, expressed to the Embassy that the information London received from
Tokyo, Washington, and Paris ‘amounts to little, and is nothing compared to what you can give us from
Peking’.111 This was remarkable praise, given the constrained circumstances of figures like Cradock
and Blishen.
Remarkably, the sources of greatest value were often official regime posters. Indeed, this was
crucial to British intelligence gathering in Beijing. The Embassy staff – and Sinologists in particular –
extracted a substantial amount of detail from the posters; typical items of interest included the dynamics
within the Peking leadership, such as who was being attacked by Maoists and scapegoated, who key
players (such as Chou En-lai) allied with and when, and which leadership figures in the provinces were
safe or under attack. Moreover, the staff were also able to gauge levels of regime propaganda, as well
as the Chinese leadership’s own perception of the internal situation, especially in the countryside.112
Furthermore, the posters provided a constant wealth of information on revolutionary dynamics. In a
report typical of the prevailing ‘unruliness’ at the height of the Cultural Revolution in March 1967,
109 Cradock, Experiences of China, p. 24.
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111 TNA FCO 21/30, Wilson (London) to Whitney (Peking), 22nd September 1967.
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Weston detailed the palpable lack of law and order in Beijing caused by revolutionary groups. This
included numerous instances of fights, gang warfare, vandalism, ransacking of factory and business
premises, and the appropriation of vehicles and equipment, at the same time shedding insight on inter-
group rivalries.113
The privileged nature of the information contained in posters was also clear from the attitudes
and reactions of the Chinese leadership, indicating an awareness of the value they provided. As Ray
Whitney observed in a letter to London, an edict issued by the Party forbade the publication in posters,
handbills, or any other documents, of ‘secret material’ on the Cultural Revolution, or Party information
that had not already been released.114 Additionally, the sheer volume of posters gave clues as to the
fervency of the revolution. Situating the posters alongside the broader political context, the volume and
production of the posters themselves was also revealing of local dynamics. Discussing the decline in
posters in a despatch to London, Whitney directly related their decline to the ‘continued dampening of
the movement’ – not in terms of its zeal, but in suggesting that the provincial revolutionaries might have
found themselves at odds with the local military force.115 Yet, it is worth noting that harvesting
information from the posters brought with it substantial risk; particularly in light of the arrest of the
Indian Chargé in June 1967, going past posters to gather information, near demonstrations, or in the
vicinity of military areas required ‘special caution’, for fear of being charged with conducting
espionage.116
London frequently received full translations of the posters, and this was where the SIS
Sinologist stationed in Beijing – Tony Blishen – was key. His practice was often to attach a copy of the
original text from posters, as well as his translation, and subsequent analysis and evaluation in a letter
to the Foreign Office. A notable example is a poster published by Chingkangshan, the media organ of
the Red Guards of Peits and the Workers’ University, translated by Blishen, which contained the text
of Mao’s first big-character poster in 1967. Blishen and the staff had known of the poster’s existence
since the previous year, but never before discovered a copy. Its importance lay in how extensively it
113 Ibid, Weston (Peking) to Wilson (London), 1st March 1967.
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had been quoted (albeit without attribution) in speeches and editorials since the summer of 1966, noting
that ‘many of the other phrases have now become household words’. Furthermore, the poster revealed
a political attack on a high-level individual, and encouraged its readers to ‘bombard the headquarters!’
of various counter-revolutionary activists.117 However, their clear informational value brought
accusations of spying to the foreign community. Following expulsion of two Indian officials for being
‘too assiduous’ in their examination of the posters, the British had to adapt to how they accessed the
posters. Cradock recalls that diplomatic cars were after that point seen ‘making strange deviations’ in
the main streets so that the occupants could view the posters from the car whilst driving past.118
The other core source of intelligence material gathered by the British – and subject of special
interest in the United States – were Chinese press summaries, and copies of newspapers, including Red
Guard newspapers. During the Cultural Revolution, these became rarefied items, increasingly difficult
to access by foreigners in the capital. Nonetheless, in addition to internal reporting and information from
across China, the summaries were useful in providing a reading of the ‘degree of emphasis’ the official
Chinese propaganda machine placed upon internal and external policy.119 Usually bought from young
Chinese boys touting them, the newspapers were effectively contraband, and thus open to inviting
charges of espionage. Nonetheless, for the British, Percy Cradock’s wife Birthe was a ‘chief supplier’
of them, going about town quietly on her bicycle, and returning ‘well-padded’, having stuffed several
layers of newspapers under her coat.120 Illustrative of the insight into official information that the British
were able to gather, in a comment upon their use of sources, Denson noted how a report on the New
Year’s Day editorial in the People’s Daily newspapers was ‘generally an authoritative policy
document’. Providing some indication of future policy trends in China, at least for upcoming months,
from the British estimation in Beijing, in the Cultural Revolution’s wake, 1968 seemed to be a ‘year of
putting Humpty Dumpty together again’.121
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These summaries received a wide circulation, often being forwarded to the Information
Research Department (IRD) in the Foreign Office, the Joint Research Department (JRD), and the
Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD), as well as other British stations in Asia.122 Passing
on material such as copies of the Reference News Bulletin received from friendly missions, or provincial
newspapers (confidentially gained on a ‘see-and-return basis’ through a member of the Bulgarian
Embassy), the newspapers would be photographed, and the film sent to the Regional Information Office
– a sub-section of the SIS in Hong Kong – for processing and distribution.123 Red Guard newspapers
held particular importance; having previously mentioned American anxiety to see as much Red Guard
material as possible, once passed to Hong Kong, the US Consulate-General made further copies of the
newspapers ‘for their own use’.124
Beijing recognised their value as a source of information – Whitney, an aficionado of
propaganda, referred to these newspapers as ‘in a number of ways better than Peking’s posters’.125 Their
worth was also clear from their demand; although after the attack on the British Embassy, processing
such material placed a burden upon the staff due to limited resources, Boyd emphasised that the British
station in Hong Kong may feel differently about stopping the circulation of newspapers ‘owing to the
Americans’.126 Gathering the Red Guard newspapers brought substantial risks, however. One source of
the Red Guard newspapers was the French Embassy in Peking, which passed them onto allied
governments. In light of the British cypher machine loss and subsequent use of French communications
channels, as well as the general air of ‘spy phobia’ that gripped Beijing, the discovery of possession of
the newspapers posed serious consequences for the diplomatic staff. The British Embassy in Paris was
all too aware of the potential security risks concerning the newspapers, acknowledging that ‘the study
of which, as you know, would, on the part of e.g. our own Embassy in Peking, constitute espionage in
Chinese eyes’.127
122 TNA, FCO 21/30, Boyd (London) to Whitney (Peking), 20th May 1967.
123 Ibid, Hopson (Peking) to FCO (London), Telno. 227, 23rd February 1967.
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There were also some basic physical obstacles to intelligence gathering in Beijing. The
diplomatic community in Beijing lived a somewhat separate, sheltered existence to the Chinese; though
they were able to walk around on the ground amidst rallies, demonstrations, and other revolutionary
activity, there was still a clear disconnect between their existence and that of the local Chinese
population. Cradock, for example, lamented the ‘literally non-existent contacts with Chinese here’ in a
despatch to London, though it did not deter him from striving to provide reporting on the ‘human
background’ of the Cultural Revolution.128 Similarly, drawing upon Curzon’s description in the 1890s
of the Chinese as a ‘hard-limbed, indomitable, ungracious race’ due to their nationalistic history, Denson
mentioned the ‘frustration which any diplomatist feels when trying to penetrate the political and
psychological wall the Chinese have built around themselves’.129 The physical and psychological
constraints therefore had a direct upon the scope and content of the intelligence that could be collated
in Beijing.
This problem was further exacerbated by frequent instances of deception or misinformation that
the British were less-equipped to gauge. Taking into account the lack of Chinese contacts or networks
that might have been able to help validate or cross-reference information, this raised questions about
information reliability. Discussing miscellaneous pieces of information he had gathered, including a
report on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Congress, Walden, for example, noted that ‘we have no
means of assessing the accuracy of this report’. The even greater problem, however, was disinformation.
This bore upon rumours from other members of the diplomatic community in particular; having heard
a ‘somewhat unconvincing story’ from a Bulgarian source about the appearance of anti-Mao leaflets in
Beijing, of which twenty to thirty thousand copies were said to have been printed, Walden
acknowledged that ‘this may be a routine piece of Russian disinformation’, but lacked the means of
confirming this to be so.130
Disinformation also had somewhat embarrassing consequences for the British too. Weston had
sent a rather animated letter to London regarding a tabloid pamphlet on military conscription he had
128 TNA, FCO 21/30, Cradock (Peking) to Denson (London), 15th February 1967.
129 TNA, FCO 21/441, Denson (Peking) to Stewart (London), 3rd June 1969, ‘China Re-Visited’.
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been shown by the Indian Embassy, which aroused some interest in London. However, the reply he
received came as a surprise – the US Consulate-General in Hong Kong had been offered the same
pamphlet to purchase. Before committing to buying it, however, through conducting paper chemistry
tests, comparing typefaces with those commonly used in China, and carefully examining the style of
text, they had discovered the document was a ‘clever forgery’. Although the Americans had a ‘good
deal of experience’ in distinguishing between forgeries, the incident illustrated the dangers of collecting
swathes of printed material in an environment in which information and knowledge were the prime
currency. This was affirmed in McLaren’s reply to Weston, in which he drew attention to the ‘market
here for almost any printed material emanating from the Mainland’, adding that the production of
forgeries was a ‘thriving industry’.131 Indeed this was a problem wherever basic economic and social
information about closed societies was in high demand, since the market seemed to produce excellent
forgers: western intelligence agencies responded by producing ‘burn lists’ of scoundrels known to be
selling forged wares.132
Lastly, Chinese information security measures proved to be a real obstacle to the British
officers. Against the backdrop of Beijing’s ‘spy phobia’, the Chinese had in place active counter-
measures to restrict access to various material to the foreign diplomatic community. For example,
around the time of the embassy attack, the Chinese took steps to prevent the British from reading posters
and getting hold of local newspapers, as well as other intelligence material. This threw the future of the
British Embassy into even further jeopardy, in terms of the utility of the post, given that the staff size
had already been reduced in the attack’s aftermath.133 Tight Chinese security of their communications
channels was another key obstacle to the British, in terms of intelligence gathering. Whilst the Soviets
used one-time pads for their cypher communications, a relatively security communications system, they
and the Chinese also made extensive use of landlines for communication. These could only be
131 TNA, FCO 21/20, McLaren (HK) to Weston (Peking), 15th July 1968.
132 H. Keith Melton, Henry Robert Schlesinger, Robert Wallace, Spycraft, (London, 2009), p. 312.
133 FCO 21/34, Bolland (London) to FCO (London), ‘The Future of our Mission in Peking’, 27th July
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167
intercepted ‘with great difficulty’,134 thus posing a significant challenge to British attempts at gathering
short-range signals intelligence intercepts.
Nonetheless, the other core aspect of the value British intelligence from Beijing provided was
information of a military nature. It was here that the observations brought balance to the technical feed
of intelligence the Americans relied upon in China as a whole, through human reporting and gathered
printed material which included considerable detail on military equipment, installations, and indications
of war preparations in the countryside. Furthermore, through liaising with DIS in London, who provided
specific intelligence requirements in some instances, the Beijing material was then forward to their
American counterpart – the DIA, particularly after Trench institutionalised a more formal means of
intelligence exchange in 1967.
As limited as travel outside of Beijing became for the British Embassy staff around the peak of
the Cultural Revolution, their movements still yielded observations and details of a military nature. In
despatches typical of the sorts of reporting that Beijing was able to provide, Davies, for example,
connected clues of blasting operations in the hillsides of Canton with mention of the supposed
construction of air-raid shelter tunnels mentioned by travellers passing through Lowu, thus alluding to
military installations and preparations in the countryside.135 The networks of sources that the British
staff were able to establish with people passing through Beijing also generated surprisingly precise
details of military value. Walden recounted to London details from a French source as to the movement
of anti-aircraft guns in the direction of Beijing,136 and through information obtained from a commercial
source, was able to provide DIS with a rolling-mill for possible aerospace application, and the specific
computers delivered to the city of Taiyan, including the exact model numbers.137
Being members of the diplomatic community in Beijing also proved its utility, as some of the
British staff members were able to siphon military details from speaking with friendly military attachés.
Through liaising with the French, Indian, and Rumanian military attachés, for example, Allen reported
back to London all sorts of details including on Chinese infantry (the inadequacy of anti-tank
134 Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, p. 343.
135 TNA, FCO 21/492, Davies (Peking) to Boyd (London), 27th August 1969.
136 TNA, FCO 21/481, Walden (Peking) to Pierce (London), 23rd September 1969.
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equipment), the Air Force (aerial training, night flights), tanks (production, models and marks,
protection from nuclear fall-out, and their firing systems), artillery, and industry (steel importation).138
Brian Stewart, another SIS officer stationed in Beijing during the 1960s, recalls effectively behaving as
a military attaché, having to attend meetings with military generals, and collecting open source material,
such as photographs of tanks and artillery at National Day celebrations.139 He emphasised an ability to
absorb details of a military nature, such as being able to recall and draw the entire Chinese creek along
the Ussuri River – the site of one of the most serious Sino-Soviet border clashes in the late 1960s –
pinpointing the locations of rusty frigates, and covertly taking photographs of submarine factories
disguised as temples.140 Printed material also provided some insight as to details that technical
intelligence would have otherwise been unable to discover. An excellent example was one of Whitney’s
letters on the translation of a poster in Beijing in July 1967, which reported the existence of a ‘Scientific
Intelligence Department’ modelled on a Russian unit of a similar name, whose function was to ‘procure,
translate, and disseminate scientific information’.141 Observations from posters and official publications
also gave insight into the Maoist framework behind military policy, through knowledge gained of the
specific Maoist policies underpinning things such as military training and professionalism.142
The Dynamics of Intelligence Exchange
The value of the British material became clear through Beijing’s exchanges with its recipients both in
London and in Washington. However, it also revealed a limited degree of exchange in the opposite
direction, in which Beijing was both intelligence supplier and customer. In London, DIS’s appreciation
of the intelligence material was clear; Appleyard noted to Beijing that their reporting had ‘aroused a
good deal of interest in military circles here’, adding that ‘there is a seller’s market for this kind of
138 Ibid, Allen (Peking) to Wilson (London), ‘Service Attache’s Views’, 18th November 1969.
139 Stewart, in discussion with author, November 2014.
140 Ibid.
141 TNA, FCO 21/21, Wilson, handwritten comment, 28th July 1967 - noted that one of Whitney’s
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information’, whilst Denson told Beijing that DIS ‘have an interest, as you know, in nearly all your
reports’.143 As such, DIS often sent to Beijing both formal and informal intelligence requests, with
increasingly specificity. Usually liaising through Lieutenant Colonel Pierce, DIS would request greater
reporting on areas such as air defence in relation to surface-to-air missile (SAM) coverage, the
appearance of additional gun sites (with locations), types of gun, the presence of fire control radar
equipment, convoys, unit sizes, and uniforms.144 Activity related to Sino-Soviet rivalry aroused
particular interest; DIS requested detailed requirements on air defence, the army (such as sightings of
Soviet troops and border guards), the border itself (in terms of security arrangements on the Russian
side, including layout and size), and lastly, rail activity (train wagons, light tanks, personnel carriers),
all of which could shed insight as to political tensions and subsequent military preparations between the
two.145
But the arrangement flowed the in opposite direction too. Just as DIS sought to gain tailored
intelligence from Beijing, so too did the British staff in Beijing seek material from DIS in London, in
order to ameliorate their own observational capacity. Having already held a copy of the US Department
of Defence’s brief on the Chinese Navy, Beijing requested further ‘recognition material’ from DIS in
London that would better enable them to identify and recognise military equipment and activity, given
the Embassy’s position to witness such activity at the heart of Beijing.146 London was more than happy
to oblige – in response to Beijing’s demand for information on aircraft, tanks and armoured vehicles,
artillery, and personnel weapons, Goss in DIS stated that ‘we very much value your military reports
here….and we must ensure that you have essential background and reference material’. As a result,
Goss arranged for Technical Intelligence (in the Army) to produce a ‘concise technical brief with
photographs of equipment and weapons’ specifically for Beijing.147
Beijing occasionally benefitted from receiving material from the Americans in a similar, albeit
informal, way. In response to a letter from Beijing, in which Appleyard had gleaned information on
143 Ibid, Appleyard (London) to Allen (Peking), 18th December 1969; TNA, FCO 21/30, Denson
(London) to Peking 30th April 1968.
144 TNA, FCO 21/481, Pierce (DIS, London) to Chancery (Peking), 16th October 1969.
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National Day celebrations but lacked the political roles of various Chinese mid to high-level officials,
the DIA produced a list of information on the names provided, thus setting the context.148 Despite its
limited capacity to store sensitive material, Beijing also received copies of the National Intelligence
Surveys prepared by the CIA, only retaining especially valuable copies.149 Moreover, in the aftermath
of the attack on the British Embassy, the tide was somewhat reversed; uncertainty plagued the future of
the post, and until the fate of the Embassy could be decided, London sought to elicit as much information
as possible from the Americans on Chinese internal policy (through the British Embassy in
Washington), until Beijing’s reporting capacity was restored.150 Furthermore, London and Washington
informally agreed that in light of the decreased flow of information from Beijing, to ‘rely upon a reverse
flow from them’, particularly on developments in China relating to decisions over Hong Kong.
Nevertheless, the latter was limited utility, as the London had ‘more or less total access to American
intelligence anyway’.151
The Special Intelligence Relationship
The Americans’ effective ‘blind spot’ in Beijing afforded considerable value to the British intelligence
gathered there. As previously discussed, the United States lacked any diplomatic representation in the
Chinese capital, and this rendered the political coverage from the British Embassy useful not only to
better gauge political relations, but also to understand what Bolland described as the ‘anarchic state of
Peking’152 as the Cultural Revolution unfolded. Significantly, for the US defence and intelligence
community, the quality of reporting and material received from the British Embassy was a means of
148 TNA, FCO 21/39, Wilford (Washington) to Wilson (London), 6th November 1967. This included
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151 Ibid, Gilmore (Washington) to Wilson (London), 28th August 1967, ‘Destruction of Chancery in
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accessing more reliable and validated information. At a time when Chinese diplomatic relations with
the Western world as a whole were unsettled, this lent greater imperative to understanding Chinese
political and military dynamics through whichever means possible. In this context, the Americans’
appreciation of the British intelligence was clear. Not only was it expressed both formally and
informally through diplomatic channels, but the various mechanisms of intelligence exchange –
primarily consultations with staff from the British Embassy in Beijing – revealed how the British
material plugged a vital hole in information on Beijing. As this final section discusses, in Beijing, British
intelligence up close was not only superior to American ‘intelligence at a distance’, but also contributed
to Britain’s superiority in the ‘Special intelligence Relationship’ in Asia by shaping the views of some
of the American agencies.
Through diplomatic channels, the Americans often expressed messages of support and
appreciation for British reporting in Beijing, particularly in the extended aftermath of the embassy attack
in August 1967. Expressing his admiration for the British staff, given the ‘disadvantages and pressures’
under which they had been working, even prior to the attack, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Berger
confided to London that the Americans’ view of the Red Guards and accompanying events in China
had ‘largely been through the eyes of Her Majesty’s representatives in Peking’ [Beijing], and requested
a subsequent round of informal talks on China with London.153 If Berger demonstrated the resonance of
British reporting within the State Department, there were parallels within other agencies too. Attending
a Commonwealth Liaison Officers meeting in London in April 1968, Bolland commented upon the
subtle infiltration of British reporting into American views. Remarking upon a briefing by a CIA officer
on internal developments in China since August 1967, he observed that the views expressed by the
American were ‘already on record, and which he based, as far as recent events are concerned, to a large
extent on reports from our Embassy in Peking’.154
Taking into account the value of military information the British reported from Beijing, the US
defence establishment also made clear the value the British intelligence was held in high esteem.
153 TNA, FCO 21/24, Berger (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Washington) to de la Mare
(London), 1st August 1967.
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172
Expressing their ‘great appreciation for the quality of the reporting’ they received from Beijing via DIS,
the acceleration of their intelligence requests reflected not only their absorption of the material, but their
own deficiencies in intelligence gathering. This was most notably in the latter half of 1968, where the
upsurge in their requests extended to rather obscure areas; amongst their requests were information on
the burden on the economy posed from the advanced weapons programme, food supply and availability,
birth rates and birth control measures, the probability of a new Leap Forward programme, private plots,
and the effect of the Red Guards on transport, industrial production, and education.155
In fact, such was the utility of the reporting to the Americans that it weighed upon the FCO’s
decision not to close the post following the attack. Initially, Murray, the Head of the Far Eastern
Department had favoured this option. Although political turmoil in Hong Kong certainly dominated
discussions on the Mission’s future, commenting from the British Embassy in Washington, Wilford
asserted that in addition to HMG’s own interests, the Americans ‘set a very high value on the reporting
which they get…of the Peking scene’. Whilst maintaining the post certainly served the Foreign Office
well, he ardently reiterated his belief that if the Americans thought London might close the Beijing
Embassy, ‘they would do all in their power to persuade us not to do so’. To this, another British official
commented that ‘full weight’ should be given to such considerations. 156
Yet, the clearest way in which the value of the British intelligence manifested itself was through
Anglo-American consultations over China. Held regularly during the course of the Cultural Revolution,
Murray described them as amongst some of ‘the most useful’ consultations London engaged in.157
Taking place under the auspices of either the Foreign Office in London, or the State Department in
Washington, the consultations involved representatives from a range of departments, including defence
intelligence officials (DIS and DIA), the British IRD and American INR (Bureau of Intelligence and
Research), the White House, and of course, a representative from the British Embassy in Beijing. In
155 TNA, FCO 21/30, Newbury (London) to Chancery (Peking), 14th February 1967.
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most cases, an intelligence representative from the SIS or CIA would also attend, in the British case
usually acknowledged as ‘a representative of ‘the Friends’’.158
Although the Americans had access to a considerable amount of material on China, the value
of the British intelligence was clear; as Murray affirmed, it was the ‘special knowledge we gain from
our position both in Peking and Hong Kong’ that set the material apart.159 This became evident from
the content of the consultations held, which though they may not have led to specific policy outcomes,
displayed a degree of intelligence liaison over the British reporting. The consultations often centred on
a piece of research or intelligence report produced by a particular department (such as the 1968 US
National Intelligence Estimate on ‘The Short-Term Outlook for Communist China’, or an INR study on
the Cultural Revolution)160, which were used as the basis for a generalised discussion, usually around
different political aspects of the Cultural Revolution.
Intelligence also reveals the dynamics at play between the two allies; whilst, on the whole, they
saw eye-to-eye on the majority of issues, occasionally a minor disagreement indicated differences in
institutional approach, that were in part to do with the direct experience the British had from Beijing. In
talks held in October 1967 on the Cultural Revolution, London and Washington disagreed on the then
more moderate phase of the Cultural Revolution campaign; the US believed this was a tactical phase,
or rest period, whilst the UK saw it as a longer-term shift in the movement.161 However, Denson noted
this disagreement to be minor, emphasising ‘no great divergence between the Americans and ourselves’
on China, and pointing to the fact that more noticeable differences of opinion lay between two elements
of the US team – representations of the Current Intelligence team in CIA, and the rest of the American
contingent.162 Cradock made similar observations on his trip to Washington in 1969, in which he found
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Anglo-American Talks on China’, 21st August 1969.
159 TNA, FCO 21/39, Murray (London) to Wilkinson (London), ‘UK/US Talks on China’, 20th May
1968, letter.
160 TNA, FCO 21/39, Murray (London) to Wilford (Washington), 16th July 1968; de la Mare
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that both sides’ general estimates of the Cultural Revolution and internal situation were ‘not far apart’.
Nonetheless, he was still able to perceive noticeable differences in perspective over the Chinese
leadership; the CIA gave greater weight to the power and succession struggle within the Chinese
leadership than London believed there to be, whilst the CIA, DIA, and State Department were all more
inclined than Cradock to doubt the power that Mao exercised over his group, and by extension, over
events after the Cultural Revolution.163
By contrast, Anglo-American consultations in October 1969 were more divergent. Both sides
discussed the ongoing Sino-Soviet border dispute (including topics such as its background, leadership,
escalation, and how it bore upon Anglo-American interests, etc.). Yet, Boyd noted his team having come
across views on the internal situation in China that struck them as ‘distinctly over-optimistic’,
concerning the definitive and somewhat early end to the Cultural Revolution. In what seems to have
been a common observation in other consultations, Boyd added that the Americans ‘seemed to be
casting around desperately for evidence to prove this thesis’.164
London’s critical and sometimes superior tone also pervaded its internal discussions of
American reports that it received. The Foreign Office would often discuss with its Beijing staff written
reports or intelligence estimates that it received from Washington (usually authored by the State
Department or CIA), where the differences in the two allies’ understanding of the Chinese leadership
was clearly visible. Commenting upon a leaflet on developments in Chinese education prepared by the
US Consulate-General in Hong Kong, for example, London was much more cautious in its estimate of
how education had been impacted by the Cultural Revolution, and what the different attitudes towards
educational policy were amongst the leadership.165 These disagreements occasionally took on a
somewhat sharper note; picking out flaws in a CIA assessment of local disturbances in China being
instigated by the more radical elements of the Chinese leadership in Beijing, Wilson faulted the CIA for
relying upon only one Red Guard newspaper as its main source. Furthermore, he pointed to a key
divergence between their two perspectives; just as in the consultations, where London differed with the
163 TNA, FCO 21/23, Cradock (Washington) to Bolland (London), 6th June 1967.
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Americans was in the latter’s assumption that those dissatisfied elements of the leadership amounted to
a solid, covert opposition force.166
Following their respective periods in the British Embassy in Beijing, both Cradock and Hopson
were invited to Washington for consultations at a much more intimate level. Both spent the majority
being received by the US defence and intelligence community in Washington, usually spending a whole
day at the CIA, and at least half a day consulting with DIA, whilst also speaking with officials in the
State Department, and a few academics.167 In Hopson’s case, he met with the Director of the DIA, and
gave a general briefing to around forty DIA officers. Lending special attention to the PLA and Cultural
Revolution, the range of topics covered was revealing of the areas the US sought further depth in when
it came to intelligence; focusing on the relationship between the revolutionary committees and Beijing’s
central authority, tensions within the Beijing hierarchy, the cult of Mao, the effects of the Cultural
Revolution upon the PLA, and operational capability were key areas of discussion.168 In fact, such was
the demand in the US for intelligence from Beijing that Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a message to
London personally requesting reports from Hopson upon his return from China.169
Cradock’s trip to Washington was of a similar vein, though his post-trip remarks were more
reflective upon the state of US intelligence on China. Attending meetings with the Office of Asian
Communist Affairs in State Department, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the intelligence
agencies, and even the Board of National Estimates (which prepared US National Intelligence
Estimates), Cradock discussed the political, economic, scientific, and technical development related to
China, as well collections of publications his staff had amassed. At DIA, he had lunch with a White
House staffer covering China, in which he underwent a period of ‘intensive questioning’.170
His trip also provided some insight as to the overall weakness the US faced in making its own
intelligence assessments regarding Beijing. Significantly, although he found the Americans to be ‘very
thorough’, professional, and possessing excellent resources and equipment for their assessments on
166 Ibid, Wilson (London) to Denson (London), 13th February 1968, ‘East Wind versus West Wind’.
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China, he concluded that ‘they did not seem substantially better informed than we are’, adding that they
lacked ‘new striking pieces of information to contribute’. From the intelligence agencies in particular,
the topics he discussed unveiled clear gaps in their understanding that lent the British material an ever
degree of importance. From discussing loyalties to Mao, to potential divisions within the Army, Cradock
noted considerable interest and questions on life in Beijing, especially the ‘methods of collecting the
information made available to us by ‘extensive democracy’’, adding that the Americans ‘rely much on
the material we relay to them’. 171 What US reliance upon technical intelligence therefore failed to
provide was an understanding of the intricacies of life at the centre of a hostile regime; noting the
‘voracious appetite for anything bearing upon life in Peking’, the British material ultimately filled gaps
on what Cradock referred to as its ‘most simple, bread and butter aspects’ of life in Beijing.172
Conclusion
Having been stationed in Beijing for three years – though not seemingly all that long – Cradock wrote
that ‘time counted twice in the Cultural Revolution’. Marred by the ‘demands of a post running under
siege conditions’, the daily presence of violent threats - if not violence itself - and the pressures of living
in a ‘demented environment’, Beijing’s feverish nature took its toll on the British staff.173 Although the
British outpost yielded an abundance of observations, political reporting, and military intelligence on
China, it remained trapped in an ‘Alice-in-Wonderland world, governed only by its own mad logic’.174
The British experience of intelligence gathering from its diplomatic post in turbulent Beijing
was revealing of two core dynamics. Firstly, it underlines the notion that understanding what
‘intelligence’ is: to a degree, it is defined by its customers and its opposition, rather than the actual form
or content of the intelligence itself. The Beijing experience demonstrated that both China and the United
States perceived of and treated almost all the British information and material to emerge from Beijing
171 Ibid.
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as a form of intelligence collection. Not only did the loss of cypher communication channels transform
almost all Britain information gathering a covert process because of the difficulties of moving this out
of China, but also the ‘spy phobia’ that took hold of Beijing increased the value of even the most
mundane information, not only because it constrained life in the capital, but also because the Cultural
Revolution was a matter of endless fascination for policy-makers in the West. Washington’s appetite
for more data – authentic data – was insatiable.
Secondly, the value given to the British reporting by the American defence and intelligence
community demonstrated Britain’s upper hand in gathering intelligence from ‘blind spots’ in Cold War
Asia. When it came to justifications for the post’s existence both before and after the attack on the
Embassy in August 1967, numerous reasons pointed indirectly to the Embassy’s importance relative to
the US. The Americans’ reliance upon a diet of satellite imagery over China, and reports from its
substantial Consulate-General in Hong Kong were unable to offset the direct value of what was
effectively a ‘listening post’ at the heart of Beijing.175 In fact, London’s reasons for maintaining the post
beyond a time of severe crisis also pointed to American use of the intelligence; discussion of the
Embassy’s future underlined ‘intelligence’ and ‘keeping even minimum political contact with the
world’s most population nation, budding nuclear power, and with reference to Hong Kong’ as the two
most significant reasons, both of which were singled out as having ‘value … in dealing with
Americans’.176
In the immediate wake of the attack on the Embassy, James Murray, Head of the Far Eastern
Department, called for a special conference to consider whether Britain should keep its Embassy open
in Beijing. Intelligence was central to this debate, and Murray noted that this had important implications
for ‘the representation of the friends’ and also for the ‘technical operation’ run out of the Embassy.
These were typically circumlocutory references to the MI6 station and the GCHQ short-range
interception operation. So important was this decision that he suggested calling Crawford Maclehose,
former Political Adviser to the Governor of Hong Kong and currently Private Secretary to the Foreign
Secretary back from a vacation with family in the Outer Hebrides to preside over the meeting. But, the
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intelligence from Beijing was simply too valuable, and the meeting was never held.177 Instead the
Beijing experience translated into better fortified buildings, including a new Consulate that was opened
in East Berlin a few years later, which had a distinctly praetorian demeanour.178
Moreover, Britain’s upper hand was also underlined by the fact that it also stood to gain from
this arrangement. In comparison to other ‘blind spots’ where the Americans were the prime intelligence
customers, Britain was also on the receiving end of intelligence exchange in Beijing. In a discussion of
intelligence exchange in the Far Eastern Department at the Foreign Office, Bolland noted the ‘very high
value’ that the Americans placed upon the intelligence from Beijing, stating that in return, ‘they supply
us with a great deal of other information from their own sources’. Additionally, ‘special operations’
were another reason given for maintaining the Beijing post beyond the August 1967 crisis, as these were
‘producing useful material, again of value in our dealings with the Americans’, albeit they did not
envisage any in the near future.179 It is for this reason that Murray labelled the British material from
Beijing ‘one of the most important elements in the contribution we make to the common pool of Anglo-
American intelligence’.180 Accordingly, by 1968, the British were repairing and restoring what was left
of their battered Embassy in Beijing.
177 TNA, FCO 21/34, Denson minute, 17 August 1967. Maclehose was about to be appointed
Ambassador to Vietnam and then became Governor of Hong Kong in 1971.
178 James Reeve, Cocktails, Crisis and Cockroaches: A Diplomatic Trail (London, 1999), pp.202-24.
179 Ibid, Bolland (London) to de la Mare (London), 5th July 1967, ‘The Future of the British Mission
in Peking’. The use of the term ‘special operations’ here referred to major intelligence operations that
would require clearance by the Foreign Secretary or the Prime Minster, rather than covert action type
activity.
180 TNA, FCO 21/35, Murray (London) to Heath (Librarian, E&O Department), 22nd August 1968,
‘Visit by Sir D. Hopson to the United States’.
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7
‘This Secret Town’: MI6 in Hanoi
‘John, I don’t see your telegrams until I’m in bed at night’.1 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
George Brown (1966-68) was talking to the British Consul-General in Hanoi, John Colvin, who was
also a senior Secret Intelligence Service officer (MI6). Colvin and his successors produced a steady
stream of observational reports from their post in central Hanoi, many of which made their way to
British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, and his American counterpart, President Lyndon B. Johnson.
During the height of the Vietnam War, political and social intelligence from this rather beleaguered
outpost provided a unique window on the conflict, shedding light on a town under increasing pressure
from an escalating American bombing campaign.
Why is Britain’s small MI6 watchtower on war-torn Hanoi of academic interest? First, it
offers a direct challenge to two established international categories: ‘diplomat’ and ‘spy’. Whilst most
intelligence officers waged a clandestine battle in the shadows of the Cold War, some operated in a
blurred space between espionage and diplomacy. Although MI6 operated under the direction of the
British Foreign Secretary, its officers were not diplomats per se.2 Accordingly, the dual identity of
these MI6 officers in Hanoi raises important questions about the nature of Cold War intelligence; the
public role associated with diplomacy stood in stark contrast to the anonymity often afforded to
classical espionage. Even prior to the First World War, much of Britain’s intelligence was gathered
1 John Colvin, Twice Around the World, (London, 1991), p.107.
2 The divide between intelligence offers and diplomats has various formal demarcations. Some
intelligence officers are listed in the Diplomatic List and usually receive diplomatic cover (for
example, some did become Ambassadors of Her Majesty’s Government). However, in this instance,
the Consul-Generals were on MI6’s payroll, not the Foreign Office.
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informally, by travellers, by officers and diplomats on leave, by civilians, even by explorers and
archaeologists.3 But thereafter diplomats and spies were increasingly perceived as two separate
professional categories, often marked by considerable antipathy.4 Indeed, the history of MI6 during
the Cold War is often seen as one marked by growing professionalization and technocratic
separation.5 With this growing divergence, Britain’s Cold War diplomats displayed an ambiguous
attitude to MI6, referring to them, not very sincerely, as ‘the Friends’.6
However, newly released documents from the UK National Archives indicate that this
division between diplomat and spy remained remarkably permeable. MI6 officers stationed in Hanoi
were valued as experienced observers, even though the highly secure police state within which they
operated in North Vietnam made real spying all but impossible. While the majority of historical
scholarship expresses a consensus that these are two separate fields of activity, this essay seeks to
demonstrate the existence of a joint diplomat-intelligence officer category. It examines the
implications of the dual identity for our understanding of Cold War intelligence. There are other
examples: just as Britain’s BRIXMIS mission in East Germany represented an exercise in defence
diplomacy, and none of its members were spies, yet it constituted one of the most effective
intelligence gathering operations of the Cold War. As Michael Goodman has shown, the BBC Survey
of World Broadcasts was funded in part from the UK intelligence budget and was considered one of
Britain’s best sources on the Soviet Bloc.7 More generally, perpetual British impecuniosities meant
that, while the Americans could professionalise and specialise, by contrast MI6 partly met the
challenge of a global Cold War with a ghost army of semi-retirees and part-timers moving between
3 John Fisher, 'Gentleman Spies in Asia', Asian Affairs, 41:2, (2010), pp. 202-4; Robert Johnson,
Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia. 1757–1947, (London, 2006), pp. 13-
36.
4 Michael Herman, ‘Diplomacy and Intelligence’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 9:2 (1998), p. 2.
5 Keith Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 (London, 2011) vii;
Philip H.J. Davies, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying: Structure and Process in Britain's Secret
Service, (London, 2004), pp.177-8.
6 Nigel West, The Friends: Britain's Post-War Secret Intelligence Operations (London, 1990).
7 Tony Geraghty, Brixmis: The Untold Exploits of Britain's Most Daring Cold War Spy Mission
(London, 1996); Michael Goodman, 'British Intelligence and the British Broadcasting Corporation: A
Snapshot of a Happy Marriage', In Robert Dover and Michael Goodman (eds.) Spinning Intelligence
(London, 2009), pp. 117-32.
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numerous occupations.8 Indeed, the divisions between spy, diplomat, journalist and academic seem
notably flexible during the 1960s.9 It is suggested here that we now need to rethink the divide between
espionage and other types of governmental activity that contributed to the intelligence picture
underpinning British overseas policy.10
At a time when President Johnson sought to pursue a policy of military ‘gradualism’ in North
Vietnam, the British reporting from the centre of Hanoi was a reliable, alternative means to American
intelligence assessments of the impact of the air raids. Furthermore, during a period when intelligence
was increasingly dominated by an American-led culture of ‘spying with science’, using computers and
satellites, Britain’s Hanoi mission reminded senior policy-makers of the value of human reporting.11
Indeed, the work of the MI6 officers who served in Hanoi prompts us to rethink the nature of the
‘special intelligence relationship’ between the UK and US. Hitherto this has been interpreted largely
in post-imperial terms.12 The British Commonwealth together with its remaining colonies, including
Cyprus, Diego Garcia and Hong Kong, were clearly valuable to America during this period.13 In
February 1968, American diplomats reviewed Britain’s remaining importance to America and
emphasised what they called ‘the value of residual empire’ for the burgeoning American global
military machine, especially in terms of airbases and locations from which to mount technical
surveillance.14 Kim Philby, whose irreverent memoir of life in MI6 was published at this time,
8 Interview, Daphne Park, German Historical Institute, 17 April 2008.
9 See the case of Robert Zaehner in Iran during the 1950s, discussed in Mark J. Gasiorowski and
Malcolm Byrne, Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran (Syracuse, 2003) pp. 129-35.
10 Reginald Hibbert distinguishes between secret intelligence and non-secret sources in Philip H.J.
Davies, ‘The SIS Singapore Station and the Role of the Far East Controller: Secret Intelligence
Structure and Process in Post-War Colonial Administration’, Intelligence and National Security, 14:4
(1999), p. 109. See also Michael Warner, ‘Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence”’, Studies in
Intelligence 46:3 (2002), pp. 15-22.
11 Richard Helms, A Look over my Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency, (New York,
2003), pp. 264-268.
12 For example, Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War, and the
Twilight of Empire (London, 2013), pp. 2-15; David Easter, 'GCHQ and British External Policy in the
1960s', Intelligence and National Security, 23:5 (2008), pp. 681-706.
13 Christopher M. Andrew, 'The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-
American Connection', Intelligence and National Security, 4:2 (1989), p. 224; Philip H.J. Davies, MI6
and the Machinery of Spying, (London, 2004).
14 Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, ‘What Now for Britain?’, Box 8, Philip M. Kaiser Papers, ,
REU-11, Thomas L. Hughes, 7 February 1968.
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recalled that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had told him: ‘whenever we want to subvert any
place...we find that the British own an island within easy reach.’15
However, the UK’s Consulate-General in Hanoi is not about residual empire. Instead it
illuminates an additional and neglected geographical aspect of the special relationship, which we
might call the intelligence value of ‘diplomatic divergence’. Throughout the Cold War, Britain’s
policy of de facto or de jure recognition for regimes that were in power – including communist states -
stood in stark contrast to the American approach, which was more ideological. Typically, Britain
formally recognised the Chinese Communist government and established an embassy in Beijing while
the United States doggedly recognised Taiwan until 1975.16 Similar situations prevailed in Havana,
Luanda, and more recently, in Teheran and Pyongyang. Britain enjoyed outposts in all these ‘enemy’
countries and their reporting was of notable interest to the United States. It is suggested here that
Britain’s diplomatic watchtowers in locations such as Hanoi, Peking and Havana constituted a valued
element in the transatlantic intelligence relationship.17 The value of the post in Hanoi lay in its ability
to provide insight into an area long-considered problematic for US intelligence.
Finally, Britain’s Consulate General in Hanoi offers us a fascinating glimpse of the social
history of embattled British outposts overseas. Historians have tended to view Britain’s activities
overseas through the prism of high policy, reflecting a lamentable bias in record preservation towards
elite activity. Indeed diplomatic history as a whole has often been regarded as dry and even a little
dull.18 By contrast, Britain’s curious outstation in Hanoi at the height of the Vietnam War offers us a
fascinating glimpse of the workaday tribulations of emissaries who were closely watched by the
Vietnamese security state as they sought to take the pulse of everyday life within what they referred to
as ‘this secret town’.19
15 Kim Philby, My Silent War (London, 1968), p. 195.
16 R. Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China', The Historical
Journal, 26:1 (1983), pp. 139-158; N.B. Tucker, Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations
and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York, 1983).
17 For example James G. Hershberg, ‘Their Man in Havana: Anglo-American Intelligence Exchanges
and the Cuban Crises, 1961-62’, Intelligence and National Security, 15:2 (2000), pp. 121-176.
18 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, 'Diplomatic History and the meaning of Life: Toward a Global
American History' Diplomatic History, 21:4 (1997), pp. 499-518.
19 Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 69.
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Britain’s Precarious Outpost in Hanoi
Hanoi was not Britain’s most attractive diplomatic station; in 1906 it was formally declared by the
Foreign Office as an ‘unhealthy post’.20 Nevertheless, its significance rose steadily together with the
strategic importance of South-East Asia, and as Japan expanded into the northern part of French
Indochina in 1940, Britain’s consulate offered her a ringside seat. Vietnam’s growing significance was
reflected in two important British interventions following the Second World War. First, British forces
occupied southern Indochina in 1945 and assisted France’s return to its colony. Thereafter, the bitterly
contested French re-occupation ensured that Southeast Asia became one of the hotter regions of the
Cold War.21 Second, following the French withdrawal in 1954, Britain’s appointment as Co-Chairman
of the Geneva Conference placed it in a prime position to help shape Vietnam’s ‘new political map’.22
During the early 1960s, British activity in Vietnam remained significant. Britain’s interests in
the region were shaped by its successful termination of the Malayan Emergency and its creation of
Malaysia. Its regional role was expanded by the creation of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation
and its role as one of several powers guaranteeing the International Control Commission (ICC) for
Vietnam created by the Geneva accords in 1954. In the early 1960s, Britain intervened directly,
sending a British Advisory Mission to the South Vietnamese government that sought to impart the
lessons of the Malayan Emergency. By now, Britain was also engaged in a large-scale military
‘Confrontation’ (albeit largely undeclared) against the increasingly pro-Communist government of
Indonesia in Borneo.23
Domestically, by 1967 Vietnam was high on Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s political
agenda. For the United States, who had by then committed half a million troops, British attitudes were
20 See the extensive correspondence at T[he] N[ational Archives], P[ublic] R[ecord] O[ffice], FO
369/17/15, File 7109, folios 80-82, 1906.
21 Andrew Rotter, The Path to Vietnam: Origins of the American Commitment to Southeast Asia,
(New York, 1989).
22 Simon Kear, ‘The British Consulate-General in Hanoi, 1954-73’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 10:1
(1999), pp. 219-220; Kevin Ruane, ‘Refusing to Pay the Price: British Foreign Policy and the Pursuit
of Victory in Vietnam, 1952-54’, English Historical Review, CX (435), (1999), pp. 72-75.
23 Peter Busch, All the Way with JFK? Britain, the US, and the Vietnam War (New York, 2007), pp. 3-
15: Matthew Jones, 'A Decision Delayed: Britain's Withdrawal from South East Asia Reconsidered,
1961–68', English Historical Review, 117:472 (2002), pp. 569-595.
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a test of loyalty. By contrast, for much of the British Labour Party, and especially the left wing,
opposition to Lyndon Johnson’s Vietnam policy was a cause célèbre. Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs Michael Stewart (1968-70) observed that Vietnam was ‘the most agonizing of all the problems
I had to face.’24 Wilson was especially anxious about the negative impact of American bombing of
North Vietnam on his own domestic power base. In addition to opposition from his own party,
disapproval of the war was widespread amongst the British public, as evidenced by the fact that on 17
March 1968 tens of thousands of protesters marched to the US Embassy in Grosvenor Square.
Vietnam – to quote one historian – was a ‘jungle too far’ for Britain.25 Wilson therefore had to strike a
balance between distancing Britain from the bombing campaign, and support for its ally. Accordingly,
the use of British intelligence assets to offer secret support to the United States’s war effort in
Vietnam was attractive, since it placated the White House but remained below the radar from the point
of view of British public opinion.2627
Secret intelligence support took three forms. At a global level, Britain sought to replace
American specialist intelligence assets in Europe, such as signals intelligence monitoring flights, in
order to release American units for service in Vietnam. At a regional level, Britain provided volumes
of signals intelligence from its large Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) monitoring
station at Little Sai Wan in Hong Kong. The British colony of Hong Kong was also host to America’s
largest CIA station in the region which masqueraded as a ‘consulate’ and boasted some six-hundred
24 Rhiannon Vickers, ‘Harold Wilson, the British Labour Party, and the War in Vietnam’, Journal of
Cold War Studies, 10:2 (2008), pp. 41-43.
25 Robert Fleming, ‘A Jungle Too Far: Britain and the Vietnam War’, http://www.nam.ac.uk/whats-
on/lunchtime-lectures/video-archive/jungle-too-far-britain-vietnam-war.
26 For more information, see Sylvia Ellis, Britain America, and the Vietnam War, (Westport, 2004);
John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives, 1966-67:
Marigolds, Sunflowers and ‘Kosygin Week’’, Diplomatic History, 27:1 (2003), pp. 113-149; Effie
G.H. Pedaliu, ‘Transatlantic Relations at a Time When ‘More Flags’ Meant ‘No European Flags’: the
United States’ War in Southeast Asia and its European Allies, 1964-68’, International History
Review, 35:3 (2013), pp. 556-575; Rodhri Jeffreys-Jones, In Spies We Trust: The Story of Western
Intelligence, (Oxford, 2013).
27 See Ruane, ‘Refusing to Pay the Price’, pp. 74-75 for a discussion of the Churchill administration’s
calculations in relation to Vietnam. Constraining America’s actions, and thus preventing the eruption
of a wider war constantly fed into Britain’s calculations during the 1950s and 1960s in relation to
Asia.
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staff. Within Vietnam itself, Britain’s most significant contribution was the intelligence activities of
its Consulate-General in Hanoi.28
Established in 1946 by Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Trevor-Wilson, the Consulate reflected a
broader shift in MI6 towards longer-term political intelligence gathering.29 Trevor-Wilson was one of
the more colourful characters in MI6; having spent the inter-war years working for a French perfume
house, he became the MI6 station chief in Algiers in 1942, and later was the first MI6 officer into
liberated Paris in 1944. 30 In 1946, he was despatched to Hanoi, where he befriended North
Vietnamese revolutionary (and later President) Ho Chi Minh, and accompanied him on overseas
diplomatic missions. In the early 1950s, he was the steadfast drinking companion of Graham Greene,
the British novelist and intelligence officer, in Vietnam until he was finally expelled by the French for
being too friendly to the Vietminh.31 Although Britain had also stationed staff at Haiphong, North
Vietnam’s principal port city, this mission was short-lived and only operated during 1956-59.32 By
contrast, Britain retained its unique outpost in Hanoi beyond the partition of Vietnam in 1954, and on
through the height of the Vietnam War.
Britain’s Consulate-General in Hanoi did not enjoy diplomatic status, since Britain did not
officially recognise the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam (DRVN). The office was accredited to
the municipality of Hanoi and so operated totally differently to the British Embassy in Saigon.33
Although the regular duties of the Consulate-General during the 1950s have attracted the attention of
diplomatic historians, the sequential presence of six MI6 officers at the height of the Vietnam War has
been overlooked. Although he provides an excellent overview of the Consulate’s diplomatic activities
28 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘The Value of Residual Empire: Anglo-American Intelligence Cooperation in
Asia after 1945’, in Richard Aldrich and Michael Hopkins, (eds.), Intelligence, Defence and
Diplomacy: British Policy in the Post-War World, (London, 1994), pp. 226-258.
29 Richard J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of
Secret Service, (Cambridge, 2000), p. 348.
30 David G. Marr, Vietnam: State War and Revolution (Berkeley, 2013), pp.227-8; Manuela A.
Williams, Mussolini's Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East
(London, 2006), p. 170; T.O. Smith, Britain and the Origins of the Vietnam War: UK Policy in Indo-
China, 1943-50 (London, 2007), pp. 78-9.
31 Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of America's Vietnam
(New York, 2012), pp. 293-5.
32 TNA, FO 371/186408, ‘Status of Consulate-General Hanoi’, Murray to de la Mare, 22 September
1966.
33 Kear, ‘The British Consulate-General in Hanoi’, p. 220.
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in a substantial profile of the post, Kear fails to take note of the fat that six Consul-Generals were MI6
officers.34 The same is to be said of Priest and Hughes in their thorough discussion of Anglo-
American strategic intelligence assessments of South Vietnam in 1963. Although they recognise that
the British had ‘access to a multitude of sources independent of, and sometimes superior to’ the
Americans, including the British presence in Hong Kong and Beijing, they make no mention of the
intelligence presence in Hanoi, other than a brief allusion to how information from JIC reports was
available in other Foreign Office documents.35
In fact, between 1964 and 1973, all the Consul-Generals were experienced mid-career MI6
officers boasting considerable geographic expertise, ranging from Russia, to Africa, to the Far East.
The first was Myles Ponsonby, who was stationed in Hanoi between 1964-65, before he took over as
head of the MI6 station in Rome in 1969.36 His successor, John Colvin, witnessed first-hand the
gradual escalation of American bombing from tactical strikes to heavy raids, known as ‘Operation
Rolling Thunder’, during his posting in Hanoi. Colvin went on to serve as the MI6 regional controller
in the Far East and then MI6 liaison officer in Washington.37 In 1967, Colvin was replaced by Brian
Stewart who served in Hanoi for two eventful years before becoming Secretary to the Joint
Intelligence Committee, and was tipped by many to become a future Chief of MI6.38 Stewart was
succeeded by Gordon Philo, who having served in Turkey, rose to be principal staff officer to the head
of the service.39 In 1969, Daphne Park, Baroness of Monmouth, a high profile Africa hand who had
34 Ibid, pp. 217-220. Kear offers an excellent overview of the activities of the Consulate-General to
1965 including the Davies Mission.
35 Andrew Priest and R. Gerald Hughes, ‘American and British Intelligence on South Vietnam, 1963’,
in R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len. V. Scott, (eds.), Exploring Intelligence Archives:
Enquiries into the Secret State, (Abingdon, 2008), pp. 173-212.
36 ‘Ponsonby, Myles Walter’, Special Forces Roll of Honour, 27 July 2006. Available at
http://www.specialforcesroh.com/showthread.php?30670-Ponsonby-Myles-Walter. Last accessed 23
January 2014.
37 Obituary: 'John Colvin: Diplomat and Spy who served in Hanoi during the Vietnam War',
Independent, 16 October 2003. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/john-
colvin-37281.html. Last accessed 23 January 2014. See also John Colvin, ‘Hanoi in My Time’,
Washington Quarterly, Spring 1981, pp. 143-46.
38 Stewart is named as an MI6 officer in Amy Davidson, ‘I Wouldn’t Begin to Know’, New Yorker, 11
November 2010. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/clos eread/2010/11/i-wouldnt-
begin-to-know.html. Last accessed 23 January 2014.
39 ‘Gordon Philo: SIS Officer and Writer’, The Times, 18 March 2009. Available at
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/obituaries/article2084774.ece. Last accessed 23 January 2014.
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previously served in the Congo was stationed in Hanoi.40 Finally, John Liudzius, a veteran of Eastern
Bloc ‘rollback’ operations against the Russians arrived in Hanoi in 1971.41
Collecting Intelligence on the Ground
The Consulate-General in Hanoi was known in the Foreign Office as ‘the worst post in the world’.42
Plagued by crushing heat and humidity, Hanoi’s worn and broken buildings lay in disrepair, debris
from bomb damage littered the streets, rendering the city a ‘decay beyond remedy, the degradation of
one of the most noble cities in Asia’.43 As Park shrewdly observed, ‘…what the American bombs had
not already laid waste appeared…to have been destroyed by years of neglect’.44 Located in the
commotion of downtown Hanoi, this ‘general air of dilapidation’ extended to the British residence and
office,45 where at official events, strategically-placed Union Jack flags hid cracks in the wall,
offsetting its ‘heavy and inelegant’ interior.46 As Daphne Park famously noted in her valedictory
despatch from Hanoi, the Residence was formerly a ‘house of ill-fame’, having a bidet in every
bathroom.47 For Colvin, the city’s spirit was captured in the simultaneous ‘filth’ and ‘vigour’ evident
to the casual observer walking around town.48 Collecting intelligence here at ground level presented
some unique challenges.
The Consulate-General occupied a peculiar place within Hanoi’s political landscape. The
shadow of non-recognition hung over the post, affecting the manner in which its staff were treated.
Their status in Hanoi fluctuated between that of private foreign residents and fully accredited
40 Gordon Corera, The Art of Betrayal, (New York, 2012), pp. 103-106.
41 Curtis Peebles, Twilight Warriors: Covert Air Operations Against the USSR, (Annapolis, 2005), p.
59.
42 Kear, ‘The British Consulate-General in Hanoi’, p. 221.
43 Colvin, Twice Around the World, 33; Colvin, ‘Hanoi in My Time’, pp. 143-44, 150.
44 Paddy Hayes, Quees of Spies: Daphne Park, Britain’s Cold War Spy Master, (London, 2015), p.
221.
45 Brian Stewart, Scrapbook of Roving Highlander: 80 Years Round Asia and Back, (Newark, 2002),
p. 232.
46 N[ational] S[ecurity] F[iles]: Vietnam Country File, L[yndon] B[aines] J[ohnson] Library, Box 85,
‘Celebration of the Birthday of Her Majesty the Queen’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Brown (London), 10 June
1968.
47 Hayes, Queen of Spies, p. 221.
48 Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 69.
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diplomats.49 On occasion, they were denied opportunities to meet foreign visitors and journalists, and
in one case, were even labelled ‘English immigrants’ on a visit to a museum, and yet, sometimes
found themselves seated on the same table as Politburo members at a diplomatic reception.50 The
refusal of the North Vietnamese authorities to permit the British staff to tour areas of Hanoi heavily
damaged by air raids (a privilege granted to full diplomatic missions) led to confrontations; Vice-
Consul Livesey reported being followed three times in the vicinity of the consular office, whilst
Consul-General Stewart was arrested and detained in Hanoi the following year en route to a church.51
Accused of spying in the area that had suffered the greatest damage from US air raids, London
debated whether the incident had jeopardised his position in Hanoi, and consequently his utility for
reporting.52
The ‘curious anomaly’ of the Consulate’s status had other indirect consequences.53 In the
absence of diplomatic relations, Stewart noted that the easiest way for the DRVN to register its
displeasure at the British would be via ‘administrative harassment’ of the consular staff.54 The speed
with which the DRVN carried out administrative requests was often used as a gauge of political
relations between the two countries. For example, when granted a permit for a new car, Stewart
deduced that the Consulate was ‘in a better political standing than before’, whilst Park considered the
speed at which her luggage was returned, and DRVN restraint at opening various boxes in Customs as
indicators of the Consulate’s improved political standing.55 Colvin observed that sometimes the
reasons for administrative harassment could be clearly traced back to London’s policies! In several
instances, ministerial statements made in London that were favourable to the US resulted in delayed
49 TNA, FCO 15/555, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 11 October 1967.
50 Ibid; FCO 15/555, ‘Visit to Military Museum’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 1 February
1968; Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 5.
51 TNA, FCO 15/578, Colvin (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 8 August 1967.
52 TNA, FCO 15/556, ‘Position of H.M. Consul-General, Hanoi’, Murray to Wilkinson, 29 December
1967.
53 TNA, FCO 15/555, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 11 October 1967.
54 TNA, FCO 15/578, Tel. 48, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 27 May 1968.
55 TNA, FCO 15/555, ‘Relations with the DRV’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 6 June 1968;
FCO 15/1355, ‘No Profile in Hanoi’, Park (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 26 June 1970.
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exit visas and even arbitrary power blackouts for the Consulate.56 London did not take such actions
lightly and saw that the DRVN was constantly trying to increase the restrictions on its staff.57
On one occasion, when running short of petrol and refused more by the appropriate ministry,
Park unabashedly sought permission to import a bicycle. After various exchanges between Park and
the ministry, including one response that it was ‘unsafe for an honourable lady to be regularly cycling
to the airport at night’, Park wrote a third time, asking for permission to import a tandem and
promising to take her driver with her - but without any response. 58 After some months, she returned to
the issue and suggested a trishaw with a member of the North Vietnamese counterintelligence bureau
as peddler - which was accepted! For one of her colleagues however, eventually her sense of mischief
went too far: ‘she turned up at the Soviet national day with a Union Jack on the handlebars. The
trishaw was withdrawn.’59 Just as Park greatly enjoyed such opportunities to tease the authorities,
Stewart observed that the Russian, Asian, and African ‘hands’ each brought different understandings
of a security state to bear on their life in Hanoi.60
Stewart described a ‘steady wing-clipping exercise’ by the DRVN.61 Fuel was ‘permanently
unobtainable’ for the Consulate-General, and the staff were denied privileges often afforded to most
diplomatic missions, such as permits to import furnishings and power generators, and general repairs
to the building.62 The consular staff often had to resort to elaborate methods in order to obtain basic
supplies; when, for example, the petrol ration for the Consulate was stopped, Stewart relied on
borrowing petrol from friendly missions and bringing it home in old gin bottles.63 The differing
personalities and experiences of the Consuls-General often determined how they handled their prison-
like existence in Hanoi. Whilst Colvin often sought to travel abroad to escape the mental pressure of
56 Colvin, Twice Around the World, pp. 45-48.
57 TNA, FCO 15/1725, ‘Consulate-General at Hanoi’, Squire to Wilford, 24 May 1972.
58 Bill Collier, Diplomatic Wanderings: From Saigon to the South Seas (London, 2003) 29.
59 Sir Gerald Warner, ‘The Secret Intelligence Service: Memorial Address’, 29 May 2010, in Pauline
Adams and Liz Cooke (eds.), Daphne Park 1921-2010, Memorial Tributes, 2010, p. 25; see also the
extensive correspondence at TNA, FCO 15/1355, ‘Administrative Problems of Consulate-General in
Hanoi’, 1970.
60 Brian Stewart, in discussion with the author, 5-6 November 2013.
61 TNA, FCO 15/555, Tel. 49, Stewart (Hanoi) to Foreign Office (London), 21 December 1967.
62 Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 27, 47; TNA, FCO 15/555, ‘The Position of the Consulate-
General in Hanoi’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 12 December 1967.
63 Stewart, Scrapbook of Roving Highlander, p. 236.
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bugging and ‘the constant need for speech security’ in Hanoi, his successor, Daphne Park - the
legendary career MI6 officer – was more cavalier and forced Hanoi’s restrictions to suit her. Park also
told London that she found ‘a certain satisfaction in not noticing harassment when it happens’.64 If the
DRVN’s actions were intended to register displeasure at the British, Stewart lamented that there was
‘not much wing left to clip’.65
North Vietnam was paranoid about spying. Accordingly, as the war escalated in the mid-
1960s, the Consulate staff found themselves subject to numerous counterintelligence measures that
constrained their operating environment. In particular, the DRVN sought to control physical
movement by repeatedly denying the Consuls-General a bicycle permit, a driving licence, or sufficient
petrol rations for their car to get to the airport - all under the pretence of ‘protection’ or ‘security’.66
These measures were effective in narrowing the space in which the British were able to gather
intelligence. By January 1968, Colvin’s replacement, Brian Stewart, conceded that the lack of the use
of a car, bicycle, and the restriction of the area in which he was permitted to take walks ‘reduced
significantly’ his reporting capacity, forcing him to rely on a network of friends to gather intelligence
on the outskirts of Hanoi where much of the bombing was concentrated.67
The consular staff worried about speech security. According to Colvin, the staff operated
under the assumption of ‘total technical surveillance’ by the local authorities, also accepting that their
house staff served as low-level spies on behalf of the local police, and that the consular residence was
most likely ‘wired from top to bottom’.68 In the 1960s, Western diplomats serving in Communist
countries had reported a bugging epidemic in their embassies as a result of the miniaturisation allowed
by transistors.69 In Hanoi, the authorities barely attempted to hide technical surveillance. Colvin
recalls two Vietnamese technicians paying an unexpected visit to the consular residence to ‘repair’ an
64 TNA, FC 15/1355, ‘No Profile in Hanoi’, Park (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 26 June 1970.
65 TNA, FCO 15/578, Tel. 49, Stewart (Hanoi) to Foreign Office (London), 21 December 1967.
66 TNA, FCO 15/1355, ‘Tandem Tactic’, The Daily Express, 28 August 1970; Colvin, Twice Around
the World, p. 69; TNA, FCO 15/1355, ‘No Profile in Hanoi’, Park (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 26
June 1970.
67 TNA, FCO 15/555, ‘Restrictions on Movement in Hanoi’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 4
January 1968.
68 Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 36.
69 Richard J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency
(London, 2011), pp. 183-200.
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issue with the unbroken telephone set - they extracted ‘two presumably worn out devices’ which
Colvin was asked to hold as they were replaced! Instances such as this were characteristic of life in
the British residence; as such, secret matters were confined to either discussion in the open air, or
communicated indoors by writing.70 Some were more comfortable with this than others: Park, who
noted that she was reported on daily, accepted this as a quirk of living in a Communist country,
adding that, ‘you don’t hold it against the person or feel rancorous about it’.71
Cypher Wars
The 1960s were a turbulent time for British diplomatic premises in Asia. In early September 1963,
substantial protests took place outside the British and Malaysian embassies in Jakarta, whilst in
Sumatra, mobs wrecked both the British and Malaysian Consulates. On 17th September 1963, violent
riots erupted again in Jakarta, and the British Embassy there was sacked and burned while the security
forces stood by. In March 1964, government-inspired riots in Phnom Penh damaged the British
Embassy, the British Information Offices, and completely destroyed the British Council offices.
In August 1967, echoing the actions of Beijing in the previous chapter, the North Vietnamese
government withdrew cypher privileges from the British Consulate-General in Hanoi, preventing the
transmission of secret outbound telegram traffic.72 It is not clear how closely events in Beijing and
Hanoi were connected.73 Somewhat implausibly, the DRVN claimed that the sole criterion for
outward cypher rights and use of the consular bag was recognition of the DRVN and the associated
issue of proper diplomatic status.74 The move should has come as little surprise; in March 1965,
Ponsonby reported delays in receiving telegrams from London, (adding that he had no means of
70 Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 61-62.
71 Adams and Cooke, (Memorial Tributes, p. 36.
72 TNA, FCO 15/578, ‘Communications with Hanoi’, Fyjis-Walker to de la Mare, 17 August 1967;
FCO 15/578, DSYT 1/196/1, ‘Department Circular’, Communications Department, 21 February 1968.
73 On the impact of the Cultural Revolution on DVRN politics see S. Quinn-Judge, 'The Ideological
Debate in the DRV and the Significance of the Anti-Party Affair, 1967–68', Cold War History, 5:4
(2005), pp. 479-500.
74 TNA, FCO 15/578, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 29 August 1967.
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knowing whether his telegrams were reaching London), born out of suspicion that Hanoi was stopping
the transmission of cypher telegrams.75 Whilst that was explained simply as the result of
administrative delays, Ponsonby attached a document to London that clearly indicated Hanoi had been
tampering with his telegrams.76 The withdrawal of cypher rights effectively meant that whilst the
Consulate-General could continue to collect intelligence, it lacked a secret, secure and fast means of
getting its information back to London.
Numerous options were considered as short-term means of restoring secret communications
with London, including offering cypher telegram facilities in both directions to North Vietnamese
officials in London, or introducing a third staff member to act as an undeclared ‘personal courier
service’.77 The former was particularly risky, as the North Vietnamese base in London was supposedly
‘the main base for securing supplies of foreign currency to support the guerrilla war in the South’.78
The problem persisted for several years and in 1971, when the cypher privileges had still not been
restored, the high-risk possibility of using a Chinese flight to Hong Kong was even considered to get
British material out of Hanoi.79 Although able to send uncyphered telegrams to London, Brian
Stewart, the incumbent Consul-General, knew that these communications were vulnerable to the
‘diligent Hanoi monitors of our telegraphic traffic’.80 Stewart needed to send his reports back to
London without the formal apparatus of intelligence reporting which denoted sources and methods.
He therefore devised a discreet code whereby various innocent phrases would signal different levels
of source reliability for sensitive material, including his detailed commentary of the effects of US
bombing, or DRVN internal politics.81
75 TNA, FCO 371/180510, Ponsonby (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 3rd March 1965.
76 Ibid, Ponsonby (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 1st March 1965. Ponsonby attached a telegram in which
the heading was on a separate piece of paper to the main body, described as ‘stuck on as an
afterthought, and probably nothing to do with the original message’. Pointing to the carbon reversal of
the ply-paper used, he indicated that the original endorsement of the time and date of receipt had been
removed.
77 TNA, FCO 15/578, Tel. 350, Foreign Office to Hanoi, 20 September 1967; TNA, FCO 15/578, Tel.
1325, 13 November 1967.
78 Hayes, Queen of Spies, p. 215.
79 TNA, FCO 15/1495, ‘The Post at Hanoi’, Margetson, 20 September 1971.
80 TNA, FCO 15/578, ‘Telegrams to and from Hanoi’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 7
December 1967.
81 TNA, FCO 15/578, ‘En Clair Conventions’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Smedley (Vientiane), 5 March
1968.
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Hanoi’s new restrictions were a blow. At various points during 1966 and 1967, Colvin’s
cypher facilities had not only provided excellent reporting on Hanoi but also offered a secure conduit
for any visiting Western figures who were putting out informal peace feelers to the North Vietnamese.
The British repeatedly offered the Americans the use of this ‘secure channel’ for any initiatives,
recognising that the practicalities of secret exchanges between the two combatants were difficult. In
February 1967, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk responded by asking the British to use Colvin to
'convey to the North Vietnamese that we place the highest priority on finding a mutually agreeable,
completely secure arrangement for exchanging communications with them, and we will attempt to
meet any suggestions they have to offer to achieve this end'. Therefore, the truncation of Colvin’s
cypher rights in mid-1967 sent both London and Washington a sombre message.82
The restrictions also impeded British efforts to pass timely intelligence to the Americans.
Therefore Stewart made secret use of the Canadian component of the International Control
Commission (ICC) to pass his intelligence back to London. Run by the Canadians, Indians, and Poles,
the ICC enjoyed Commission stations in Hanoi, Saigon, and Vientiane. Established in 1954, the ICC’s
mission was to oversee the implementation of the Geneva Accords, which had resulted in the partition
of Indochina and ceasefire agreements in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The ICC staff used two
dilapidated Dakota D-47 transport aircraft to commute between them until one crashed in the jungle,
reducing the fleet to one. The aircraft flew from Saigon to Vientiane (via Phnom Penh), and was the
only link for Western or non-communist missions in Hanoi with the outside world. British staff were
allowed to use this unnerving form of transport to move between the consulate in Hanoi and the
British Embassy in Vientiane, as well as to collect diplomatic mail, though flight nights were sporadic
– they depended on the guarantee of safe passage by Pathet Lao guerrillas, and impending US air raids
threatened its safety. Some of the Consul-Generals would visit the Saigon Embassy as often as once a
month, brief colleagues, use its cypher facilities and pick up welcome supplies. Indeed, that ‘was the
main purpose of the ICC from the British point of view'. 83
82 TNA, FCO 82/320, Summary of events of 5 January 1967 and 4 February 1967, Top Secret NO-
DIS.
83 Remarks of Sir John Margetson, 'Negotiating While Fighting: Peace Initiatives, British Policy and
the Vietnam War, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Seminar Transcript, 9 May 2012, p. 40.
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All three delegations to the ICC (Canadian, Polish, and Indian) enjoyed diplomatic bag and
cypher privileges. However, using the Canadian diplomatic bags was risky, and an uncertain,
unsatisfactory substitute for a regular bag run. Although diplomatic bags were usually regarded as
inviolable, local behaviour was unpredictable, and arbitrary changes in DRVN customs regulations
often posed obstacles.84 For example, an incident in which the connecting door between two ICC
compounds was locked forced the British Vice Consul-General to carry the diplomatic bag in plain
sight through the street - where it could be seen by the ever-watchful security police.85
If the diplomatic bag option was problematic, British use of the Canadian ICC wireless
facility was even more precarious. Although the signal link offered a means of transmitting
encyphered messages to the British Embassy in Saigon, it was operated by Indian signallers who were
notoriously incompetent and slow, often ‘garbling’ messages during transmission.86 Accordingly,
sensitive material was transported by the most secure means possible at the time - on handwritten
manuscripts safely tucked away into the Consul-General’s pocket. However, the volume was
negligible and had to await travel by the Consul-General to a location such as Saigon. Accordingly,
from August 1967, Hanoi had effectively denied the British the possibility of secret real time
reporting.87
All these alternative forms of messaging carried significant risks, including arrest. In both
Hanoi and Peking, a fear of reprisal hung over the consular staff, who inhabited what one official
termed an ‘Alice in Wonderland state of communications’.88 Extreme diligence was required in
wording in order to avoid cross-referencing different forms of communication, and the Canadian
conduit required the complete concealment of all British identification marks.89 North Vietnam’s
Available at http://issuu.com/fcohistorians/docs/final_transcript_with_revisions_pdf. Last accessed 18
February 2014.
84 TNA, FCO 15/578, Tel. 48, Stewart (Hanoi) to Foreign Office (London), 27 May 1968; FCO
15/578, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 26 October 1967.
85 TNA, FCO 15/560, Colvin (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 2 May 1967.
86 TNA, FCO 15/578, ‘Telegraphic Communications’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 24
October 1967.
87 Stewart, in discussion with the author, 2013.
88 TNA, FCO 15/578, Tel. 850, Wilkinson (Saigon) to Foreign Office (London), 7 November 1967.
89 TNA, FCO 15/578, DSYT 1/196/1, Tel. 48, ‘Department Circular’, Communications Department,
Stewart (Hanoi) to Foreign Office (London), 21 February 1968.
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reasons for withdrawing cypher rights were also a constant source of debate. Interpretations
fluctuated; some saw the withdrawal as an attempt to ‘flush’ British diplomats out of North Vietnam
entirely, whilst others viewed the measure merely as a logical response to the Consulate-General’s
‘non-status’.90 Richard Fyjis-Walker, Deputy Head of the South-East Asia Department, saw a ‘deeper
significance’. For him, the withdrawal signalled an impending military escalation by the North,
requiring a tightening of ‘loopholes through which any sort of intelligence might be thought to be
reaching their enemies, the Americans’.91
Although Fyjis-Walker’s reasoning was well grounded - the Tet Offensive was launched only
a few months later in early 1968 – there was in fact a more mundane explanation. Colvin (or his
deputy, Geoffrey Livesey) had broken a fundamental rule of clandestine communications by referring
to two encyphered telegrams in an en clair (uncyphered) message. The two encyphered telegrams
were intelligence reports on the extent of post-bombing damage after US Air Force raids, which made
reference to reports by a French diplomat that the bomb damage to the Cau dyke was ‘the worst
damaged dyke that he had so far seen’.92 The error - referring to secret communications in an open
message - would have heightened lingering suspicions by the North Vietnamese; the previous year,
they had inferred similar accounts of bombing damage in US press reports and Congressional
testimony, indicating the probable source of US intelligence to be allied diplomats.93
Yet it was never clear exactly how much the DRVN knew about British activities.
Interpretations varied between the Consul-Generals. John Liudzius, an MI6 officer94 who served as
Consul-General during 1970-71, was convinced that the DRVN were aware of British use of the ICC
Canadian bag. The Consulate’s North Vietnamese secretary/interpreter changed his schedule without
prompting when ICC flight schedules changed, and together with the ‘additional interest’ displayed by
security guards around the Consulate on bag days, prompting his conviction that they were aware of
90 Ibid. TNA, FCO 15/578, Murray (London to Stewart (Hanoi), 31 October 1967.
91 TNA, FCO 15/555, ‘H.M. Consulate-General in Hanoi’, Fyjis-Walker to Murray, 23 November
1967.
92 TNA, FCO 15/578 FCO (London) to Consulate-General (Hanoi), 17 August 1967.
93 TNA, FCO 15/578, Livesey (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 1 August 1967.
94 His previous MI6 career is discussed in Tom Bower, The Red Web: MI6 and the KGB Master Coup,
(London, 1989), p. 58.
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bag use.95 Stewart was certain that the DRVN knew of British circumvention of restrictions, pointing
out that his house staff were undoubtedly reporting back to the DRVN accounts of his well-stocked
cellar and grocery store, clearly the result of more than an occasional air trip. However disliked the
British reporting was, had the North Vietnamese restored the cypher rights, they would not have
known what the British were reporting.96 The speculation was endless. By 1971, Liudzius calculated
that even if the DRVN was aware of British secret communications they might now have come to the
conclusion - with negotiations looming - that it might be favourable to have conditions in Hanoi
reported upon objectively.97
Despite British deftness at evading the DRVN cypher restrictions, the future of the Consulate-
General was constantly in the balance. The Canadians had already been accused – quite rightly - of
conducting their own espionage activities by the North Vietnamese government, and subsequently, a
Canadian member of the ICC was expelled from Hanoi.9899 With this in mind, the British staff were
wary of what John Colvin described as ‘espionage psychosis’ in North Vietnam - a heightened
sensitivity (and hostility) to foreign activities, following unfavourable Western reporting of bombing
sites.100 From London’s perspective, unless the consular staff could transmit their intelligence back
home, their main purpose was lost and they would be reduced to ‘waving a metaphorical Union Jack,
incommunicado’.101
Perceptions were paramount; it was clear that the North Vietnamese authorities regarded the
British as spies. Contemplating the North Vietnamese regime’s knowledge of Canadian bag use, for
example, Liudzius remarked upon various indications that the DRVN - amongst others - ‘attach a spy
aura to our post’.102 Manifested through their counterintelligence measures designed to disrupt and
95 TNA, FCO 15/1495, ‘Status of H.M. Consulate-General in Hanoi’, Liudzius (Hanoi) to Murray
(London), 30 September 1971.
96 Stewart, in discussion with the author, 12-13th November, 2014.
97 TNA, FCO 15/1495, ‘Status of H.M. Consulate-General in Hanoi’, Liudzius (Hanoi) to Murray
(London), 30 September 1971.
98 TNA, FCO 15/578, ‘Communications with Hanoi’, Fyjis-Walker to de la Mare, 17 August 1967.
99 The Canadian component of the ICC was reporting intelligence to the Americans, much like the
British. See Margaret K. Gnoinska, Poland and Vietnam, 1963: New Evidence on Secret Communist
Diplomacy and the ‘Maneli Affair’, (Washington: Cold War International History Project, 2005).
100 TNA, FCO 15/578, Colvin (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 8 August 1967.
101 TNA, FCO 15/578, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London), 22 November 1967.
102 TNA, FCO 15/1495, Liudzius (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 1971.
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inhibit the activities of the British officers, the behaviour of the DRVN made it clear that they
considered the observational activities of the British Consul-Generals as intelligence gathering.
Therefore, in the eyes of the North Vietnamese, ‘intelligence’ was not necessarily ‘secrets how we
understand secrets’,103 but, nonetheless, a form of spying on their regime. The intelligence value of the
post flowed in the opposite direction, too; detailing growing instances of theft from the foreign
missions in Hanoi, Stewart interpreted them as ‘possible evidence of increased DRV intelligence
interest’ in the missions. Noting that they coincided with a period of preparations for peace talks, the
theft of briefcases and tape recordings from the Canadian villa, for example, was likely engineered by
the DRVN in order to ‘improve their access to intelligence on non-communist assessments and, of
course, on US intentions’.
Washington failed to cover the tracks of its British collaborators. Despite the hazards faced by
British personnel, the Americans were cavalier in their use of the resulting intelligence, using it
publicly to justify continued bombing. In 1972, in open session, American officials told a
Congressional Committee that there was now ‘a good deal more evidence on the nature of the strain
produced by the bombing’ of North Vietnam. They added that the ‘US intelligence indications’ that
underpinned this were based on the views of the Hanoi diplomatic community, ‘notably the Canadians
and the British’.104 For both London and Washington, intelligence from Hanoi on the impact of the
bombing upon North Vietnam was important, albeit for different reasons.
Blurring Boundaries
While the diplomatic and political utility of the Hanoi Consulate-General post has been recognised in
other literature, its intelligence value seems to have gone unnoticed.105 Although the US once had a
103 Stewart, in discussion with the author, 2014.
104 Congressional Record, United States Congress, (Washington DC: US Government Print Office,
1972), 118:13, p. 16772.
105 Kear, ‘The British Consulate-General in Hanoi’, 225. Kear uses the Davies Mission to illustrate the
Consulate’s political function, especially as an alternative to traditional diplomatic channels. See also
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Consulate in Hanoi in the early 1950s, this had been closed in retaliation for a decision by the North
Vietnamese authorities to ban the consulate from using its radio to transmit outbound messages, thus
significantly hampering its communication capacity.106 Therefore, the British Consulate was able to
provide reporting from a location that had proved impenetrable to US intelligence agents –from
‘inside the enemy citadel’, as Colvin aptly put it.107 Historically, the CIA had a poor track record when
it came to North Vietnam; a 1955 plot (jointly with MI6) to instigate a row in the Hanoi politburo that
they hoped would lead to the assassination of Ho Chi Minh failed, whilst efforts by the CIA to
develop relationships in Saigon collapsed owing to a lack of Vietnamese-speaking officers.108
Furthermore, the CIA had repeatedly failed in its efforts to launch covert missions in the North,109 and
its lack of human agent coverage meant it was virtually blind in Hanoi. Every covert penetration
mission launched from the South had either been wound up or ‘played back’ as a deception operation
by the DRVN’s formidable counterintelligence service.110
Despairing of progress, the White House transferred responsibility for these missions from the
CIA to the Pentagon in the hope of better results, but to no avail. Richard Schultz concludes that the
CIA and the Pentagon inserted some five hundred agents into the North to set up spy networks, but
‘Hanoi caught every one and doubled several back for years.’111 American intelligence was therefore
restricted to a diet of satellite imagery and signals intelligence, supplemented by the only non-
technical source available to the Americans – ‘exile intelligence’.112 In the latter case, American
reports usually depended on reports from the debriefing of refugees, which brought only limited
John W. Young, ‘The Wilson Government and the Davies Peace Mission to North Vietnam, July
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value.113 Refugees had little interaction with the North Vietnamese government, possessed out of date
knowledge, and were likely to exaggerate the ills of the society that they had escaped.114 Often the
information was acquired in locations such as Saigon or Vientiane and was long out of date.115 Often
the information came from elsewhere altogether and was acquired in locations such as Saigon or
Vientiane.116 By contrast, the British intelligence officers at the Consulate offered experienced
reporting, from trained observers.
At a time when MI6 operations in Asia were being questioned and some responsibilities were
being handed over to its burgeoning Australian sister service, Hanoi was an example of successful
intelligence collection.117 Conventional accounts of Cold War intelligence have tended to separate the
roles of diplomats and intelligence officers. Typically, Corera’s study of MI6 during the Cold War
argues that diplomats were ‘keen to keep relations ticking over’ while intelligence officers were ‘there
to steal secrets and generally up to no good’, adding that this could result in friction between the two
sets of actors.118 Yet, the value of the British intelligence owed much to the dual identity of the MI6
officers – the positioning of seasoned intelligence officers in a consular role. Moreover, it is now clear
that a number of people advanced their careers by working alternately in both services.119
113 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, ‘Comments on the Effects of US Air Strikes,
Missile Launchings, Transportation Difficulties and Food and Drug Shortages in North Vietnam’,
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20th Parallels’, Intelligence Information Cable, Central Intelligence Agency, 7 March 1967.
115 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, ‘Reaction to American Air Strikes of Coastal
Area Inhabitants of North Vietnamese Provinces between 17th and 20th Parallels’, Intelligence
Information Cable, Central Intelligence Agency, 7 March 1967; ‘Description of Conditions in Hanoi’,
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Although the penumbral nature of the Consulate’s status limited the radius of its operations,
its staff enjoyed real immersion within the adversary’s society. Some historians have emphasised their
lack of access to the North Vietnamese governing elite, but as we shall see this was not always the
case.120 Moreover, the intelligence backgrounds of the six Consul-Generals facilitated the careful
cultivation of relationships with officials inside the diplomatic community in Hanoi, as well as a small
number of non-diplomatic contacts. Park, for example, regarded intelligence work in Hanoi as a
combination of covert activity and developing high-level personal relationships, which in turn
provided intelligence.121 In her case she developed a close friendship with the Soviet Ambassador in
Hanoi, Ilya Shcherbakov. Beyond simply cultivating contacts, their intelligence background lent itself
to sifting through and recording the finer details of the ‘closely cultivated, sorted-through
relationships’, in contrast with diplomats, who tended not to separate such information (i.e. sources
and opinion or comment) in their reports.122
Britain’s diplomat-intelligence officers also had the access to open sources in
Hanoi that the United States lacked. In short, they behaved like amateur anthropologists. With regard
to non-clandestine material, British officers collected a ‘mass of stuff’ that the diplomats tended to
overlook, relying instead upon official comments or reports published by the host government.
Stewart, for example, would often visit his local bookshop to peruse magazines and newspapers –
most of which was passed onto London or Washington – and listened to local radio broadcasts,
gauging local opinion.123 As trained MI6 officers they were also aware of the complex issues of
intelligence ‘validation’. Given the scarcity of information in a highly secure state, they knew that
intelligence could be ‘tainted by the cross-breeding of speculation, false confirmation and the like’.124
Stewart preferred personal and physical observations, emphasising that, for him, the only really
reliable source seemed to be ‘the evidence of our senses’.125 Given the lack of equivalent expert cadre
120 Kear, ‘The British Consulate-General in Hanoi’, pp. 222-223.
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to interpret the Vietnamese press papers, Stewart’s Vietnamese linguistic skills were also of use in
understanding the value of the local press as a source information (or misinformation).126
The blurring of boundaries also extended into the military realm. Stewart observed that his
position was more akin to that of a military attaché; there to observe, rather than run agents, his
mission effectively consisting of work with ‘eyes, ears, and camera’.127 Former JIC Chairman Michael
Herman has argued that though experienced in the use of intelligence, and ‘the most able people
around’, diplomats are not trained to handle military matters or the covert evidence underlying them.
Conceiving of the intelligence collection system as resisting distinct boundaries, he points to military
attaches as ‘sitting at various points on a continuum’ between covert and covert source collection.128
The dual identify of the Consul-Generals therefore enabled them to bridge a divide; Colvin, for
example, was asked to give London map squares taken from a North Vietnamese map of Hanoi in
order to locate the villages of houses that he claims were damaged by American air raids, and to
identify targets Colvin claimed could be spotted from the road. 129 Similarly, in his reports to London,
Liudzius often detailed his sightings of ‘about 20 small planes, presumably fighters/trainers, and one
4-engined plane away from the small ones’ on a military base near Tam Dao.130
However, Hanoi was also an example of the limitations of intelligence gathering within a
security state. This operated on a number of levels: rather than simply being the result of working
within the confines of a security state, the constraints on intelligence gathering were partly the result
of non-recognition of the DRVN. Park observed that ‘the real hardship lies in the fact that, surrounded
by Vietnamese, we can know none of them’. Non-recognition created a ‘special vacuum’ around the
British staff, in which they could live amongst the Vietnamese, but not interact with them – what Park
termed ‘co-existence without contact’.131 Liudzius expressed a similar frustration at understanding the
126 Stewart, in discussion with the author, 2014. For more information, see ‘Vietnam: A Can of
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attitudes of the ordinary Vietnamese around him. For him, the ‘observer’ status in Hanoi meant that he
could not get ‘much below the surface in our knowledge of them and of their thoughts’, reducing his
own views to ‘little more than impressions’ of the town.132
The impact on their access to human sources was considerable. In a significant despatch to
London on an impending North Vietnamese propaganda campaign against US bombing, Colvin
conceded that, since he was unable to leave Hanoi, his sources were confined to ‘two non-Communist
Frenchmen, and one left-wing, but truthful, old British female’, discounting Eastern Bloc journalists
amongst others. This did not go unnoticed by London. In a letter to the Foreign Office, Gordon
remarked that ‘there are few other posts where the staff are prevented so completely by the authorities
from having an effective contact with the local population’, adding that the number of North
Vietnamese with whom Liudzius conversed ‘probably does not exceed a dozen’, limiting his
valedictory despatch to a ‘series of impressions’ based on his observations from Hanoi.133.
Hanoi was therefore a significant example of conducting ‘intelligence without espionage’.
Drawing some parallels with Herman’s conception of intelligence, Reginald Hibbert, (himself a
former senior Foreign Office official whose career embraced intelligence) argued that in order for
intelligence to be considered a useful term, it should be used in a broader sense beyond simply
‘secrecy’. In this respect, information collected by diplomatic and consular missions formed a key
component of the ‘layer cake of intelligence’ in which secret intelligence comprised of less than ten
per cent of assorted intelligence on a country. Within this more holistic understanding of intelligence,
the British material contributed towards ‘as comprehensive and accurate a picture as possible of the
attitudes, policies, political and economic imperatives and likely course of action’ on the North
Vietnamese regime.134
Echoing Foreign Office discussions in the early 1950s, in April 1966, Gordon Etherington-
Smith, then the UK Ambassador to Saigon, questioned the utility of continuing the two-man post.135
132 TNA, FCO 15/1474, ‘Some Reflections on a Year in Hanoi’, Liudzius (Hanoi) to Tomlinson
(London), October 1971.
133 TNA, FCO 15/1474, Gordon (London) to Tomlinson (London), 25th November 1971.
134 Reginald Hibbert, ‘Intelligence and Policy’, Intelligence and National Security, 5:1 (1990), pp.
111-112.
135 TNA, FCO 371/186408, Etherington-Smith (Saigon) to FCO (London), 1 April 1966.
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Then too, SIS had fought for its survival; then chief of SIS, Sir Stewart Menzies, wholly disagreed,
having a ‘fondness for operating in out of way places’.136 Into the 1960s, the value of the Hanoi post
grew alongside the US’s accelerating campaign of air bombardment. If, as has been argued in this
chapter, the definition of ‘intelligence’ lay in the eye of the beholder, then from the American
perspective, the Hanoi material filled a discernible gap. What the British reporting offered was
essentially an anthropological assessment, consisting of detailed impressions of life from the centre of
enemy society.137 Moreover, this unique British intelligence resonated at the highest levels of the
American government. The British, French, and Canadians were the only Western representatives able
to report from Hanoi, and as we shall see, the British observations made their way to the desks of the
US Secretary of State, the Director of the CIA, the National Security Advisor and ultimately, the
President. The intelligence fell into three main categories: high level political intelligence;
observations from Hanoi of psychological value; and observations of military value.
The Despatches
What was the main value of British reporting from Hanoi? The attitude of senior leaders to the
possibility of talks between the US and DRVN was undoubtedly the matter of the greatest interest for
London and Washington. Lacking direct channels with Hanoi, the US had been enquiring on a weekly
basis as to what the attitudes of the North Vietnamese might be if US bombing ceased; Rusk had
remarked to one of Prime Minister Wilson’s advisors that ‘every week they received no reply’,
describing the North Vietnamese reaction to the thirty-seven day pause in the bombing campaign as
‘totally intransigent’.138 Although direct access to Hanoi’s political leadership was episodic, at best,
the British Consuls-General were able to confer often with ambassadors, particularly from the Soviet
bloc, to gauge political developments in North Vietnam.139 Colvin noted that other diplomats in Hanoi
136 Hayes, Queen of Spies, p. 214.
137 Stewart, in discussion with the author, 2014.
138 TNA, PREM 13/1274, Downing Street (London) memo (no date), 1966.
139 Kear, ‘The British Consulate-General in Hanoi’, p. 231.
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often disclosed information to him because of his perceived association with the US, in the hope that
Washington would hear their messages. Brazenly denying any direct contact with the Americans, he
was happy to maintain the facade, observing that he had ‘something, however factitious’, to offer
them.140 As the only Consul-General able to speak Vietnamese, Stewart devoted much time to
assessing North Vietnam’s Foreign Minister, Nguyen Duy Trinh’s use of syntax in political
statements that might indicate the seriousness with which Hanoi was considering negotiations in
exchange for the cessation of bombing raids, and under what conditions they would come to the
negotiating table.141
Although the Consulate’s non-diplomatic status prevented its staff from being included on the
regular diplomatic social list, the Consuls-General were sometimes invited to DRVN national
occasions.142 Despite not being allowed to mix freely with the Vietnamese people, at these receptions
Park was able to converse with the Vietnamese Politburo, who had also been invited.143 Typically, at
National Day celebrations, the interactions between officials and foreign representatives were often
indicative of higher politics at play: Sino-Soviet tension often manifested itself at such events. 144 At
an important Chinese reception, a walkout by Soviet and Eastern bloc representatives in response to a
Chinese speech was compounded by a veiled threat from the Chinese to the DRVN against ‘any
attempt at negotiation or any other action other than continued obduracy’ in the same speech.145 The
140 Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 57.
141 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 34, Tel. 63, Stewart (Hanoi, via Maclehose, Saigon)
to FCO (London); Tel. 2, Stewart (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 5 January 1968; TNA, FCO 15/1474,
Tel. 31, Liudzius (Hanoi, via Lloyd, Vientiane) to FCO (London), 26 November 1971. This was
significant – according to Kosygin, the possibility of negotiations essentially came down to Trinh’s
statement of whether an unconditional halt in bombing ‘would’ or ‘could’ allow for talks. For more
see Ellis and Dumbrell, ‘British Involvement in Peace Initiatives’, pp. 132-146; Stewart in discussion
with the author, 2014.
142 Caroline Alexander, ‘Profiles: Vital Powers’, New Yorker, 30 January 1989, p. 57–71. (Profile of
Daphne Park).
143 Stewart, Scrapbook of a Roving Highlander, p. 237.
144 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 86, No. 10, Colvin (Hanoi) to Brown (London), 30
September 1967.
145 TNA, FCO 15/1076, ‘Hanoi W/E 27 December’, Park (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 29 December
1969; TNA, FCO 15/1000, Tel. 51, ‘Observations from Hanoi’, Philo (Hanoi) to FCO (London),
September 1969.
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Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi frequently used the British to register his unofficial views of the
intentions of the North Vietnamese government and to criticise Chinese policy.146
For the Americans, British intelligence from Hanoi was chiefly about the impact of the
bombing campaign. Lacking its own observers on the ground in North Vietnam, the US government
struggled in its efforts to analyse the effects of the air raids, and its attempts at assessment were
described as ‘merely perfunctory’ as late as 1972. Known as the ‘Hanoi watchers’, the nearest US
intelligence observers were based in Saigon, and relied on weak sources – interrogations of prisoners
of war, radio broadcasts, and newspapers filtered out of Vietnam - some obtained by the British
Consul-General - to gauge the impact on North Vietnamese society. Without input from reliable
human sources, evidence was ‘thin and slow’ and often outdated.147 An appraisal of the bombing of
North Vietnam in 1965, for example, cited regional press reports, aerial photography (which the
reported conceded was not always available), and most unreliably, North Vietnamese regime
propaganda as its sources. American assertions that propaganda statements nevertheless ‘probably
reflect current Hanoi estimates of the situation’, highlights the painful lack of first hand reports. 148
The observations of the British Consuls-General therefore provided valuable insights into the
effects of the air war. For example, Stewart’s comments on the impact of US bombing upon Haiphong
in October 1967, using two of his human sources, were typical of the material forwarded to both the
CIA and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). The CIA and DIA worked together to produce a
regular assessment of “Rolling Thunder”, fusing aerial photography with allied diplomatic
reporting.149 Describing the destruction of the city as having ‘the air of a European city which had
suffered general bombardment during the last war’, and the ‘great fortitude’ of the population in face
146 Kear, ‘The British Consulate-General in Hanoi’, p. 232.
147 National Archives at College Park, MD, Henry S. Bradsher, ‘The Hanoi Watchers’, The
Washington Star, 25 May 1972, Records of the Central Intelligence Agency, CREST Database.
148 Ibid, ‘An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam’, 1965, Records of the Central Intelligence
Agency, CREST Database.
149 CIA/DIA, 'An Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam' (through 12 September 1966),
0240817016, Larry Berman Collection. Texas Tech Archives.
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of such destruction, Stewart’s despatch made its way up to Walt Rostow, US National Security
Advisor.150 Similar material was often read by President Johnson himself.
President Johnson often requested more detailed intelligence on the impact of the air raids.
Operation ‘Rolling Thunder’ was an expression of Johnson’s policy of ‘gradualism’, but also the
subject of constant argument in the National Security Council (NSC). Aware that in late 1966, air
raids near Hanoi had effectively terminated North Vietnamese interest in making contact through
diplomatic channels (known as the peace initiative ‘Marigold’), Johnson agonised over devising a
policy that would pressure the North Vietnamese, but without risking targets that might jeopardise
negotiations.151 In addition to avoiding civilian casualties, he also strove to avoid inflaming political
tensions with the Soviets and Chinese to prevent escalation into a wider war. The resultant
‘gradualism’ campaign comprised targets confined to areas away from major cities, interspersed with
self-imposed ‘sanctuaries’ (areas of no-fire) and bombing pauses.152 A commentary by Rostow for the
President on ‘the extracts you wanted on life in North Vietnam’,153 underlined the importance of the
British intelligence reports from central Hanoi as a means of assessing the broader impact of his
gradualism campaign.
Typically, in May 1967, Rostow asked Director of Central Intelligence, Richard Helms, for a
detailed report from Colvin on the effects of the bombing of a power plant in Hanoi to give to the
President.154 The following day, Johnson was given a first-hand account of the raid by ‘a somewhat
aggrieved’ Consul-General on the disruption of power and water supplies in Hanoi, stating that ‘every
other town in North Vietnam is in even worse shape and bombing is unlikely to reduce infiltration, let
150 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, ‘Report from H.M. Consul-General, Hanoi:
Visits to Haiphong in Mid-October’, Stewart (Hanoi) to FCO (London).
151 Wayne Thompson, To Hanoi and Back: the United States Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-73,
(Washington DC, 2000), p. 43.
152 Ibid, p. 25. According to Thompson, no other President had involved himself to such an extent in
the selection of targets and bombing tactics, especially when compared to the military’s
recommendations.
153 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, Rostow (White House) to Johnson (White
House), 31 August 1967.
154 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, Brown (White House) to Johnson (White
House), 21 May 1967.
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alone bring this peasant nation to negotiate’.155 This raid took place on 19 May 1967. Colvin was
standing on the balcony of the Consulate with his Vice-Consul, Geoffrey Livesey, as air raid alarms
sounded. Seven or eight F-105 Thunderchiefs shot across their vision at roof-top height, seeming ‘so
close we could almost touch them or call out to the pilots’. Although the British did not usually
inspect the results of air raids - this could easily open them up to claims of acting as ‘spotters’ for the
US Air Force - in this instance, the target was so near that they could not resist a look. It seemed
heavily damaged beyond repair, but, surprisingly, the following day the power returned to that area of
Hanoi. This supported Colvin’s general view that the raids were not yet at an intensity to overcome
North Vietnam’s resourcefulness or determination.156 As Rostow observed to Johnson, Colvin’s
reporting showed ‘what the bombing of Haiphong and Hanoi is really like - - with all due respect to
intelligence analysts 10,000 miles away’.157
What intrigued Johnson and Rostow were the little things.158 Colvin’s observations on savings
programmes or the ‘Campaign against Decadent Youth’ constituted compelling indicators of the
performance of the Vietnamese economy and societal cohesion during wartime.159 American overhead
photography was plentiful, but it could not capture intangible but important subjects such as morale,
war weariness, and the degree of acquiescence to political leadership amongst the Vietnamese
population. British reports also allowed for limited validation of American intelligence. For example,
a report by Stewart detailing the ‘social evils’ present within Hanoi, such as ‘prostitution, teddy boys,
and black marketeers’ reinforced a report by the US Ambassador in Saigon that drew to Rostow’s
attention rising rates of prostitution and teenage crime as one index of the effectiveness of the
155 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, Rostow (White House) to Johnson (White
House), 22 May 1967; LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, Colvin (Hanoi) to FCO
(London), Tel. 338, Colvin (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 22 May 1967.
156 John Clark Pratt (ed.) Vietnam Voices: Perspectives on the War Years, 1941-1975 (Georgia, 2008),
pp. 266-9.
157 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, Rostow (White House) to Johnson (White
House), 7 October 1967.
158 TNA, FCO 15/524, ‘Hanoi Observations’, Stewart (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 27 September 1968;
LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, ‘Hanoi Observations’, Stewart (Hanoi) to FCO
(London), 23 August 1968.
159 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, ‘British Reports from Hanoi - Effect of
Bombings’, American Embassy (Saigon) to Department of State (Washington), 9 June 1967.
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bombing campaign.160 Social observations were supplemented by copies of Vietnamese newspapers
and publications scooped up in Hanoi and sent out via the diplomatic bag. The main customers for this
material were ‘a multiplicity of more or less esoteric American agencies’.161
British intelligence reports were also saturated with information of military value. The ability
of the British officers to circulate around Hanoi - what Colvin termed the ‘continual investigation à
pied’ of Hanoi - elucidated images of a town gearing itself towards protracted warfare.162 Through the
extensive mobilisation of women for the war effort or census checks on the civilian population (in
relation to draft-dodging/desertion), the various forays of the Consul-Generals around Hanoi provided
glimpses into the fabric of a society under the duress of war.163 During a casual stroll through Thong
Nhat Park in Hanoi, Stewart discovered that ‘shabby peasant huts of wood and leaves’ were in fact
concealing anti-aircraft batteries, wireless masts, and signal cables.164 A similar walk in the Zoological
Gardens inadvertently placed Stewart and his deputy in a prime position to watch an air raid on a key
bridge in Hanoi. Observing that the ‘SAMs (surface to air missiles) seemed to be a good deal less
effective than the A.A.’ (anti-aircraft batteries), Stewart witnessed the shooting down of five US
planes, and two parachutes descending.165 Stewart also reported having seen special scoreboards
around Hanoi advertising the results of what they called the ‘battle for Hanoi’.166 Harston, one of
Park’s successors, remarked that despite being limited to a two kilometre radius of Hanoi, key routes
still yielded insightful clues; one of his five routes passed rubbish bins outside the military hospital,
160 TNA, FCO 15/524, ‘Hanoi Observations’, Stewart (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 27 September 1968;
LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, Note to Rostow (White House), 11 July 1968; LBJ
Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, Bunker (Saigon) to Rusk (Washington), July 1968.
161 TNA, FCO 15/578, ‘Vietnamese Publication Procurement’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Murray (London),
27 November 1967.
162 Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 38, 65.
163 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 257, Ponsonby (Hanoi) to FCO (London), 13 May
1965; LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 257, ‘Hanoi Observations’, Stewart (Hanoi) to
FCO (London), 23 August 1968; LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, ‘Hanoi
Observations’, Stewart (Hanoi) to FCO (London) 4 July 1968.
164 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, ‘Hanoi Observations’, Stewart (Hanoi) to FCO
(London), (no date).
165 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 85, Stewart (Hanoi) to Brown (London), 27 October
1967.
166 TNA, FCO 15/524, ‘Final Observations after Twelve Months in Hanoi’, Stewart (Hanoi) to Stewart
(London), 27 September 1968.
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giving him a good estimate of the number of soldiers being recruited ‘just by counting the syringes
used for inoculations’.167
Additionally, scouring the local newspapers for information, which in itself was an integral
daily part of the Consul-General’s routine, yielded figures such as the daily count of the number of
American planes shot down - though, the Vietnamese tendency to inflate these figures somewhat
skewed their value - and a discussion of the movement of Chinese troops closer to the DRVN
border.168 Moreover another of interest to the US was information on US prisoners of war. The main
North Vietnamese holding centre for prisoners of war was Hoa Lo prison – just a short stroll away
from the Consulate, whilst another location, Son Tay prisoner, was around twenty miles from the
centre of Hanoi, at which the US had supposedly attempted to conduct a rescue attempt not long after
Park’s return to London in November 1970.169 In conjunction with British signals intelligence
provided from Hong Kong, the on-the-ground reports contributed to a clearer picture of Hanoi’s
military activities, and as Young has suggested, may have even helped the US to plan their military
operations.170
Anglo-American Divergence
Sharing intelligence did not mean shared outlooks or shared policies. Colvin consistently
expressed his apprehension at the US achieving any sort of success in its bombing campaign.171
According to him, the air raids had not ‘decisively affected the economy or the strategic capacity’ of
the DRVN, nor had they increased resistance amongst ordinary Vietnamese.172 Stewart echoed this
167 Hayes, Queen of Spies, p. 224.
168 Sophie Quinn-Judge, ‘The Ideological Debate in the DRV and the Significance of the Anti-Party
Affair, 1967-68’, Cold War History, 5:4 (2005), 486; LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box
34, Tel. 63, Stewart (Hanoi, via Maclehose) to FCO (London), 27 June 1968.
169 Hayes, Queen of Spies, pp. 232-233.
170 Young, ‘The Wilson Government and the Davies Peace Mission to North Vietnam’, p. 73.
171 Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 42, 84.
172 Ibid, pp. 52-53; TNA, FCO 15/555, ‘H.M. Consul-General, Hanoi, Murray to de la Mare, 2 June
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theme, and did not perceive any fundamental change before or after the remarkable Tet Offensive in
February 1968. Tet was one of the largest-scale military campaigns to take place during the conflict,
initiated by the North Vietnamese Army. Although the offensive inflicted heavy casualties on the
North Vietnamese, it was a huge psychological blow to the South Vietnamese and American forces,
and induced a halt in the US bombing campaign. Stewart was well placed to gauge the possibility of
talks in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, and believed that the DRVN’s supposed willingness to
enter into talks was little more than a ‘semantic exercise’. Rostow agreed with Stewart’s ‘grim, but
possibly realistic assessment’ that the DRVN leadership had disguised its true intentions of being
prepared to settle for a protracted war, for which…‘they are fully prepared at whatever continuing
sacrifice’.173
Colvin, Stewart, and their successors, perhaps under-rated their importance in
counterbalancing the American quantitative approach to estimating the war in and around the North
Vietnamese capital. Light-heartedly labelling himself the ‘forward observation officer’ for the US Air
Force in Hanoi, Stewart was at the same time wary that the critical tone of his reports placed him at
odds with the US defence and intelligence communities reading his material.174 Wary that his ‘one-
man band’ differed in its assessments to those of the US civil, military and intelligence apparatus,
Stewart conceded that his reports were unlikely to receive the same weight or consideration if they
differed significantly from those of staff in Saigon, Singapore and Washington. From both his own
impressions, and sources who had passed through other towns in North Vietnam, Colvin’s perception
of a resilient and resourceful population (especially in the aftermath of air raids) ran counter to US
beliefs that the air raids would eventually defeat a technologically inferior adversary.175 Similarly, in
Stewart’s mind, the US approach to counting enemy casualties, the number of raids carried out, or the
amount of installations damaged was fruitless in comparison to what he was able to provide - an
‘analysis of the mind of the people’ in Hanoi.176
173 LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 95, Rostow (White House) to Johnson (White
House), 14 February 1968; LBJ Library, NSF: Vietnam Country File, Box 95, Tel. 90, Stewart
(Hanoi) to FCO (London), 13 February 1968.
174 Stewart, Scrapbook of a Roving Highlander, pp. 233-235.
175 Colvin, Twice Around the World, p. 106.
176 Stewart, Scrapbook of a Roving Highlander, pp. 233-235.
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Collectively, the British intelligence flowing from Hanoi supported what Colvin termed the
‘implacability thesis’.177 Given Vietnam’s history of resistance to foreign rule, for Colvin, the
hardened attitude of the DRVN leadership and the grit of the broader population pointed to a country
that had ‘made war a way of life’.178179 Similarly, in his final despatch from Hanoi in 1971, Liudzius
expressed doubt that the DRVN would opt for a negotiated settlement, insisting that its people were
‘resigned to the prospect of a protracted struggle’ rather than surrender.180 Stewart even went as far as
to argue that the US air campaign had in fact fuelled the DRVN propaganda machine through the
sighting of US planes over Hanoi. Up until 1964, he observed, the enemy was ‘an unseen and
unknown figure in South Vietnam whose deeds and very existence were perhaps unreal’. But the
manifestation of US planes over Hanoi had inadvertently provided a symbol against which the DRVN
were able to rally the population.181
The critical tone of the British reports was emblematic of a broader tension at play in the
special relationship. Dumbrell, Ellis, and Jeffreys-Jones have argued that a high degree of
‘transatlantic antagonism’ was palpable over Vietnam.182 Britain’s ongoing economic decline -
accelerated by its decolonisation process, military overstretch, and a struggling economy - had
effectively relegated Britain to the role of junior partner in the ‘special relationship’. According to
Dumbrell and Ellis, both countries were well aware that the power differential between them
continued to grow, underlined in Rusk’s statement that ‘the concept of Atlantic cooperation could
177 TNA, FCO 15/648, ‘Escalation as Seen from Hanoi’, Colvin (Hanoi) to Brown (London), 7 April
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replace the special relationship’.183 As Dumbrell has argued, as the twentieth century progressed, a
continued close alliance was predicated on an increasingly narrow base of defence and intelligence
co-operation.184
Studies of Anglo-American relations in foreign policy during the 1960s have tended to focus
on the nuclear deterrent, NATO, and Europe.185 Yet, Britain’s military non-involvement in Vietnam
was a significant point of contention with the Americans, at a time when Anglo-American relations
were already characterised as being in a ‘negative and distrustful state’.186 Both Wilson and Johnson
faced intense domestic pressure respectively; the former was under fire from strong internal
opposition, which criticised what it regarded as Britain’s contradictory policy in Vietnam, whilst the
latter grappled with a host of objections from both the policymaking elite in Washington and the
general public.187 The result was intense disagreement between two leaders as to the best course of
action in Vietnam. Moreover, Johnson believed that Britain was not fulfilling its obligations as a
member of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and no longer attached ‘any real
importance’ to the UK’s co-chairmanship of the ICC.188
By contrast, from the British perspective, Johnson’s political isolation over Vietnam was self-
inflicted. Wilson saw an inherent contradiction in the US’s military campaign, maintaining that the air
raids – and the US’s choice of military targets in particular – ran counter to Johnson’s ultimate
intended objective: a negotiated settlement.189 These tensions surfaced most clearly in the US
bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in 1966, in which, in a statement to the House of Commons, Wilson
183 Ibid, p. 115. Jonathan Colman, ‘Communication: ‘What Now for Britain?’ The State Department’s
Assessment of the ‘Special Relationship’, 7th February 1968’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 19:2 (2008),
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sought to distance the UK from the US’s tactics in Vietnam.190 Regarded by the Americans as a
public show of disunity from its closest ally, the statement did little other than exacerbate existing
tensions. Already infuriated that its closest ally was prepared to ‘share advice, but not responsibility’,
Johnson made clear his disapproval at Britain’s dissociation. As Dumbrell and Ellis make clear, rather
than aiding London’s credentials, Britain’s non-combatant status called in question Wilson’s good
faith when it came to diplomacy.191
The tension festered, and London’s frustration grew at its omission from various US
initiatives. In March 1965, London found that it was not informed about the US’ plans to use gas in
Vietnam – a policy it ‘vehemently opposed’.192 Furthermore, despite numerous British attempts to
broker peace deals, the Johnson administration repeatedly negated its efforts. Importantly, Britain was
excluded from the main US diplomatic peace effort known as Operation Marigold in 1966, in which
the Poles acted as intermediaries for talks with the North Vietnamese regime. To London’s vexation,
this undermined Wilson’s own peace efforts via Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin.193 Taking place in
London between November 1966 and February 1967, the Wilson-Kosygin initiative fell through due
to a change of conditions demanded by Washington at the very last minute. Although the reasons
behind this are disputed – Dumbrell and Ellis, for example, consider it a ‘deliberate sabotage’ of
Wilson’s initiative194 - it was clear that the US had side-lined Britain within the confines of the special
relationship.
As Logevall has argued, despite significant reservations about the US’s tactics, Wilson saw
little value in challenging Washington over its policies over Vietnam.195 He therefore sought to pursue
a dual-track strategy: Britain would provide its ally with strong diplomatic support and promote a
190 TNA, PREM 13//1274. The sheer intensity and extent of Whitehall’s deliberation over the wording
of Wilson’s statement reflected quite the predicament. Wilson was caught between defending UK
values, internal political opposition, and supporting its most important ally.
191 Dumbrell and Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives’, p. 120.
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193 Remarks of Matthew Jones and James Hershberg, ‘Negotiating While Fighting’, pp. 9-20. Ibid,
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negotiated settlement, whilst also seeking to influence the US by criticising its military tactics, thus
seeking to limit their scope.196 In this context, passing on the Hanoi material was key, not simply in
influencing the Americans, but in restoring Britain’s credibility in the broader relationship. This did
not go unnoticed amongst Foreign Office officials, who observed that the primary aim of the reporting
was to ensure that ‘what we regard as sensible and balanced material is getting into American
deliberations’.197 However, this also implied a degree of reciprocity; Murray noted that the material
was also to ‘encourage the Americans in Saigon to give us information about their activities as a quid
pro quo’, whilst Gordon hinted that passing on the material was ‘to be forthcoming with the
Americans in order to encourage them to be forthcoming with us’.198 This sentiment was echoed in a
vital letter by Nigel Trent, who suggested that London’s best option was to keep the Americans in a
‘frame of mind in which they assume it to be worthwhile to keep up the dialogue with us about
Vietnam’.199
Yet, London harboured reservations about precisely which Hanoi material to pass to
Washington. Colvin’s reporting was being passed on to US officials at a time of fierce internal
political debate between ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ over strategy in Vietnam. Consequently, the FCO feared
that particular despatches might become ‘an admittedly small weapon’ in American hands, with each
side ‘claiming Colvin’s views in support of their own’.200 Moreover, commenting from the British
Embassy in Washington, Gilmore observed that along with the possibility of ‘selected extracts’
finding their way to the anti-bombing lobby in the US Congress, there was a danger of Colvin ‘being
cited in a Congressional squabble’.201 These risks extended into the public sphere; Trench expressed
wariness that the US press were ‘obviously digging around’ for Colvin’s estimates of bomb damage in
Hanoi. At the height of Operation Rolling Thunder, Dean reported to London a Washington Post
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edition that carried a ‘fairly prominent report from London’ that Colvin had been instructed to prepare
a detail analysis of the US bombing raids in and near Hanoi.202
London therefore found itself in a delicate position; it was imperative to prevent Colvin’s
identity – and those of his sources – from being leaked in public,203 whilst still passing his reports on
to the US. Official secrecy thus became an important consideration, especially given the varying
standards of different US institutions – the US military, for example, tended to distribute material on a
‘flood principle’ (high numbers of copies to multiple agencies), thus diluting the ‘need to know’ basis
of circulation. Given the political context, intelligence about the effects of the bombing was being
‘bandied about in a heated inter-agency dispute’ in Washington, which Colvin’s reports risked
becoming embroiled in. Furthermore, the leaking of his reports threatened to undermine Britain’s
policy of discreetly exerting pressure upon the US to minimise the scope of its military activities.
London therefore sought to avoid ‘prejudicing any flexibility which the Secretary of State may wish to
retain on the issue’, by surreptitiously withholding certain reports from American hands.204 The
Consul-General thus had the authority to indicate to London which documents to withhold, by
marking them ‘Guard’ in transmission (as well as to protect sources).205
In this regard, evidence of bomb damage in Hanoi was a particularly sensitive issue. Avoiding
casualties was a key calculation in Wilson’s decision to dissociate the UK from the US air raids over
Hanoi and Haiphong, and this lent even greater weight to Colvin’s post-raid reporting in late 1966 as
Operation Rolling Thunder was underway. Countering the US State Department’s assessments of the
air raids, Colvin detailed the resulting structural damage, such as a raid on 13th December 1966, which
destroyed part of the wing of a local high school, the university, and ‘a hamlet on the river bank
totally destroyed by fire’. Most importantly, his reports of casualties were a key point of consternation
202 TNA, FO 371/186354, Dean (Washington) to FCO (London), Tel. no. 3509, 30th December 1966.
203 TNA, FCO 15/570, Murray (London) to Gordon (Saigon), 24th July 1967. Murray noted that in
passing the Americans the reports, and receiving information in return, a key concern was to protect
Colvin’s position, and to ensure there was not chance that his reports would be leaked to the press.
204 Ibid, Trench (British Embassy, Washington) to Murray (London), 28th March 1967, ‘Vietnam:
Reporting from Hanoi’.
205 Ibid, Gordon (Saigon) to Murray (London), 25th January 1967, ‘Extract from Minute Saigon, 16th
December, 1966’.
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between London and Washington. In a raid on 8th December, he reported back figures of 187
casualties, including nine women and eleven children killed.206
His reports placed him at odds with the US leadership, especially over what caused the
casualties; Rusk, for example, denied in his press statements any allegations that US ordnance fell
over Hanoi, though he did note expended ordnance being dropped. By contrast, in a despatch that was
passed onto the State Department, Colvin maintained that some of the damage and casualties were
caused by air-to-ground rockets exploding in civilian areas, and that the damage to the high school
was caused by bombs, either by pilot error or in reply to anti-aircraft fire’.207 Furthermore, Colvin’s
on-the-ground reporting highlighted the limits of the US’s reliance upon technical intelligence. On
occasion, the US was unable to answer questions the British Foreign Secretary posed over civilian
casualty estimates, because in some instances, smoke in target areas following the strikes prevented
post-strike photography by US planes.208 Yet, Colvin’s positioning at the centre of the raids was such
that he was able to observe the impact first-hand; he described witnessing parts of a rocket with the
marking still on in the damaged Rumanian Embassy, and validated reporting by a French journalist on
the extent of destruction in towns such as Yen Vien or Gia Lam.209 Lastly, Colvin’s observations also
captured the more aggressive aspect of the US’s air raids. Noting in one instance that US aircraft flew
above the area for forty-five minutes without touching the obvious military targets, he concluded that
the targets were so small and of such risk to aircraft that high, that the motive could only have been
‘deliberate warning of worse to come’ if Hanoi continued the war.210
One of Colvin’s most astute despatches advised London of the DRVN’s most effective means
of undermining the US political campaign: through attacking morale. In addition to its military
campaign, the DRVN sought to undermine the US politically, by corroding its relationship with its
population and, crucially, its allies. Central to this long-term effort was an ‘exposé of the results of
American bombing’ – of which casualties were key. Writing to London, Colvin felt obliged to express
206 TNA, FO 371/186354, Colvin (Hanoi) to FCO (London), Tel. no. 246, 8th December 1966.
207 Ibid, Colvin (Hanoi) to FCO (London), Tel. no. 257, 19th December 1966.
208 Ibid, ‘United States Telegram’.
209 Ibid, Colvin (Hanoi) to FCO (London), Tel. no. 257, 19th December 1966; Colvin (Hanoi) to FCO
(London), Tel. no. 282, 30th December 1966.
210 Ibid, Colvin (Hanoi) to FCO (London), Tel. no. 282, 30th December 1966.
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his belief that ‘there have been instances for American carelessness’, which would be easy for the
North Vietnamese to ‘exploit to uncommitted observers’ and hard for the Americans to defend.211
Wilson’s dissociation of the UK from the US bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong would therefore have
played into Hanoi’s hands. Indeed, this sentiment was not lost on observers within the British
Embassy in Washington. Though written somewhat derisively, Gilmore stated to the FCO his
observation that the ‘row’ going on in both Washington and internationally over the raids was a
‘testimonial to the excellence of the advice to the North Vietnamese authorities’ described in Colvin’s
despatch.212
Because of these tensions, intelligence from Hanoi was about rivalry as well as co-operation.
Numerous instances arose in which London decided against passing on the Hanoi material to the
Americans, owing to a combination of political and security reasons. For example, Trench made
mention of material withheld from Washington about the presence of Cubans in North Vietnam;
political circumstances at the time suggested that the information ‘might blow back on us in the
context of British-flag shipping to North Vietnam’. Similarly, he pointed to other withheld letters that
contained information of lesser value, though still ‘just the stuff of which subaltern gossip is made’.
Trench also sought to ensure that London was careful about its allies – he underscored the importance
of not passing on material that showed the French, Indians, or Canadians ‘in a mischievous role’, not
to protect them, but to protect the UK by preventing blowback. Interestingly, the same applied for the
actions of US citizens, in case of being swept up ‘in some contentious security case’.
Ultimately, passing on the Hanoi material was constantly assessed against a reading of
temperament in Washington.213 Caution at how the reports’ occasional ambiguous tone might be
exploited in political circles determined that several of Colvin’s reports were not exchanged with
Washington. This was due to the fact that they ‘certainly stimulated interest…if only for the questions
211 TNA, FO 371/186345, Colvin (Hanoi) to Brown MP (London), Despatch no. 6, 22nd November
1966.
212 Ibid, Gilmore (British Embassy, Washington) to Waterstone (FCO), 14th December 1966,
‘Bombing of North Vietnam’.
213 TNA, FCO 15/570, Trench (British Embassy, Washington) to Murray (London), 28th March 1967,
‘Vietnam: Reporting from Hanoi’.
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it has left unanswered’.214 Commenting on one of Colvin’s despatches about the DRVN’s intentions
and morale, for example, Dean decided not to pass the despatch on, because it risked giving some
Americans ‘misleading ideas of what is in our own minds, without bearing on possibilities which have
any real interest in Washington’.215 Because these same despatches were drawn upon ‘heavily’ in
drafting the briefs for the British Secretary of State’s visit to Moscow in 1967, as well as British JIC
assessments on the effects of US air raids on North Vietnamese morale, it is quite likely that London
enjoyed a more accurate appreciation of the real impact of Operation “Rolling Thunder” than
Washington.216217
The Value of Secret Intelligence
Despite Britain’s instrumental use of intelligence, a good proportion of the material was passed to
Washington. What were termed ‘relatively straightforward letters’ from Hanoi were despatched to the
State Department, the US Information Agency, and the CIA ‘at about Director level’. More sensitive
material, such as the reports of bomb damage, ‘we brought ourselves, one copy only’ to the State
Department, then considered the safest pair of hands and the most concerned.218
Interestingly, in an incident following the expulsion of a Canadian intelligence officer from
Hanoi, an opportunity presented itself to London. Noting that the combination of publicity on
Canadian reports from North Vietnam – some of which quoted Colvin directly as a source219 - along
with the officer’s expulsion would have dried up the flow of Canadian material to the Americans, this
had implications for any material that London might want to pass on to Washington – ‘with a
214 Ibid, Murray (London) to Wilford (British Emb., Washington), 10th October 1967.
215 TNA, FCO 15/648, Dean (Washington) to FCO (London), Tel. no. 1686, 19th May 1967.
216 Ibid, Fyjis-Walker (London) to Colvin (Hanoi), 18 May 1967.
217 Priest and Hughes, ‘American and British Intelligence on South Vietnam’, p. 199. Priest and
Hughes argue similarly; their comparative piece on American and British strategic intelligence
assessments of South Vietnam arrives at the ‘curious position’ that owing to primarily political and
institutional factors, the Joint Intelligence Committee’s assessment 63(20) seemed ‘more accurate – or
at least more prescient’ than the National Intelligence Estimate 53-63.
218 Ibid, Trench (British Embassy, Washington) to Murray (London), 28 March 1967.
219 TNA, FCO, 15/570, Gordon (Saigon) to Murray (London), 29th August 1967.
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predisposition to try and give the State Department rather more than at present’.220 The implications
for intelligence exchange were clear. By providing the Americans with first-hand intelligence ‘from a
place where they had no representation of their own’, operating on the principle of ‘maximum
transmission’ elevated Britain’s status as an intelligence partner, if not a diplomatic one.221
Crucially, Colvin was invited to the American Embassy in Saigon for consultations.222 The
Saigon embassy also housed one of the largest CIA stations in the world, and it was clear that the
invitation was another means of garnering intelligence on Hanoi that the Americans were unable to
attain otherwise. In a key consultation with Saigon in mid-December 1966, Colvin discussed political
and military developments in Hanoi, such as the North Vietnamese leadership’s attitudes towards the
bombing campaign, access to the Hanoi elite and a move towards guerrilla warfare tactics in the
South.223 It was clear that political attitudes, influence, and strategy were all elements that the
American intelligence machine was unable to capture, above all without its own personnel at the heart
of Hanoi. When Ambassador Eugene Locke, one of Lyndon B. Johnson’s close personal friends,
reported to him from Saigon in November 1967, the entire section about Hanoi was based on a
conversation with Stewart who had just replaced Colvin.224
Significantly, upon their return to London, the Consul-Generals were also invited to
Washington for further consultations. Most notably, they were received at CIA headquarters in
Langley, VA, where in addition to being consulted by middle-ranking officers (both operations and
intelligence), they met with the Director of Central Intelligence. Described by one former Consul-
General as being like ‘thirsty people with nothing to drink’, the level of detail requested by the CIA
was revealing. They sought information on virtually all aspects of North Vietnamese life, including
minute details on rations, morale, the historical background of the Vietnamese, their habits, and their
220 Ibid, Gilmore (Washington) to Murray (London), 29th September 1967, ‘Canadian Reports from
Hanoi’.
221 Ibid, Gordon (Saigon) to Murray (London), 12th April 1967, ‘Reporting from Hanoi’.
222 It is worth noting that the FCO did not arrange briefings itself – all correspondence happened via
the British Ambassador in Saigon. Stewart, in discussion with the author, 2014.
223 Ibid, American Embassy (Saigon) to State Department (Washington), Airgram No. A-342, 14
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resistance to the foreign invader. Curiously, this took precedence over information about the bombing
campaign, which was left more to the remit of the US Navy.225
As we have seen, London was not beyond holding intelligence back from Washington.
Colvin’s view that Hanoi was implacable in the face of American airpower suited London well, given
that Wilson wanted a cessation to the bombing. But on 8 August 1967, Colvin sent an uncharacteristic
despatch suggesting North Vietnam might be beginning to crack under the strain of the increasing
bombardment. Most of the senior diplomats in Hanoi had fled and were officially ‘absent or about to
depart on leave’, including the Bulgarian, Cuban, Czech, Hungarian, Pathet Lao, Polish, Rumanian
and Soviet Representatives. The Chinese and Indonesian representatives had also been absent for
months. This was an ‘indication of the seriousness with which the DRVN’s communist allies regard
the present juncture’, accompanied by substantive medical evidence that between 60% and 90% of
children were now showing signs of malnutrition.226
This momentary aberration in Colvin’s reporting promoted intense discussion in London.
Should this despatch be given to the Americans? The effect on the Americans would ‘be to confirm
them in their belief that their bombing policy is on the right track and they should keep on with it’,
observed Fyjis-Walker in London. ‘This, of course, will produce political difficulties here’. He
envisaged the Americans quoting Colvin back at their Ministers in support of the air war. The
question drifted upwards to Sir Arthur De la Mare, the Assistant Under-Secretary who superintended
Asia, who deemed that it should be withheld.227 Britain’s Washington Embassy was sent an immediate
message telling them: ‘You should not, repeat not, show Hanoi Despatch No.7 to the Americans’.228229
Colvin later joked that these Foreign Office officials had ‘lost the Vietnam War’ because they had
refused to show the Americans his despatch claiming that the North Vietnamese were about to crack
225 Personal information.
226 TNA, FCO 15/481, Despatch No. 7, Colvin (Hanoi) to Brown (London), August 1967.
227 TNA, FCO 15/481, ‘Vietnam: Hanoi Despatch No. 7’, Fyjis-Walker, 18 August 1967; FCO
15/481, minute, de la Mare, 21 August 1967.
228 Ibid, ‘Teine 9125’, London to Washington, 21 August 1967.
229 A similar withholding of a despatch to the Americans can be found in FCO 15/648, which detailed
Colvin’s impression of North Vietnamese views of the war’s escalation.
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under American bombing.' In fact, later reporting suggested the North Vietnamese were ready to
evacuate their capital and move ‘up country’ to continue the war if necessary.230
Oddly, Colvin’s greatest intelligence success was against the Americans. In late 1966, he
uncovered the fact that unknown to the British, the Americans had been continuing elaborate secret
talks on Vietnam, known as ‘Operation Marigold’, thus undermining the parallel efforts by the Wilson
government. The New York Times journalist Harrison Salisbury inadvertently gave the game away to
Colvin after his own private discussion with the Vietnamese Prime Minster Phm Van Dong. This
embarrassed Rusk, who apologised to Wilson at length. Wilson was advised by his Private Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, Michael Palliser, that ‘it is quite clear that if Rusk's hand had not been forced by
the fact that Harrison Salisbury has talked to our man in Hanoi (Colvin) about these exchanges with
North Vietnamese Ministers, we should still know nothing of the exchanges ... that have been going
on for the last six months'. He added: 'I think the Foreign Secretary will have good reason to feel
pretty aggrieved at the way he has been treated by Rusk'. Palliser thought that Colvin had uncovered
‘a rather gloomy story of muddle, lack of confidence, and incompetence' by the Americans.231
However, Wilson was not telling Washington everything either. A month later, he explained to the
Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin that Britain in effect had North Vietnamese 'representatives' in
London masquerading as press reporters. Wilson stayed in touch with them via his own Parliamentary
Private Secretary, Ernest Fernyhough, who was 'an old friend of Ho Chi Minh's'. Kosygin observed
that he thought Colvin’s presence in Hanoi was ‘a good thing'.232
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The value of the British intelligence was clear, and duly conveyed by the American
leadership. In 1971, the US Ambassador wrote to the UK Secretary of State on the instructions of the
US Secretary of State William Rogers wishing to express his appreciation for Liudzius’ reporting
from Hanoi, stating that this had ‘added considerably to our knowledge about North Vietnam’.234
Commenting upon this letter, Douglas-Home remarked that the Americans had, ‘on many occasions’
informally expressed how valued the Hanoi reports were, described as ‘one of their few first-hand
sources of information’ on life in North Vietnam.235 However, the consultations were what turned out
to be subject of the most praise. London was constantly wary that were the Americans to discover any
omissions from the Hanoi material, or indeed, were the reports to cease being passed on altogether,
then it should expect relations with the Americans to ‘suffer accordingly’. Remarkably, Gordon added
that same would apply, were London to ‘keep John Colvin away from the Americans’ during his trips
to Saigon.236 The value of the Consul-Generals was such that Arch Calhoun, Minister Counsellor for
Political Affairs at the US Embassy in Saigon, had reiterated to Gordon ‘how much they valued the
opportunity’ to talk Colvin, adding that the information was ‘very useful to the small number of
people in the American Embassy who saw it’ – the latter most likely being CIA officers.237
Yet as Young has emphasised, Vietnam was not a British foreign policy priority, and was
treated accordingly in the Foreign Office. 238 The British Consulate-General in Hanoi therefore
confronts us with two curious paradoxes. First, a small and beleaguered outpost that was little cared
for in London held a greater significance for the Americans and the prosecution of their war; even
FCO officials acknowledged that Britain’s role in Vietnam was ‘eroded’ by its support of US
policy.239 Yet, Vietnam was a British concern insofar as it constituted a delicate issue in Anglo-
American relations. Indeed, as Priest and Hughes note, Britain was not directly involved in the war;
British intelligence therefore provided a British perspective ‘on a largely American problem’ as well
234 TNA, FCO 15/1474, Annenberg (London) to Douglas-Home (London), 1 December 1971.
235 Ibid, Grattan (London) to Annenberg (US Amb., Washington), 8th December 1971.
236 TNA, FCO 15/570, Gordon (Saigon) to Murray (London), 12th April 1967, ‘Reporting from
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238 Young, ‘The Wilson Government and the Davies Peace Mission’, p. 87.
239 TNA, FO 371/186407, Shepherd, Hanoi, to de la Mare, London, May 1966.
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as on Britain’s principal ally itself.240 The peculiar position of the Consuls was reflected in the varying
levels of appreciation shown by their superiors. Stewart recalls that on his return to the UK, virtually
none of the Foreign Office staff took an interest in his activities in Hanoi.241 The only exception was
the Head of the South East Asia Department, Donald Murray, who expressed his gratitude for the
‘volume and quality’ of reporting since the revocation of cypher rights several months earlier.242 Yet,
both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary received the Consuls-General in London for
personal consultations, which was most unusual for any diplomat.243 Moreover, they were showered
with Americans messages of appreciation, including a fulsome letter from Rusk.244 As one FCO
official remarked, much of the value was knowing that ‘this Anglo-American liaison is appreciated at
a high level in the United States’.245
Second, the Consulate was revealing of the broader dynamics of what we might call the
‘inverse’ Special Relationship. John Tusa once stated that there were three categories of people who
searched for the truth in their work: academics, journalists, and diplomats. To this, one of the former
Consul-Generals added spies.246 At a time when Anglo-American relations were characterised by their
‘inherent complexity, secrecy, and indeed…by the tentativeness of contacts between Washington and
Hanoi’,247 the British intelligence was able to counterbalance broader tensions that plagued Britain’s
non-involvement in the ground war in Vietnam. Although limited in scope, the intelligence reaffirmed
the UK as a key ally; it ‘made the US feel we weren’t fighting, we were on the same side’.248 As one
of the Consul-Generals observed, the Hanoi Consulate effectively had Britain ‘punching above its
weight’, in the broader special relationship. In a conflict in which the US had committed one million
240 Priest and Hughes, ‘American and British Intelligence on South Vietnam’, pp. 183-184.
241 Stewart, interview with the author, 2013.
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troops, and the UK none, the intelligence to emerge from Hanoi was a contribution ‘totally impossible
to value’.249
In intelligence terms, the 1960s were regarded as a tumultuous period for MI6, with many
calling into question the utility of traditional intelligence gathering.250 GCHQ, computers and
technical intelligence were devouring more and more of the British budget.251 Sir Dick White, Chief
of MI6 during this period, believed that the survival of the service ‘depended upon its relationship
with Washington’, and so reporting from locations where the Americans lacked representation such as
Hanoi, Havana, and Peking took on a greater importance.252 MI6 officers in the Hanoi Consulate
underlined how Britain’s smaller outposts were able to some extent, to ‘offset the asymmetry’ of the
Special Relationship.253 Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence in the late 1960s, later
confirmed that the declining Anglo-American partnership was ‘saved’ by the ‘good advice’ offered by
a relatively small number of British diplomats and intelligence officers.254 Hanoi was also important
for MI6. It provided good internal diplomacy within Whitehall at a time of growing mistrust of
intelligence activity, especially by the CIA - something that was only intensified by Watergate.255
The Hanoi Consulate also represented a reversal of trends during the boom years of technical
intelligence collection, led by GCHQ and its sister organisation the US National Security Agency.
With this new global intelligence industry came growing professionalisation, and a perceived
separation from parallel activities, including diplomacy and military service. Yet we can now see that
conceiving of intelligence officers narrowly and only in terms of espionage can be problematic. As the
case of Hanoi showed, the stationing of British intelligence officers in diplomatic posts was valuable
in providing the West with ‘eyes and ears’ into North Vietnam. MI6 officers serving as Consul-
Generals operated in the twilight between diplomacy and intelligence, illustrating that intelligence
249 Ibid.
250 Corera, The Art of Betrayal, p. 133.
251 Richard J. Aldrich, ‘Counting the Cost of Intelligence: The Treasury, National Service and
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often has ‘untidy and sometimes artificial boundaries’.256 The information that was most valued was
part espionage, part diplomatic reporting, but also part sociological observation. In this case, the
blurring of these institutional boundaries was precisely what enabled valuable intelligence collection
where formal avenues were lacking. In October 1971, pondering why the British were still in Hanoi,
despite the growing counterintelligence obstacles erected by the DVRN, Consul-General Liudzius
captured the reason with limpid clarity: ‘...however dark the glass through which HM Consul-General
is obliged to peer, the post provides just about the only window which the Western world has on
events in North Vietnam’.257
256 Herman, ‘Diplomacy and Intelligence’, p. 6.
257 TNA, FCO 15/1474, ‘Some Reflections on a Year in Hanoi’, Liudzius (Hanoi) to Tomlinson
(London), October 1971.
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8.
Conclusion
Writing intelligence history has often invited the accusation of becoming the intellectual and political
prisoner of government. The release of officially-sanctioned histories, such as Jeffrey’s substantial
history of SIS, and the weighty study of MI5 by Chris Andrew,1 both produced for the purpose of
celebrating centenaries, generated considerable criticism along the lines of being too closely tied to
official documents provided by the institutions they served, whilst not incorporating wider sources.
This was especially true of the Jeffery volume which made little effort to engage with the considerable
SIS papers available at Kew.
More widely, Scott and Jackson, the leading figures at the respected centre for intelligence
studies at Aberystwyth, objected to the degree of ‘collaboration’ between academia and the British
intelligence agencies, emphasising the ‘sanctuary’ of objectivity that the ivory tower should provide
from official narratives. Similarly, Anthony Glees pointed to the risk of ‘whitewashing’ the more
nefarious aspects of such institutions and their pasts.2 Andrew himself discovered, to his considerable
irritation, that after security censorship by MI5, there was a further layer of deletions imposed by the
Cabinet Office on more political grounds before his manuscript was cleared.3 These criticisms
epitomise the tension that continues to characterise the researcher’s relationship with the archive, and
reliance upon official documents when it comes to studying a field as elusive as intelligence. Through
its examination of a lesser known area of British intelligence history, and by picking apart at
1 Andrew, Defend the Realm; Jeffrey, MI6. Goodman’s recent history of the JIC by contrast engages
widely with the material at Kew.
2 Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity’, pp. 46-47.
3 Jason Lewis and Tom Harper, ‘Revealed: How MI5 bugged 10 Downing Street, the Cabinet and at
least five Prime Ministers for 15 Years’, Daily Mail, 18 April 2010.
227
conventional categories that define the boundaries of intelligence, this thesis has sought to challenge
this assertion. The archive is too complex to be controlled by the ‘history police’, despite the best
efforts of government. By attacking neglected files and using new electronic methods to comb them, it
has ultimately sought to demonstrate the utility of uncovering a previously hidden facet of one of
Britain’s most secretive intelligence agencies, and to explore its implications in a broader context.
Reviewing the uneven landscape of the existing scholarship on intelligence, several
interlinked areas stand out that illustrate the necessity of new forays into British intelligence history.
Firstly, the Cold War history of the SIS is remarkably unknown, especially by contrast with its sister
service MI5. This is partly because the official history stops disappointedly in 1949, but also because
the SIS is not obliged to pass its records onto The National Archives at Kew – and indeed may never
do so. Although historians have discovered ways to circumvent such restrictions, as discussed in the
methodology, intelligence history as a sub-field increasingly gives attention to areas where the
authorities have seen fit to release documents, allowing government to steer scholarship in a way that
is unattractive, and possibly even unhealthy.
To some extent, intelligence history has been driven by public obsessions. The treachery of
the Cambridge Five and its resulting ‘molemania’ has gripped scholars for decades, and scholarly
attention has also focused on more accessible intelligence-related institutions, such as the Special
Operations Executive, or the wartime efforts of Bletchley Park. By contrast, as discussed in the
literature review chapter, SIS’s history lies in a fragmented, weaker condition. Although a cluster of
seminal pieces on SIS exist, these tend towards a generalised history of the agency; individual case
studies lack the depth that can challenge definitional categories or conventional norms as this thesis
has sought to do. The works of Dorril, Jeffrey, West, Davies, and Bower detail various episodes in
SIS’s history, but these are mostly narrow ‘regimental histories’ or biography without real evaluation
of SIS’s contribution to the bigger picture in which intelligence operated.4
4 Dorril, Inside the World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service; Jeffery, MI6: The History of
the Secret Intelligence Service; West, MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations; Davies,
MI6 and the Machinery of Spying: Structure and Process in Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service;
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Furthermore, the problematic geographical distribution of this scholarship cannot be
overlooked. Despite some work on British involvement in the Vietnam War (even then, attention is
cast upon South Vietnam, with little reference to North), evidence of SIS’s history is especially thin in
the Asian Cold War theatre.5 Seminal pieces fail to pick apart at SIS’s regional intelligence collection
efforts beyond the World Wars, and somewhat worryingly, the role of intelligence in regional
diplomatic negotiations and peace talks has been severely understudied. Whilst the same cannot be
said of GCHQ’s history in the region, of which there exists a greater depth of research, gaps still
remain; the volume of literature on Cold War signals intelligence in Asia is confined to a nucleus of
core pieces on Indonesia and Hong Kong, in addition to Aldrich’s broader history of Anglo-American
global signals intelligence, which lends some coverage to Asia. Again, the availability of sources is
very much a key factor; as previously discussed in the methodology chapter, the closure and retention
of certain high-level Foreign Office and Prime Ministerial files pertaining to Asia indicates a clear
degree of sensitivity over signals and human intelligence from these locations. Compared to the
Soviet Union, Europe and the Middle East, Asia has therefore remained an understudied component
of British intelligence history, which this thesis has accordingly sought to address.
Asia also presented a specific opportunity to address these empirical lacunae through
challenging conceptual boundaries. Conventional definitions of ‘intelligence’ as a term vary in how
they understand intelligence activities, actors, processes, and outcomes. Accordingly, the different
levels of analysis associated with interpretations of what intelligence is has resulted in varying
boundaries for intelligence definitions; some scholars adopt all-encompassing definitions of
intelligence that include ‘information’, whilst others rely upon narrower understandings that centre
themselves around one of intelligence’s core characteristics – that of secrecy. In an attempt to move
beyond conventional understandings, this thesis has sought to challenge this definitional dichotomy by
examining intelligence through the lens of a different actor: the diplomat-intelligence officer, whose
crossover role has been historically present between different institutions across British imperial
Corera, The Art of Betrayal: The Secret History of MI6; Bower, Red Web: MI6 and the KGB Master
Coup.
5 Busch, All the Way with JFK.
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history. Approaching the notion of ‘intelligence’ as something akin to a spectrum, rather than a
bounded or rigid concept, has enabled the exploration of intelligence not necessarily gathered through
clandestine methods. A thesis focused on the stationing of SIS officers in British diplomatic offices in
Hong Kong, Beijing, and Hanoi, regionally located in the Asian theatre, has therefore facilitated a
study of the nexus between covert and overt intelligence collection.
With these issues in mind, the central research questions for this thesis were therefore
formulated as:
• What kinds of intelligence were the British able to gather in Asia during the Cold War, and
how was this achieved?
• What was the significance of this intelligence?
• How did it relate to the ‘Special Relationship’ between the UK and the US?
• How does this change our understanding of what intelligence is?
The three case studies presented in this thesis – Hong Kong, Beijing, and Hanoi - have
therefore been chosen because they directly address these questions, linking Britain’s imperial legacy
with intelligence collection abroad. In doing so, they have produced a contribution to knowledge that
uncovers a fresh dimension of the British SIS’s history, as well as, to a lesser extent, British signals
intelligence collection in Asia during the Cold War. Dissecting this contribution along thematic lines,
it can be broken down into three main areas: intelligence collection; the dual identity diplomat-
intelligence officer; and British intelligence with regard to the Anglo-American Special Relationship.
Alongside this, it has also shed some light on the importance of embassies as remarkable sites of low
level contestations during the Cold war.
Firstly, British officers were able to gather both human intelligence and signals intelligence
from their respective posts across Asia. Drawing upon the notion of intelligence as a ‘spectrum’, the
British were able to collect a range of overt and covert intelligence; demonstrating the diversity of
material they had access to between the different posts examined, the former ranged from open source
230
publications, and interactions with both the native and expatriate elites in the capital cities, to socio-
political and economic observations informed by short travels into other parts of China by the British
staff. The latter included human intelligence derived from agent running in Hong Kong, to signals
intelligence gathering from the British officers in both Hong Kong and Beijing. Furthermore, the very
content of the intelligence gathered was reflective of changing intelligence requirements in Britain;
reporting and intelligence material harvested on the Sino-Soviet rivalry, atomic weapon development,
and the inner workings and dynamics of host country governments (particularly Beijing), pointed to
the growing significance of China as a Cold War intelligence target.
Secondly, the means by which the intelligence was collected underscores the importance of
challenging conventional understandings and boundaries that have dominated the debate over of how
intelligence is defined. Across all three posts in Asia, SIS officers were stationed in diplomatic
positions, affording them a crossover role that brought together the advantages of both traditional
intelligence and diplomatic skills. In addition to political reporting from diplomatic circles that these
officers had access to, their astute observational skills and ability to capture detail – particularly of a
military nature – allowed them to operate effectively from within severely constrained security
environments. In addition to making sense of the complex, chaotic intelligence landscapes in both
Hong Kong and Beijing, the intelligence background of these officers enabled them to navigate the
societies amongst which they operated. It also enabled them to endure the general air of ‘spy phobia’
that seemed to captivate local audiences in the 1960, typifying the aversion to Western officials
operating abroad during especially intense episodes of the Cold War. Remarkably, some of the most
valued reporting was the local observance of the everyday life in these secret towns, albeit carefully
interpreted through the eyes of professional intelligence officers who, akin to Sherlock Homes, would
often make important deductions about the state of those societies from small, but significant details.
Furthermore, these dual identity roles enabled such officers to circumvent the rather
uncompromising restrictions placed upon the British diplomatic premises, most notably when it came
to communications channels. In many ways, 1967 was a year of crisis for the British in Asia; across
all three stations, the British had to endure riots in Hong Kong, the ransacking of the embassy in
Beijing, and the loss of cypher channels in Hanoi. Although the intelligence identity of the officers
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posed a significant risk during such volatile periods, it was also a useful resource. Their ability to rely
upon diplomatic allies and premises to communicate with London turned out to be a vital instrument
in maintaining channels that doubled as avenues for political reporting and intelligence dissemination,
without overly raising suspicions. Therefore, by challenging conceptual boundaries, the blurring of
boundaries between diplomat and intelligence officer has thus allowed for the discovery of a new
dimension of British history that moves away from the more traditional focus upon clandestine
collection methods and covert action. In some ways this is also an old dimension, for in the nineteenth
century, before professionalization, intelligence was a space inhabited by the amateur adventurer, the
archaeologist, and the butterfly collector.6
Thirdly, the intelligence that the British were able to collect in Asia held significant
ramifications for Britain’s broader standing in a period of perceived weakness. Since the onset of the
Cold War, the British Empire had been a steady state of decline; wounded by imperial overstretch,
declining economic power, and waning diplomatic influence upon the emerging superpowers from the
Second World War, not to mention its own self-belief, Britain’s standing diminished on the
international stage. As Britain fought to contain zealous nationalist insurgencies across the 1950s and
1960s, it ceded substantial influence through the gradual loss of its imperial territories, including
India, Kenya, and Ceylon, to name but a few. The reverberations were significant for Britain’s foreign
policy conduct in the Asian theatre; the constraints imposed upon Britain’s power shaped a much
more conciliatory approach to international relations, in which it maintained relationships – and
importantly, a physical diplomatic presence – in countries considered somewhat adversarial, such as
China. Contrasting with the more aggressive stance pursued by the United States in Vietnam, Korea,
and territories outside of the Asian sphere, such as Suez and Grenada, Britain’s shift in foreign policy
damage relations with its greatest ally, engendering a firmly-rooted ‘diplomatic divergence’ between
the two. Seen from the major world capitals, Britain was largely considered to have reduced down to
being the junior partner in the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’.
6 Satyia, Spies of Arabia, pp. 12-34.
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However, the intelligence Britain gathered from Asia proved to be, in several respects, a
counterbalance to its declining international standing. As the likes of Aldrich and Dumbrell have
argued, military and intelligence linkages often held a greater resilience than those of diplomatic ties
between the two countries. This was especially important considering the significant intelligence
problems that the United States faced; on the one hand, the US’s intent focus during the Cold War
upon the Soviet Union and Communism had resulted in it giving ‘far less attention to the rest of the
world’.7 On the other hand, as a consequence of its own, uncompromising approach to foreign policy
into the 1960s, the US found itself lacking diplomatic representation in core target countries such as
China, and Vietnam. Aside from technical means, by the early 1960s, the American intelligence
community was virtually blind in cities such as Beijing and Hanoi – locations in which the British had
SIS officers stationed. Similarly, in Hong Kong, clashing with the British Governor, the United States
encountered significant difficulties waging covert operations and human intelligence collection in the
British colony, resulting in the loss of important networks and personnel it had sought to develop as
an inroad into China. There were limits to America’s presence within this important British
watchtower.
The intelligence gathered in Asia afforded Britain a gravitas that resonated within the
decision-making elite in the US. No other country outside the Communist Bloc operated a global
intelligence network, and the United States valued not only exchanging raw data, but also this wider
analysis. Britain’s intelligence gave the Americans alternative perspectives on the politics of hostile
regimes, military intelligence on adversary planning that informed targets for air strikes, the degree of
damage inflicted upon societal fabrics though degradation of economies and morale, and insight into
political rivalries on both an internal and external level. Intelligence collected by the dual diplomat-
intelligence officer therefore resulted in granular detail from within hostile territories that were fed to
senior levels of leadership in the US defence and intelligence community, including, in some
instances, the American President himself. At a strategic level, this was illustrative of the impact and
influence intelligence is able to have upon foreign policy; the British intelligence bridged a gap at a
7 Loch K. Johnson, ‘Introduction’, in Loch K. Johnson (eds.), Handbook of Intelligence Studies,
(Abingdon, 2007), pp. 8-9.
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time of the diverging foreign policies between the two allies, soothing ‘transatlantic antagonism’,
mistrust, and even resentment by American officials at Britain’s inability to exert a stronger hand
internationally or contribute military force, typically in the context of Vietnam. As global decline in
the 1960s eroded Britain’s capacity as a reliable military partner, Britain’s response had been to
construct a new myth: one in which a revised relationship with the Americans based increasingly on
intelligence and special forces which would ‘preserve the illusion of imperial power’.8 Intelligence
offered a softer means of influencing the relationship, providing what the US could not acquire by its
own means, and by extension, also addressing Britain’s own shortcomings. It can therefore be seen
that Britain’s intelligence machinery in Asia contributed to reducing the asymmetry of the Special
Relationship.
But what of the dual identity diplomat-intelligence officer? To what extent does this allow us
to challenge the manner in which intelligence can be understood more broadly? The answer is perhaps
to be found elsewhere in Britain’s global intelligence network. In the Asian sphere, there was clearly a
tenable link between Britain’s residual empire and its intelligence collection outposts from diplomatic
officers. This was particularly so in areas in which the Americans were not politically able to operate;
in comparison to peripheral location such as Taiwan, which the US stalwartly recognised until 1975,
direct British outposts in Beijing and Hong Kong held greater value – what should be understood as
the intelligence value of ‘diplomatic divergence’. However, similar situations prevailed in British
diplomatic premises across the world during the Cold War. SIS officers were stationed in countries
such as Havana and Luanda – again, places in which the US lacked a presence – illustrating the
richness of depth Britain had across its intelligence network. Extended to more recent decades, SIS
officers also operated from significantly higher-risk locations where there were no Americans,
including Teheran and Pyongyang, exponentially increasing the worth of their reporting from such
‘enemy’ territories.
Alongside human agents, there is the more opaque issue of signals intelligence. Britain’s
global intelligence network was not confined to human intelligence; signals intercepts and
8 Jeffreys-Jones, In Spies We Trust, pp. 128-129.
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communications monitoring comprised the other core component to Britain’s collection capability. As
previously discussed, the Diplomatic Wireless Service (DWS) took on a secondary role of acting as a
secret monitoring service that operated from within British Embassies and High Commissions –
essentially, its staff were ‘forward operators’ for GCHQ.9 This practice encompassed more than the
DWS. During the 1980s, the British embassies in Moscow, Nairobi, Pretoria, and Lilongwe were
utilised for signals monitoring. In Asia as has been seen, both Beijing and Ulan Bator were part of this
network.10 The likelihood also existed that the missions in Accra, Budapest, Cairo, Freetown, Prague,
and Warsaw, took on similar functions,11 in which British intelligence officers operated from the
overlap between their diplomatic communications, speech security and signals intelligence roles.
Easter argues that GCHQ likely used some of these sites during the 1960s, and his reasoning is
historically rooted; it has been claimed that as far back as the 1950s, ‘approximately fifteen British
embassies had a permanent GCHQ presence’, though this had supposedly been reduced down to four
by the 1980s.12 This raises interesting avenues as to further research of this ‘dual identity’. Tracing the
path of both British intelligence officers to acquire the intelligence, and the path the raw intelligence
took before reaching its transatlantic consumers was merely one means of approaching this aspect of
British intelligence history. However, it is clear that with the tantalising evidence pointing to a hidden
signals intelligence story of field activity in embassies, there is another relatively untouched area of
British intelligence history; the future release of archival files that are currently still classified,
contains the potential for further chapters to be unearthed in both SIS and GCHQ’s not-so-distant past.
Moreover, moving beyond a reliance upon official written documents will ‘rescue from oblivion the
gaps in knowledge’ on both institutions, pushing intelligence historians towards a more reflexive
9 Aldrich, GCHQ, p. 57; p. 192.
10 Jeffery Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UK-
USA Countries: the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand, (Boston, 1985), pp. 335-6.
11 Ibid. See also - David Easter, ‘GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s’, Intelligence and
National Security, 23:5 (2008), p. 685 - former GCHQ employee Jock Kane claims that GCHQ
secretly gathering signals intelligence from the British embassy in South Yemen after in gained
independence in 1967, stating that ‘two GCHQ operators were sent to the embassy under the cover of
working for the Diplomatic Wireless Service’.
12 Easter, ‘GCHQ and British External Policy in the 1960s’, p. 685.
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approach to their sources.13 The notion of the ‘dual identity’ therefore has the potential to find greater
utility in future research, but also to be challenged in the context of more ambitious case studies –
Asia has been but one element in demonstrating its utility to the broader field.
13 Moran, ‘Coming to Clarity’, p. 46.
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